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CONSTRUCTIVE RHETORIC

BY

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TO MY FATHER
EDWARD EVERETT HALE

HE LEARNED MUCH, HE HAS OFTEN SAID, FROM HIS RHETORICAL
WORK IN COLLEGE, AND HE OWED MUCH TO EDWARD CHAN-
NING, WHO USED TO READ HIS COLLEGE ESSAYS. TO NO
ONE MORE HEARTILY SYMPATHETIC COULD I DEDICATE
THIS EFFORT TO HELP EVEN BY A LITTLE THE
RHETORICAL WORK AND THE ESSAY-
WRITING OF THE COLLEGE
MEN OF TO-DAY

PREFACE.

Now that I finally see this book in the delicate sarcasm of print, my desire is strong to call especial attention to its excellencies, and to point out the reasons for its defects. But I suppose no preface ever really served to make a book understood, if the meaning did not otherwise insist upon itself. One thing only of the sort is worth mentioning, namely, the neglect of various matters which are from other points of view important. Both in the material of the book and in the way it is written much is lacking, much remains unsaid. In most cases, however, I have considered the value of what will not be found, and have resolved to sacrifice it, thinking that so I could better accomplish the main purpose of the book. One might as well acknowledge frankly that the whole art of writing cannot be got into one moderate volume.

A matter of more importance is to acknowledge with gratitude the help I have had in the recent text-books of Scott and Denney, and Newcomer. Coming upon them at the time that I was arranging the class-work which is here systematized, I have no doubt that I have borrowed more of their ideas than is anywhere formally acknowledged. The main points of the book were settled without reference to them, but I found in *Paragraph-Writing* and *English Composition* so much that was suggestive, that I am sure

that my debt to them is large. In Fletcher and Carpenter's *Theme-Writing* also I found much that was suggestive. I hope the authors will regard my imitation as the sincerest flattery. Otherwise I believe that I have made acknowledgment of my borrowings in each separate place. But there are so many good writers on Rhetoric that I am constantly finding out that I have been anticipated where I least expected it.

TO TEACHERS.

“WHY talk of goodness when you can be good?” is an excellent aphorism; and one may be tempted to say of this *Constructive Rhetoric*, “Why talk of writing if you can get men to write?” Teachers of Rhetoric whose work is largely constructive may think it ridiculous to spend so many words as are here set down in telling men how to write, when the main thing is the actual writing; and certainly a book on Constructive Rhetoric might be much shorter than this one, if it confined itself to suggesting and outlining exercises. But besides the writing itself, indeed making the writing itself easier and better, there is another important matter, and that is the standpoint. The aim of this book is not only to offer a system of practice which should go along in a practical and productive order. It aims to put the whole matter in the right light. One’s writing is a good deal helped by much thinking over these things. I have tried here to set down or suggest enough to give basis for class-room talk and discussion which will prove fruitful. A part of each exercise may be given to a discussion of the text and the remainder to the writing or correction of exercises and essays.

For it must be remarked (according to the note on page 4) that the system of Rhetoric presented in this book will be found quite barren if it be not accompanied, step by step, by written exercises. As many exercises as possible should be written—one for every recitation period if practicable, but at least one a week. Some of them should be written in the class-room. Give out a subject beforehand,

so that the student may think it over a little, and then give fifteen minutes in which to write a theme of two hundred words or thereabouts.

The exercises are meant to give practical illustration of the points discussed, but they have a farther use. The subject of Sentence-structure is not one which can well be presented from a constructive point of view. On the other hand it can be well taught by much correction of written exercises. It is expected, therefore, that in the correction of the exercises in Parts One and Two especial attention will be paid to the structure of the sentence. If this be done the student will be ready to get the good out of Part Five.

One point further, in regard to the correction of the exercises. The teacher should bear in mind that the object of such corrections is not to give the student a perfectly correct style, but rather to give him the ability to do his correcting for himself. When he comes to work of his own, whatever it may be, that calls for written expression, he will have no one at hand to correct it. The work in college, then, should aim not so much to give him a perfectly correct style, as to give him the instinct for self-correction and improvement. Any one who has got so much can look out for himself, and on looking out will find everywhere means for correcting and improving what he has written, so that it becomes in a measure his own.

After Parts One and Two there are fewer exercises, and what there are do not offer practice in writing. It would be as well, therefore, while the student goes over the latter part of the book and does the exercises there provided, for him also to continue the exercises of Parts One and Two, especially those in 9, 16, 27, 40, 41, 42, at the rate of, perhaps, one a fortnight. It is only in some such way that the ideas of the book can be converted into the unconscious skill and dexterity which marks the good writer.

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CONSTRUCTIVE RHETORIC.

INTRODUCTION.

1. Rhetoric as a Science and Rhetoric as an Art.

Before we begin our actual work, it will be useful to have a clear idea of what we expect to accomplish. We are to deal with Rhetoric. The word Rhetoric, however, has a somewhat vague meaning in many minds, and even those who have more exact ideas on the subject sometimes differ from each other.

I read, for example, of a certain book, that on such and such a foundation “the author piles a structure of magnificent logic, and makes it glow with all the fires of rhetoric.” Here the critic obviously felt that Rhetoric was a matter having no connection with the plain, ordinary disposition of one’s ideas in the most effective manner, that it was rather a something to be subsequently applied, a something glowing, blazing, fiery,—a sort of gilding, perhaps. And with an idea not so very different, Cardinal Newman said,¹ “These are not the words of rhetoric, gentlemen, but of history.” And just as the other writer felt that Rhetoric was merely something to be added to one’s writing as an outside ornament, so Newman, here, feels that Rhetoric is something opposed to actual fact, something fantastic, unreal, false. I need hardly say that it is not with any such idea in mind that I propose to you the study of Rhet-

¹ *Idea of a University*, p. 13. Although Newman understood the real art of Rhetoric better than most men.

oric. We shall not pursue the study with a view of gaining the power to ornament our writing with brilliant, glittering superficiality,—we will leave that kind of Rhetoric to any one who still cares for such exhibitions. Our desire at present is to learn to express ourselves in writing, and to express ourselves well, comprehending in that last word a great deal; and we take the term Rhetoric as a convenient name for the discipline which we undertake to that end.

But even in the more scholarly use of the word there has been some variation. Not to mention the views of the ancient rhetoricians, Dr. Campbell, for instance, defines Rhetoric as “the art or talent by which the discourse is adapted to its end.” On the other hand, Rhetoric has been treated¹ as “the science of the laws of effective discourse.” Not a few writers on the subject have defined it as an art and treated it as a science.

This is one great cause for the vagueness which some of you may feel in the matter. You are not quite clear in your minds whether Rhetoric be a Science or an Art. Now the difference between these two things is not hard to grasp. We use the two words glibly enough, and in general with a fair notion of their meaning. When we talk of Science, we think perhaps of the work of Darwin or Huxley, who were biologists; and when we talk of Art we may have in mind Velasquez or Rembrandt, who were painters. And Biology and Painting are very typical examples, one of a science and the other of an art. For Biology in itself implies merely knowledge; biological facts and theories may be applied to many useful ends, but in itself Biology is a system of knowledge. Now a system of knowledge is the very thing that a painter usually lacks; he can paint a picture, but he can rarely tell you just how he did it. He has systems of Perspective, Anatomy, Composition, perhaps; but with all these there is always much

¹ By D. J. Hill.

that is unexplainable in his work. Art, then, is not a matter of knowledge alone, nor even mainly of systematized knowledge. When we speak of Science and Art together, we mean that Science concerns itself about the knowing, without especial reference to anything being done; while Art concerns itself chiefly about doing, caring for knowledge, not for itself, but only in so far as is necessary to have the thing done well.

Bearing this distinction in mind, then, we can see that Rhetoric may, if we choose, be regarded as a Science. We may study good writing just as we study plants or animals or stones or anything else. But as far as the science is concerned, we go no farther. The botanist knows a good deal about plants, but he could never make one. Nor could the zoologist or geologist make an animal or a stone. In like manner he who regards Rhetoric as a science only, is not necessarily able to write well. Good writing interests him and he studies it; he does not pretend to be a writer himself. It is a frequent slur on critics that they are men who could not themselves attain eminence in the art for which they profess to lay down the law. But there is a weak point here: a man may reasonably enough know a great deal about a thing and never be able to make the thing he knows about. In other words, Science does not necessarily imply skillful doing; as Science, it concerns itself with knowledge alone.¹

I think, however, that we should agree that such a science is hardly our first aim in studying Rhetoric. We want to write. Everybody, nowadays, wants to be able to write easily and well. Effective discourse (that's a technical

¹ It does not follow that the scientist too may not have his own art. Wholly aside from the knowledge acquired, one may attain a very great skill in handling the materials. Even in mathematics, pure science as it is, there is the art of solving problems distinct from the knowledge of the problems solved. And every Scientist who is not content to rest upon what has been done for him by others must to some degree be skilled in the Art of Discovering Truth.

name for good writing) is prized everywhere, and by everybody. That is what we want. In other words, not so much the Science as the Art of Rhetoric.

If, then, we are to pursue the Art of Rhetoric, we shall probably do well to proceed according to the method of the other arts. And what is that method? Why, in a few words, it is a certain amount of principle and a great deal of practice. We shall find, if we think over the question, that some arts require more so-called *principle* than others. No one succeeds at the Art of Civil Engineering without a very thorough knowledge of several sciences. No one undertakes the Art of Sculpture without careful study and knowledge of the human figure. So is it with most of the Higher Arts. If we recognize such arts as the tonsorial art or the art of self-defence, we recognize also that one need not lay very much stress on the principles in question. In other words, we may say (with some exceptions) that the higher the art the more knowledge of the principle required. And what is this *principle*, as we have loosely called it, but a name for some branch of science?

The connection between Art and Science is well stated by Mill: "Now the imperative mood is the characteristic of art, as distinguished from science. Whatever speaks in rules and precepts, not in assertions, respecting matters of fact, is art." (*Logic*, bk. vi., eh. xiii., § 1.) "The reasons . . . of any rule of art can be no other than the theorems of the corresponding science." (*Ibid.*, § 2.)

In all the higher and finer arts we must have knowledge, and a good deal of it, as well as skill. In our own case we must have a good notion of the science of Rhetoric, if we would be really successful at the art. We shall, however, take a leaf out of the book of the other arts. They carry on the two things as nearly as may be together. So shall we.

NOTE.—It must be remarked that in the art of writing, as is the case with every other art worth acquiring, an immense amount of

practice is necessary if we would excel. The amount of practice given by any college course is small. If the exercises in this book are followed out conscientiously, the student will write perhaps 20,000 words. Any one who would acquire a good style, must write as much as that in a month, and so on every month for a good while. In other words, no college course will give much more, even in the way of practice, than an idea of how to proceed. A student of painting will work six or eight hours a day for four years, at the least. But of course writing comes more by nature, as Dogberry says.

2. The Critical and the Constructive Methods of Studying Rhetorie. Having taken our part, then, let us hold to it. We want to learn to write well. We see that this is not the chief aim of the study of Rhetorie as a Science. Such a Rhetorie will teach us to know good writing, but we want to write. We recognize that such a Rhetorie may be a valuable university discipline, that it may be an excellent means of culture, that it may very greatly increase our enjoyment of what is already written. But those things are not what we are now aiming at. Further, we recognize, too, that such a Rhetorie may be necessary to an acquirement of the art of writing well. In so far as it is necessary, then, we shall follow it; not for itself, however, but in so far only as it leads us to the attainment of our present purpose. And we have now to consider how far it is necessary; in other words, we must ask ourselves what method should we pursue to master our art.

If we consider the methods which are at present in favor, in most quarters, we shall see that they are largely critical in character. Different teachers of English composition pursue different methods, but the following types will represent most of those now in use. Few teachers follow one of these methods alone; they usually appear in differing combinations.

I. The study of Rhetorie as a Science: that is, the study of classified generalizations of the usage of good authors, and of whatever principles seem to obtain in the matter.

II. The study of the works of good authors and the imitation of them.

III. The correction of erroneous writing done by others.

IV. The writing of exercises to be corrected by an instructor and rewritten by the author.

Of all these you will observe that the basis is critical. If carefully followed such study and teaching should enable you to consider what you have written and to correct it. By constant correction and avoidance of error, your style should be gradually purged, it should become refined. The bad should disappear and you would replace it by the good. And if you ask how you are to get new and good modes of expression to replace the faulty methods which you reject, it may at once be said that such work is also to a certain degree constructive. We are very imitative in language. If we have more to do with good writing than with bad, our own writing will tend to better itself. But of all these methods the basis is critical. The constructive part is, on the whole, unconscious, or, at least, unsystematic.

Teachers of other arts are apt to lay more emphasis upon this constructive side. A singing-master is not content with criticising your wheezy head-notes, nor even with sending you to the concert or opera; he will tell you as nearly as he can how to produce good, strong chest-tones. A drawing-master will not content himself with correcting that crazy-looking face, nor does he merely tell you to go to the picture-gallery; he will make you practice drawing ears and eyes and noses from the cast before he lets you try to draw from nature at all. There is a certain analogy even with a teacher of gymnastics. He doesn't put you on the parallel bars and then tell you when you have fallen off. He gets up himself and shows you how to do something easy. He makes you do a great many stupid and uninteresting things before he encourages you to try the grape-vine.

If, then, we can increase the constructive element in our

method, we shall probably find it an improvement. There is certainly great advantage in having a good critic look over your work and say, "That's wrong." But it would be a saving if we didn't do things wrong more than was absolutely necessary. And indeed, to a good many students who sit down to the dreadful infliction of an essay, the question is not always, "How shall I do it right?" It is more apt to be, "How shall I do it at all?"

So the method that we want is one that must be as constructive as possible. We want a teacher who will teach us how to do it, rather than one who tells us always how not to do it. Well, we may want such a teacher, but of course the question is whether we can get one.

It must be confessed that we cannot get along entirely without critical work. The music-teacher, the painting-master, the gymnast, all have to do a great deal of correcting. Probably we shall not escape it. But there is some thing in understanding clearly what we want. We want such a method of learning to write good English as will build up rather than pull down. We want a teacher who will say, "Do it in just this way and you will have it pretty nearly right." If we can get as near as that we can put some heart into our work.¹

3. Matter and Manner. Our object is to increase, even, perhaps, to create, a power of effective expression. Of correct expression, of course, that goes without saying. So we must be critical. But our chief aim, our first thought, is to build up, to enlarge, to strengthen.

When we say "a power of effective expression," what we have in mind is the ability to write in such a way as to effect our purpose. The How to write is first in our minds. But, of course, we find out at once that the What is as important as the How. It is of little use being able to write well if we have nothing to say.

¹ Whoever has followed the most recent publishing in Rhetoric does not need to be told that the best text-books of the last few years are strongly constructive in tendency.

These two things, the What and the How, are commonly enough called Matter and Manner. Matter is the subject, what you write about, what you have to say, your material. Manner is the treatment, how you write, how you say what you have in mind. If you do well, we may say, your style.

The precise relation of these two things to each other offers the most difficult problem in the science of Rhetoric. It is a question which has never yet been adequately solved. Many very excellent things have been said or written about it, but never yet has any theory been propounded which will explain all the difficulties that come up. Still, we all feel, probably, that there is some connection between the two. We all feel that it would be folly to try to write without considering carefully the nature, the requirement, of our thoughts. And doubtless we all know by experience how painful it is to have good ideas and to be unable to find just the right form to express them in. Broadly, we can see certain proprieties. It would be foolish to write a business letter in a manner like that of Macaulay. It would be foolish to write an examination paper in a manner like that of Carlyle. We can see that there is some sort of connection between thought and expression. But to state definitely the precise nature of that connection would be—certainly at present—a bit beyond us.

To see clearly the difficulties in one's way is the first step toward overcoming them. So far in the world's history men have written excellently without knowing much about the connection between matter and manner. They have not known exactly what the connection might be, but they have generally recognized that there was some connection. Let us follow their example, since we can do no better.

In settling upon a method, then, we want to find one that will always recognize that what we say is in some way connected with the way we shall say it. We want a method that will forget neither matter nor manner. We want a method which shall encourage and develop and enlarge our power of thought along with our power of style.

4. Plan of Attack. Now suppose you ask yourself, What is the first thing I need help about? What will be your answer? Is the thing you need most Words? Probably not: you have enough for practical purposes. You may find out in time that your vocabulary is limited, but I do not believe that that idea comes to one very early in the business. Is the thing you want an idea of how to construct a Sentence? Not if you have been well trained in English grammar. You may not write the best kind of sentences, but some sort of sentence you can write so as to give a good notion of your meaning. Do you want to know how to Paragraph correctly? The importance of paragraph structure is very great, but one is not apt to realize it at first. Do you want Figures of Speech? If I am not mistaken you would be glad to consign all figures of speech to any distressing limbo that may come to mind—synecdoche, paralipsis, metaphor, prosopopeia, metonymy—the whole tribe of them.

I may be wrong, but it seems to me,—in the light of my own experience of twenty years ago and of this very afternoon,—it seems to me that the first thing, the greatest difficulty on beginning, is, How to get the ideas in order. How shall I get just the right things to say? Read and study, observe and think. Get all ready to write, and that's the first problem, it seems to me. Not words at first, not sentences, nor paragraphs, nor even figures of speech. We don't think first of clearness or simplicity or ease, or any of those things that are treated of in the book. We want to pick out just what to say and to get our ideas in right order to put on paper. If, here, we have not some little skill or some little help, out come the ideas, bad and good together, all in confusion, and the result is depressing.

Whether this be your first need or not, you will see that there is some sense in beginning here. We have the art of Rhetoric in view, not the science; we may therefore dis-

pense with a logically methodical analysis. We want to be constructive in our methods rather than critical; we are compelled to be constructive here. We want to consider thought as well as style; this is just the place to consider thought, for at present there is nothing else to consider.

The answer to the question, How shall I get together and arrange what I am going to say? goes, in books on Rhetoric, by the name of Kinds of Composition.

A good study of this matter will do something to make us feel at home with our material. If we have to write an account of the last football match for the college paper, the principles of Narration¹ will be of use. If we have to write a paper on some curious fossil discovered in the last geological excursion, Description¹ is what we want. If we are to answer an examination question, say, "What is meant by the Association of Ideas?" we shall do better if we know something of Exposition.¹ If we are noting down points for the debate on the subject, "Resolved, That Recent Events have shown it advisable to extend the Suffrage to Women," it will be well to know something of Argument.¹ Whatever it be, we may for the moment dismiss consideration of Diction, Sentence, and Paragraph. What we want to know is how to arrange our ideas for presentation, and to get what help we can in choosing out the ideas to arrange.

Only for a time, however, shall we be able to neglect these other matters, which at first appear merely technical, wholly confined to the very writing itself. Even before we put pen to paper, we shall probably see our ideas arranging themselves into groups, crystallizing, as it were. We shall see that there is a closer connection between this particular two than between either one and the rest. Now if we inspect those two thoughts sticking together,—or there may be more; there may be half a dozen,—if we look hard

¹ See pp. 24, 43, 83, 321, respectively.

at them as they group themselves together and refuse to be drawn apart, we shall see that they are in fact little less than Paragraphs. And practically you might as well arrange your paragraph-structure before you write the words down, for if your ideas be rightly arranged the paragraphs are there, and you will make it easier for the reader if you indicate it in the conventional way. It will be easier for you, too, as you will find; but this is a later matter. So right after the study of Kinds of Composition comes the study of the Paragraph.

When we once begin with a good, clean piece of paper, our subject being carefully thought out and arranged and all ready to be set right down, there may be some doubt as to what counsel is most necessary. The thing is to clothe flesh and blood upon the bare skeleton, to give fullness and substance to the mere topics or headings of the outline. Of course much suggests itself at once to every one, but it will be useful to have some notion as to the different modes of presentation that have been common, and some of the different things that one must have in mind in following them out, all of which matters may conveniently be included under the head of the paragraph.

Probably no one does much of any writing without becoming aware that he has rather a limited vocabulary. We think of Shakespeare and his traditional fifteen thousand words. How excellent it would be to have so many. As a rule, most people are well content to look over what they have written, and, when they see a word that seems not quite right, they cross it out and put another one in its place. But it would be better to have the right word from the first. Then, as a rule, one has some difficulty, where a word seems evidently wrong, to think up precisely the right one. It would be a great gain if one had always at hand some half a dozen words to choose from. Now our method is constructive; it aims to enlarge and increase the power of expression: if there is any way to enlarge and

increase the vocabulary, that will be an important part of our work. We shall find, too, that this part of our study is not so disconnected with the nature of our thoughts as it seemed at first. Not with the main blocking out of the subject, perhaps, or with the arrangement of parts. But the exactness of meaning that ought to follow our effort, the nice discriminations, the thinking precisely instead of being satisfied with a blurred and confused impression—these things have a good deal of connection with our ways of thinking, as with particular ideas. So we cannot wait much longer without working for a good vocabulary.

Then there are the matters of Sentence-structure and Figures of Speech. Probably your first idea would be, "Couldn't we leave those out until they are absolutely necessary?" We shall find some knowledge of these matters and some intelligent command over them very useful in course of time; at present, perhaps, we need not point out their particular place, nor go into any further detail as to the minor topics which will call for attention some time or other. We may be satisfied with having given a disposition to the more important matters which we must deal with, and may now proceed at once with a discussion of the different Kinds of Composition, and with such practice as shall suggest itself.

PART ONE.

KINDS OF COMPOSITION.

5. The Four Kinds of Composition. Rhetoricians generally note at least four Kinds of Composition: Narration, Description, Exposition, and Argumentation. Disregarding exactness for the moment, we may say, in the way of rough definition, that Narration details a sequence of events, Description gives the impression of some particular thing, Exposition explains a general idea, and Argumentation shows the truth of a proposition. These distinctions are founded upon the different kinds of subject that are likely to come to our attention; for this seems to be the most sensible basis to take while we are merely studying how to consider our subject, how to find out the best things to say of it, how to get the good out of it, and, in some degree, how to put in general order what material we can collect. We can always tell what kind of subject we are thinking about, and, if we can say "With such and such a subject proceed by Description," or whatever be the proper kind of composition, it will be a convenient way of beginning. The definitions given above include propositions, and terms both general and particular: whatever we are thinking of will come under one head or another. Terms, or names, are either particular or general according as they are the names for particular things or general ideas. Now if our subject be some particular thing which we view as a series of events, we call the mode of treatment Narration; if it be a particular thing which we are not so viewing, we treat it

by Description. If we are considering and explaining a general idea, we call it Exposition; and if we are proving a proposition, we call it Argumentation. There are all kinds of Narration, of course—good, bad, and very bad; we call any sort of writing which considers a particular thing as a series of events Narration, and our treatment of the topic will point out some of the matters one should have an eye to in writing on such a subject. So with the other kinds of composition: the nature of the topic determines the treatment.

It will appear later that the same topic may, apparently, be treated by different kinds of composition, according to our desire. Thus a class-meeting, let us say, might be handled by Narration or Description. But the exception is not a real one. If we say, "The meeting was well attended, enthusiastic, jovial," and go on to enlarge and amplify those characteristics, it is doubtless a Description. But then we are not regarding the subject in the character of a succession of events. On the other hand, we might say, "The meeting began promptly at 3 p.m., with last year's president in the chair. We at once proceeded to ballot, etc. While the ballots were being counted we whiled away the time by singing, etc." That is not a Description, but a Narration, for we are considering the meeting strictly as a succession of events.¹ Or it may seem that we can consider a proposition either by Exposition or by Argument. We may either explain its meaning or prove its truth. But if we look closely into the matter we shall see that if we treat a proposition by Exposition, we are really treating it as if it were a general term. Thus, suppose we take the statement, The nations of Europe have benefited to an incalculable degree by Christianity. The point might be argued pro or con. But we might also assume the truth of the statement, as everybody would, and then

¹ This point is handled a little more at large in **16, d.**

enlarge and amplify it, so that the full meaning put up in those few words shall become more apparent. This might be done with this proposition or with almost any other; but where we do it we cease to regard the proposition as such: we regard it as, in this case, a general term, i.e., Incalculable benefits of Christianity to the nations of Europe. That is a general term, rather more complicated than the general term Benefit, but a general term all the same, and as such to be handled by Exposition.¹ So it may seem that some successions of events would be treated by Exposition, but that is only when such successions constitute a general idea, as for instance Typhoid Fever, of which the exposition states the course of the disease. Or we may find something that is obviously enough an exposition and yet seems to have a particular thing for its subject, as when a zoologist describes some bird or beast which he has discovered, which makes a new species perhaps. (23.) There are cases where it may seem that our definitions are incorrect, and yet if one examines each case carefully, it will probably appear that there is sufficient reason in them to give real help in writing on the subject in question. Our present object is to know how to handle the topics that may come before us. Therefore, according to the nature of the topic do we call the mode of treatment Narration or whatever else. Doubtless the names have not, as a rule, any so precise meaning; but it will be convenient for our purposes to write Narration instead of "the best way to write about some particular thing viewed as a succession of events"; Description, instead of "the best way to write about some particular thing not so viewed"; and so on with the other kinds of composition. One can always accept definitions, even when not the best, so far as any particular treatment is concerned.²

¹ This point is handled a little more at large in 24.

² Opinion is not definitely settled as to just what are the characteristics of the various Kinds of Composition.

Some writers mention Persuasion as a kind of composition. But if we base our division on the nature of the subject-matter Persuasion need not be mentioned, for it does not deal with any particular subject-matter, nor does it follow any particular method. It is characterized definitely by its aim; it is an effort to persuade. It does not appear that Persuasion is merely the persuading a reader or hearer of the truth of a proposition. It would rather seem to be the recommending to his interest of anything, whether an event, a person, an idea, or a truth. The division which includes Persuasion with the first four kinds of composition is not made according to any fixed principle, and the species are therefore not mutually exclusive, as the phrase is. In the division of characters in Sir Charles Grandison into Men, Women, and Italians, Richardson gives a good example of a division not mutually exclusive, the last division belonging partly to the first division, partly to the second. The same thing may be said of Persuasion; it is included in the other divisions. A persuasive discourse must be either narration, description, exposition, or argument. Its persuasive character is determined by characteristics wholly different from those which would mark it as narrative, for instance, or descriptive. We may look in the same way at some other Kinds of Composition sometimes mentioned, as Criticism, Letter-writing, and so on. They are divisions made on a basis different from that of our present division, and so need not be considered just now. We will, therefore, hold to the division into four kinds of composition, and endeavor to determine the nature of each kind and its appropriate method. The present part will treat of the first three kinds only; the study of Argument may conveniently be delayed for a while.

EXERCISES.

Of each of the topics below, consider whether it is a particular term, a general term, or a proposition. Then think whether it will be best to treat it as it stands, or whether it will be more sensible to

throw it into a different form. By what kind of composition should each be treated ?

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. Autumn Weather. | 15. Should the Racing of Ocean
Steamers be prohibited by
Law? |
| 2. The Presidential Election of
1876. | 16. The Oratory of Burke. |
| 3. The Ocean Greyhound. | 17. A University should permit
perfect freedom of teach-
ing to its Professors. |
| 4. Ichabod Crane's Ride. | 18. The Eloquence of Revolu-
tary Periods. |
| 5. The Typical American. | 19. The Earlier Life of Gold-
smith. |
| 6. Protection [or Free Trade]
must be a Benefit to any
Nation. | 20. Joseph White was murdered
by John Francis Knapp. |
| 7. The Necessity of an Educa-
tion. | 21. Our Debt to Shakespeare. |
| 8. Faneuil Hall. | 22. The Decline and Fall of the
Roman Empire. |
| 9. Adams and Jefferson. | 23. The invention of the Steam-
engine has revolutionized
Commerce and Manufac-
ture. |
| 10. Braddock's Defeat. | 24. The Prejudices of Dr. John-
son. |
| 11. Ethan Allen at Ticonde-
roga. | 25. The Decay of Political Hon-
esty in Republics. |
| 12. A Midsummer Ramble. | |
| 13. More and more attention is
coming to be paid to the
Study of Modern Lan-
guages. | |
| 14. John Bull. | |

I. NARRATION.

6. General Definition. You will hardly require any more formal or exact definition of Narration. I have already spoken of it as the account of some particular thing which not only can be, but is, regarded as a succession of events. You have, then, already a notion of what is meant by the term which you may render more definite and precise by the following considerations on the nature of Narration and its method.

A. THE NATURE OF NARRATION.

7. Narration and Description the Simpler Kinds of Com-

position. Perhaps one of the first remarks about Narration would be that it is a very easy and natural form of discourse; in fact, the most simple and easy. It has, indeed, been pointed out that Narration and Description are the two kinds of composition which occur first to the human mind,¹ whether we think of the growth of the individual or of the race. The comparison between children and savages has often been made, and it would seem that we have here a case in point. The telling about something that has been done or about some particular thing that one has seen,—these are certainly far more likely to be attempted by children or savages than the exposition of a general term or the proof of a proposition. The very conception of general ideas is not among the first stages of human consciousness, and Exposition deals entirely with general ideas, while Argumentation has much to do with them. Both indeed may concern particulars (23, 81), but they deal with particulars only on the basis of their relation to general ideas.

The point is, in itself, not a very important one, but it is well enough to have it in mind. It is for this reason, I suppose, that Narration and Description are held to be the easier modes of composition, and usually considered first. We may note further, indeed, that an order somewhat more logical than the one we are following would probably place Description before Narration. One must first know something of the nature of a particular thing before one knows what it does. Just so does Exposition precede Argument.

¹ Narration, I suppose, even before Description. Note, in the following letter by a young friend, the superiority of the narration to the description and the greater quantity of it :

MY DEAR JESSIE :

We got to New York yesterday. We spent one day in Chicago, the next at Niagara Falls. We saw the burning spring, etc. We are going to the flower-show to-day and to the horse-show next week. The Waldorf is a beautiful [*sic*]. I have a souvenir spoon for you.

* * *

Cf. also the books written by children, of which a characteristic example may be found in Ruskin's *Præterita*, ch. iii.

For our purpose, however, Narration comes first, because it is practically the easiest to make a beginning with, and because we shall understand Description the better by its aid. We are not sticking too closely to the scientific analysis, you will remember; we want to follow the method which will enable us to attain our art best. But, of course, we want to understand the scientific method as well, even if we do not follow it.

EXERCISES.

See exercises on p. 21.

8. Narration More Readily Expressed in Language than Description. Somewhat more important than our last consideration is the fact that Narration is a kind of composition more suited to the character of Language than Description. Or, to put it the other way, language is better adapted to the requirements of Narration than to those of Description. This has been understood well enough by most writers on the matter, but probably the classic treatment of the subject, the one best known, by name at least, is that in the *Laokoön* of Lessing. In this famous book Lessing considered the difference in character between Painting and Poetry. But as he said very little of Poetry which does not refer quite as well to Prose, we may consider his remarks to have been on expression by Language as opposed to expression by Painting or Sculpture.

The point is this: Narration has to deal with a sequence of events. Even a short incident consists of minor events which follow each other. One character of any subject for Narration is the Time-element. Now the Time-element is also characteristic of language; just as one event follows another, so does one word follow another, and one sentence, and so on. We can get near the succession of events by the succession of our words, our sentences, and our paragraphs. It is true that we cannot always strike an exact

concordance between events and words. "All these things happened in far shorter time than it has taken to tell of them"; we very often read something like that. We could not make an exact agreement if we wanted to, and of course we do not always want to, as when a story-teller passes over unimportant things with a word or two. But the important point is that in anything that may be narrated, as well as in language, the elements or parts follow in succession, to use an inaccurate form of expression, so that to some extent one may be substituted for the other.

The subject-matter of Description, on the other hand, is not conceived in terms of Time. It is frequently conceived in terms of Space; but in any event it deals, not with events which follow each other as words follow each other in language, but with characteristics which exist all at the same time. One ascends a mountain, for instance, by a series of efforts; by one step after another one obstacle is passed and another is encountered, one danger is escaped and another makes its appearance. One can tell of such things. "We started at sunrise; we walked rapidly through the pine forests; we passed over the glacier; we hewed our way up a steep incline of ice; we clambered up terrible crags. At last we reached the top." The ascent may have taken six hours, and here we have the account in six seconds: the relation of part to part is nearly right, although on so much smaller a scale. But once at the top, look at the view and try to describe it. Half a hundred things strike you at once; look but in one direction and a multitude of details will come to your mind in a flash. If you try to write them down, you will see in a minute that you can do nothing to convey the true character of that moment's impression. You can note down a number of facts that will be useful if you wish to make a map or a picture, but as to giving anybody more than the main impression of the view, that is well-nigh impossible. For language is so fleeting. Long before you have told

me half the things you have seen, my mind has lost the beginning, and shortly becomes so confused that it takes no impression at all. You yourself actually saw a number of details at one moment. But if you want to represent the details, there is a better medium than language. The development of this idea is of more importance in the treatment of Description than it is just here, so we will follow it no further at present.

9. EXERCISES.

These two characteristics of Narration, that it is the more natural kind of composition and more adapted to expression in language, would perhaps tend to make one feel that it was a fairly easy business. Perhaps it is easier than the other kinds of composition; at least, its most obvious problems are easier of solution. But it must be confessed that the difficulties in the way of good Narration are quite considerable. This may be because they are difficulties of practice rather than of theory. Narration is easy enough, but good narration is comparatively uncommon. Just think how the average man ruins and mangles a good story in the telling. The difficulties in the way come out generally even in trying to tell some very simple thing.

It is well at first to do as many short exercises in Narration as time will allow. They should be about two or three hundred words long, and may be written either in the class-room or not. As to the correction of them, see p. viii: the purpose is to bring out the ideas of 7-12. My own practice is to give out first the subject, *An Incident*, asking the class to select each some everyday experience or something they have lately heard of, and to give an account of it. I ask them to prefix some title of their own, as for instance:

The Colt in the Well.
A Good Samaritan.
An Undramatic Ending.
A Latter day Brutus.

The War of the Roses : An Arkansas Episode.
Thirty-nine Christmas Days.
A Cowboy Surprise-party.

The following are examples of titles which should, for one reason or another, be avoided:

An Accident.	How I got it on the Head.
(Conveys no idea.)	(Too colloquial.)
Four were Hurt.	On Gay Midway.
(Brutal.)	(The rhyme sounds ill.)
Learning to Ride a Bicycle.	A Startling Situation.
(Commonplace.)	(Tritely sensational.) *

The thinking up some particular example of a general topic like *An Incident* is good practice. But in order to show the general character of such exercises the following suggestions may be useful: one or another may probably be adapted to any one's experience or imagination. Some of them, toward the end, are more suggestions for titles than anything else.

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. A Skating Adventure. | 14. The Beginning of the Snow Blockade. |
| 2. A Broken Bicycle. | 15. A Twenty-mile Ride for the Doctor. |
| 3. An Experience with a Tramp. | 16. Waiting for the Morning. |
| 4. An Evening with the Barn-stormers. | 17. The Last Iceboating of the Winter. |
| 5. Getting through the Locks. | 18. An Early Morning's Fishing. |
| 6. Bargaining for a Supper. | 19. My Last Call at the Dentist's. |
| 7. The Only Time I ever Pawned my Watch. | 20. The Critical Innings. |
| 8. An Excitement on a Cable Car. | 21. Getting through the Rapids. |
| 9. The Class Rush. | 22. A Lame Man who wasn't Lame. |
| 10. A Counterfeit Quarter. | 23. The Early Worm Caught the Fish. |
| 11. My First Interview with the President. | 24. An All-night Grind for Examination. |
| 12. Waiting for the Train. | 25. Looking for Cover in the Hailstorm. |
| 13. The First Snowstorm this Year. | |

B. THE METHOD OF NARRATION.

I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES AS APPLIED TO NARRATION.

10. Rhetorical Principles. You are all of you, probably, aware of certain rhetorical principles or rules or canons—they go by various names in various books—such as those of Unity, Selection, Sequence, and the like. Now these principles, though they may seem at first thought to be somewhat technical or pedantic, are really nothing of the sort. They are practically certain principles of common sense applied to the art of writing. They are of very broad application; it is not a paragraph only that may be considered with a view to Unity, Selection, and the rest; not a paragraph only, nor a sentence only. They are in fact not really rules of rhetoric more than of anything else. They are applicable to many other things in this world, as you will see as soon as you begin to consider them.

The Canon of Unity is to the effect that of the many things which might be said, only those should be said which pertain especially to the matter in hand. This, in common language, is, “Attend to business.”

The Canon of Selection is that out of those things that have some connection with the subject only those should be said which bring out most strongly your idea. In other words, “Don’t try to put a square peg into a round hole.”

The Canon of Sequence states the necessity of observing the right order of details or statements. That is to say, “Put the horse before the cart.”

The Canon of Proportion is that important things should be brought out strongly by the mode of composition, while unimportant things should remain, as it were, in the background. Or, “Don’t make mountains out of molehills,” or *vice versa*.

The Canon of Variety is to the effect that any particular habit of style becomes tiresome if repeated too constantly, short sentences, for instance, any one kind of figure, any

form of paragraph-structure. That is, "There may be too much even of a good thing."

To tell the truth, these Canons of Rhetoric have not much more to do with Rhetoric than with anything else. The reason why they are put into treatises on the subject is that people are apt to have a curious idea about Rhetoric (as about some other matters), namely, that it is well enough to leave behind the cautions of common sense when you embark upon it. It almost seems as if it were the theory that Rhetoric, which for us at least is no more than the art of writing well, is relieved of the usual pressure of common sense in favor of strange ideals of its own, which no one but a Rhetorician (a species of harmlessly insane person) can appreciate. That is one reason why we put these rules into our books on Rhetoric, but another is that their bearing is not in all cases obvious. So far a word as to their application here.

Let us begin with an object lesson. I have here the account of a college football game. I saw the game myself, and in the course of the evening saw the college paper which told about it. With great enterprise, the editors had got out their paper within an hour or so of the ending of the game, which explains the nature of their account of it. It was of course written hastily, and indeed the account of the second half was nothing more than what could be jotted down from moment to moment as the game progressed. You have only two extracts, but they are perfectly fair samples, although I have changed the names.

"Ridgefield got the ball on downs, but lost it immediately.

"Jervis gained 25 yards on a good run. A line smash gained 5 yards. A centre play won 57—then 5 yards more. We rapidly traveled toward the west goal, but lost on downs.

"The run tackled Ridgefield poorly and dragged a man 3 yards the wrong way.

" Ridgefield played right end with a 2-yard gain and then left and lost the ball, but got it again after a line smash.

" Left-end play, gained nothing, but around the other end brought in 20 yards for Ridgefield. They tumbled and Hardy took the pigskin across the field for a touchdown. Garnsey missed goal. [Score 4 to 0.]

" The ball was put into play with a gain of 30 yards for Ridgefield.

" Lakewood kicked from line with a gain of 20 yards, etc."

" 10 yards of goal. Ridgefield gets ball and kicks to 40-yard line. Lakewood's ball. Right end five yards. Martin, line smash 2 yards. Martin, left end, 5 yards. East, line, one yard. Copley, 4 yards. Within 12 yards of goal line. Line tried again, no gain. Ridgefield punts to 30-yard line. Copley got ball. Left end, no gain. Centre, no gain. Line 2 yards. Ridgefield's ball. Line for 5 yards. Centre, no gain. Line 1 yard loss. Punt, with 30 yards. Lakewood's ball. Right end 2 yards. Left end 5 yards. Right end, no gain.

" Left end no gain. Garnsey left end but lost ball, and Martin got it for touchdown. Goal. Score 14 to 12."

Now of course we all recognize this as rather poor work. What possible end does it attain except the filling so much space? It does not give any idea of the game to those who did not see it, except as to the score and the way it was made up. Nor does it give any idea of the game to those who did see it. It happened that the game was a very exciting one; the two teams were evenly matched, and the wetness of the ground made many accidents. The touch-downs were made alternately, so that to the very last minute it was anybody's game. The two extracts quoted are descriptions of the two most exciting moments. The first was one of those exceptional long runs with a clear field, like that of Lamar in the Princeton-Yale game of 1889. The ball being well down the field and in the enemy's

hands, one of the ends sprang upon a fumble and started for the other goal unguarded, with the three backs after him. Any one who has seen such a run knows the kind of feeling it gives. And yet our reporter makes no special remark on the subject; he merely calls the ball "the pig-skin."

The second extract is of much the same character. The score was 12—8 in favor of Ridgefield, the time nearly up and Lakewood had pushed the ball within the twenty-five-yard line. The ground was very muddy. Finally Ridgefield got the ball on the twenty-five-yard line. There were three minutes more to play. Lakewood's full-back got through the line, picked up a fumble, and was off unguarded with all Ridgefield close upon him. He was tackled just before the goal line and brought down. But he was lucky enough to pass the ball to one of his own side, who ran around under the goal posts. A goal was kicked and Lakewood won the game with a minute to spare. Of all of which we get no notion from our reporter.

Such criticism could be made by any one who had seen the game. Put into the language of a text-book on Rhetoric, it would be to the effect that the writer had disregarded the canons of Proportion and Selection and also, it may be added, as concerns the second extract, that of Variety. Unity and Sequence our author has observed; it was hardly possible to violate them.

This brings us to the especial bearing of our example. The most important canons from the standpoint of Narration are those of Selection and Proportion. The others have their application, but they are of less importance. One must bear in mind the matter of Sequence, but in Narration the succession of details is generally in a great degree determined by the actual or imagined order of the events described. One must also bear in mind the canon of Unity, but the temptation to insert irrelevant matter is not so great in Narration as in some other kinds of writing. Selection and Proportion are of the most importance.

11. Selection, indeed, is always important. It is also a great cause of despair to the teacher of English composition. It is so hard to know just what ideas are in a student's head, so as to help him to pick out the right ones. I am not going to say anything more here about Selection, for it depends more upon natural cleverness than on anything else. At any rate, Selection in Narration hardly lends itself readily to constructive treatment. Later on (pp. 43, 70) will be found certain exercises which may tend to develop and cultivate powers of right selection in special directions. The best I can do at present is to call your attention to the importance of the matter. You want to practice and practice on just this point, the picking out the right things to say, from the many things which might be said with no especial effect.

EXERCISES.

The Exercises in simple narration (9) should be continued, and as much attention as possible paid to the selection of good points. The correction will probably bring up matters which will come to discussion later.

12. The Canon of Proportion is rather more easily handled. It will lead us to make the important things stand out, to set them apart from the commonplace, to concentrate the reader's attention upon them. You can manage the matter in different ways. You would naturally give more space to important matters. You might put striking bits into separate paragraphs. You might put passages that you want especially vivid into the present tense. You could perhaps mark the effective things by uncommon forms of composition, by epigram, for instance, or by a balanced sentence. One rather curious way, used by Ruskin, among other people, is to insert a very short paragraph before the important one, calling attention to it. For instance:

“One word more.”—*Lectures on Art*, § 65.

“And now, but one word, before we enter on our task,

as to the way you must understand what I may endeavor to tell you."—*Ibid.*, § 36.

There are other ways, too; one finds them out for one's self. It is well to avoid italics and exclamation-points, for they are consecrated by tradition to the use of schoolgirls.¹

Of course these devices may be abused; they may be used in such a way as to defeat their purpose. In French it is the short paragraph which loses force through too frequent occurrence. (See also p. 106.) In English it is often the historical present, which has been so run into the ground that it has almost come to be a sure mark of an unskillful writer. These devices are effective only in so far as they are unusual. If all paragraphs are short, we have, not vivacity, but monotony, just as we have in a book written wholly in the present tense. A speaker when using a moderate tone may make a statement emphatic by speaking louder, but if he bellow all the time he is only a bore. So with writing; if you keep up a continual excitement, your reader is no longer stimulated. When we are used to the sound of a waterfall, it sends us to sleep. So you must remember that the canon of Proportion should lead you to make only the important things stand out, not to try to make everything stand out.

EXERCISES.

Something more may be done in practising the attainment of good Proportion than was the case with the Canon of Selection. Taking such a subject as is given in **9** or **13**, arrange it carefully, so that the unimportant parts will be lightly passed over, while the striking bits are handled at more length. Let a very short paragraph precede that which tells of the crisis. Let the interesting event be narrated in short, crisp sentences, the events of less character in sentences longer and less brilliant. Much must be left to the teacher in the way of suggestion, and yet the once putting in practice some device to secure good proportion may have a very good effect upon the better students.

¹ Italics and capitals are often very properly used in text-books and the like to attract attention to points that must be especially noted.

II. MORE PARTICULAR ADVICE.

13. The Beginning. Having in mind these cautions, and having made up our minds in a general way as to what we want to say, we might sit down with a good sheet of white paper and a new pen, and the only thing is to begin. The only question is how to begin; once started we shall run along finely. Now the most obvious counsel might seem to be, Begin at the Beginning. Curiously enough, this is not always the best advice. In the first place, it is not always the easiest matter to find the beginning. Old Dr. Prince, who had matchless opportunities for writing a history of Massachusetts, never got beyond the first six years, because he thought he had better begin with the proceedings of our first parents in the Garden of Eden. So he wrote a history of the world, concerning which he was not especially well informed, and left unwritten the history of Massachusetts, of which he knew more than any other man of his day. And we all know the stock story of the German professor who spent years and years upon a Life of Christ and left it finally unfinished, having brought the narrative down to the year 5 B.C. Don't follow those sad examples. You may not be so successful as Dietrich Knickerbocker. *In medias res tutissimus ibis*, if one be allowed to jest with the Classics. Remember how Homer began the Iliad at the tenth year of the siege, how Virgil began the Æneid with the tempest, how Shakespeare began Hamlet only a short time before the Prince of Denmark's death. There are innumerable examples, but I think that Balzac offers some of the most interesting. It seems to have been his practice to fix upon some event that would seize the reader's attention. Then he would sometimes spend a third of his novel in bringing matters up to the starting-point. Sir Walter Scott, on the other hand, so often felt it necessary to give so much preliminary information that it is usually some time before one gets into the story. The most striking example,

though hardly a fair one, is *Waverley*. Browning begins right at the heart of the matter (e.g., *Fra Lippo Lippi*) and often leaves you to find out the things that went before as well as you can; but then he was much more interested in the people in the given situation, than he was in the action for its own sake.

Often enough the things which happened before the actual beginning form the main subject of interest, although we may not find them out till the very end. How would one of the *Sherlock Holmes* stories seem if we knew just what had happened before the beginning of the story? The interest would be of a wholly different character. We should appreciate some things more, but we should lose the particular flavor which such narration can give, and nothing else.

EXERCISES.

Suppose you are writing a short sketch on some one of the subjects below. Familiarize yourself with the subject-matter and then plan your account of it, say of ten or twelve pages. Note down the topics to be taken up, and then write your beginning. Do a couple of hundred words and then try another. It is well to do as many as you can: one can practice beginning a story without finishing it, or one can practice writing titles without doing a word more, just as a runner practices starts without running his whole distance.

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| 1. Lincoln's First Election to
the Presidency.
2. Napoleon's Escape from Elba.
3. Caesar's First Campaign in
Britain.
4. Sir Richard Grenville's Fight
in the "Revenge."
5. Braddock's Defeat.
6. The Landing on Plymouth
Rock. | 7. Paul Revere's Ride.
8. The Death of Nelson.
9. The Chicago Railroad Strike
of 1894
10. The Panic of 1893.
11. The Northampton Bank Rob-
bery (or any other such
event).
12. The Battle with the Armada.
13. Priam's Visit to Achilles.
<i>Iliad</i> , Bk. xxiv. |
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| 14. Caesar's Ghost appears to Brutus. <i>Julius Caesar</i> , iv. 3. | 19. The Disappearance of Wakefield. <i>Twice-told Tales</i> , vol. i. |
| 15. Harry Warrington jumps for the Honor of Virginia. <i>The Virginians</i> , ch. 26. | 20. The Funeral of Elaine. <i>Idylls of the King</i> . |
| 16. The Rescue of Rebecca. <i>Ivanhoe</i> , ch. 43. | 21. The Flight of the Duchess. <i>Dramatic Romances</i> . |
| 17. The Drowning of Ham Peggotty. <i>David Copperfield</i> , vol. iii. ch. 18. | 22. The Court Scene in <i>The Merchant of Venice</i> , iv. 1. |
| 18. Jeanie Deans' Visit to Queen Caroline. <i>The Heart of Mid-Lothian</i> , vol. ii. ch. 37. | 23. Satan's Flight to the Earth. <i>Paradise Lost</i> . Bks. i. ii. |

NOTE.—These subjects are all taken from history or literature, for it would be hardly possible to refer to other sequences of events which would answer the purpose in such a way as to be easily understood. But fictitious narratives may be made almost as good practice, or narratives of every-day life, as in the Exercises in 9.

14. The Succession of Events. Having once begun, it is perhaps easy enough to carry things ahead. We have only to follow the order of events, one would say. This may be the case in a simple narrative, but of course all narratives are not simple. A simple narration has but one line of action, but we often enough have to manage a narrative where there are several lines twisted up together. In novels, as a matter of course (not that we shall probably be often called on to write novels), we may have to keep several lines in our head at once. Hence the rather clumsy “While these events were transpiring others not less important, etc.,” and “We left our hero imprisoned in the pirate’s cave,” and “We must now return to the unfortunate Emilia,” of the old-fashioned novelist. If you ever have to write a historical essay covering any length of time you will find that the matter is not the simplest thing in the world. It is worth while to see how this difficulty has been managed by good writers.

1. The beginning of George Eliot’s *Silas Marner*. Chap-

ters I and II, concern Silas before the robbery; Chapters III and IV concern Godfrey and Dunstan Cass; Chapter V is the point at which the two lines of action cross. It will be observed that by the end of Chapter II the narrative interest in Silas has for the time faded out; things with him are going along monotonously, he has become a figure, not an actor. We are content to leave him for a time to turn to some other interest. Of course the story need not have been told in this way; Chapter V might have come in the place of Chapter III. Then the situation would have been that Silas had been robbed by Someone, and the question would have been, By whom? But this was not the interest in the robbery to George Eliot. Her interest in it was as setting in motion a new train of circumstances which affected the future fortunes of Silas and Godfrey.

Another example, in this case of the management of a minor line of action, is in whatever we learn before Chapter XII of Molly Cass. It is very lightly suggested; Molly herself only appears in Chapter XII, and then only for a little.

2. Especially in history may one study the manipulation of complicated narratives. Take for a short example the account of the Armada in Green: *History of the English People*, II, 440-448.

The first paragraph (p. 440) is on Philip of Spain: the affairs in France and Drake's expedition against Cadiz are mentioned as far as they affected him.

The next paragraph (p. 441) begins with the sailing of the Armada, but its chief subject is the English preparation: the army of Parma is brought to mind by comparing his anticipations with the real facts.

The next paragraph (p. 443), passing from Parma to the Armada, enables the author to speak of the Dutch, and brings the narrative to the meeting of the Spaniards and English.

Our attention is then concentrated upon the fight with the Armada and the flight northward. The subsequent paragraphs are descriptive rather than narrative. •

The interesting thing from our point of view is the constant effort to be at the point of greatest interest, and the arrangement of minor events according to the subject of most moment at the time.

However you manage your different stories that are all to work together, indeed even if you have a perfectly simple subject, you will want to be careful about what is called Movement. Be sure that the story gets ahead somehow; do not dawdle while you give your opinions or speculations; do not be led astray into episodes, do not be too explanatory; pass over uninteresting matters as shortly as you can, so long as you do not omit anything of importance; have your sentence-structure sufficiently varied, in length if in no other way, to do away with any effect of monotony. It is not easy to explain just what movement is or how it is to be attained, but we can all feel it in what we read, and still more can we feel the lack of it.

15. The End. One thing that we may say of the end of a narration is that one should have it in mind all through. Of course story-tellers do not always do that. Thackeray used to start out on a novel, which was to run in parts for two years, with very small notion as to how the story would turn out. But it will hardly be safe to assume that we can follow his example. The very lack of construction which is generally marked in Thackeray's novels was, we may believe, one of his devices for gaining realism. For us it will be better practice to try to gain constructive skill. If we once gain constructive skill, we shall be able to dispense with it whenever we want to, and that with a sense of reserved power which has rather a good effect. So you had better keep your end in mind as you write; it will help you in the matter of Selection. You might even do well

to write the end first,¹ except that it's not very easy to join on neatly. An interesting point to you personally (unless you are very different from most students) will be that if you leave the end until you have written the rest, you will probably be somewhat tired by the time you have got to it, and will end up your work anyhow, so only you get it done. This is rather foolish, for the end is a very important part. If you are going to slur over anything, you had better slur over something in the middle. The Beginning serves to attract the reader's attention, to arouse his interest. The End makes the final impression. And this is the case in any piece of writing, whether narrative or not.

EXERCISES.

If there is time, the student can practice on the subjects in 13, writing the end instead of the beginning. He should try first merely to make an ending which should not seem to be chopped off at random. Writing ends, however, is not such good practice as writing beginnings, for it is more artificial.

At this point a narrative essay of some length (about eight hundred words) should be written on subjects like those in 13 or 16, d.

The student who desires examples of good narration will do well to consult *Specimens of Narration*, chosen and edited by W. T. Brewster.

¹ As Longfellow wrote the last canto of *Evangeline* before the three cantos that come before it. See his Journal for Jan. 14, 1847.

II. DESCRIPTION.

A. THE NATURE OF DESCRIPTION.

16. Description and Narration. It ought now to be plain to us, if we have thought over carefully the points of the last section, that Narration and Description are things very different in character. That one point, that Narration handles subjects whose parts present themselves to the mind one after another while Description handles those of which the parts present themselves to us all at once, just this one point is enough to show us that the two are different kinds of composition. They are different in nature and method, because they have to handle subjects which are different in character.

a. But we often come upon something as we read which seems to us to be Narration, and yet it seems to be describing something. What would you call that? Here is an example of what I mean:

"At last they came to an open drive or avenue of the forest where great oaks were growing. Some distance up the avenue they saw a high park pale stretching away on either hand, and in the centre of the drive were iron gates covered with gilt scrolls and letters. The Court Chaplain pushed the gates open and they went in. Inside, the forest drive was planted with young trees in triple rows. After walking for some distance they reached another gate, similar to the first, but provided with 'loges,' or guard-rooms, on either side. One or two soldiers were standing listlessly about, but they took no heed. Here the drive entered the palace gardens, laid out in grass plots and stone terraces, and crossed by lofty hedges which shut out the view. They approached the long façade of a house with pointed roofs and green shutter blinds to all the windows."

Shorthouse: *The Little Schoolmaster Mark*, ch. ii. [Parts of two paragraphs are here run together.]

That would seem to be description, and yet its parts evidently come to the attention, not all at one time, but in sequence.

If you try to think this matter out for yourself, as a man must think out everything that he really wants to make his own, you will, I think, see that this is practically a Description, because the parts of the object described did really exist all at one time. The reason that it looks to us like a Narrative is that the parts are presented to us in succession. The gateway and the plantation, the gardens and the palace, these all existed at one time, and these make really the subject of the extract, not the Little Schoolmaster's walk from one place to the other. That walk was a sequence of events; each part came into existence and then went out of existence as the next was coming to be. But the thing that that walk made him acquainted with was not a sequence; each part was existing all the time. The necessities of language compel us to arrange these parts, which really coexist, in some sequence; and what sequence more convenient than that of the order in which they come to our knowledge, or somebody else's? Hence we have Description in Narrative Form, a not uncommon and a very simple means of avoiding one of the inherent difficulties of Description.

This Description in Narrative Form is very convenient, and you will at once think of a number of subjects to which it can be applied. It is sometimes called Description from the Traveler's Point of View and if you will read Macaulay's description of London in the third chapter of his History, you will see how he has availed himself of it. It will serve our purpose with a good many things. We all of us employ the method more or less when we are traveling and writing letters home.

b. Now of course this Description in narrative form is not the same thing as the mixed Narration and Description that we often meet, for instance in books of travels. In

the example we have been considering, Shorthouse was really describing something; if Narration had been his only idea he would probably have made shorter work of it. But we could all find examples of passages where real Narration and real Description are mingled, first a bit of one and then a bit of the other. Anything that would really illustrate the matter would be rather too long to insert here, but you will have no great difficulty in turning to some history, novel, or book of travels and finding any number of good examples.

c. Nor is this Description in Narrative Form the same thing as a description of the kind that follows, where the observer himself remains in one place and describes the changing and shifting circumstances.

“The sun lingered, while up the arch of the opposite heavens the moon, within one day of being full, seemed hastening to our aid. She finally appeared exactly behind the peak of the Rympfischihorn, the cone of the mountain being projected for a short time as a triangle on the lunar disc. Only for a short time, however; the silver sphere soon cleared the mountain, and bore away through the tinted sky. The motion was quite visible, and resembled that of a vast balloon. As the day approached its end the scene assumed the most sublime aspect. All the lower portions of the mountain were deeply shaded, while the loftiest peaks, ranged upon a semicircle, were fully exposed to the sinking sun. They seemed pyramids of solid fire, while here and there long stretches of crimson light drawn over the higher snow-fields linked the summits together. An intensely illuminated geranium flower seems to swim in its own colors which apparently surrounds the petals like a layer, and defeats by its lustre any attempt of the eye to seize upon the sharp outline of its leaves. A similar effect was here observed upon the mountains; the glory did not seem to come from them alone, but seemed also effluent from the air around them. As the evening

advanced, the eastern heavens low down assumed a deep purple hue, above which, and blending with it by infinitesimal gradations, was a belt of red, and over this again zones of orange and violet. . . . After sunset the purple . . . changed to a deep neutral tint, and against the faded red which spread above it the sun-forsaken mountains laid their cold and ghastly heads. The ruddy color vanished more and more; the stars strengthened in lustre, until finally the moon and they held undisputed possession of the sky."—Tyndall: *Hours of Exercise in the Alps*, ch. ix.

This I should say would clearly be Description and not Narration; whether to call it a compound description or a description of changing phenomena is largely a verbal question.

d. There remains still another point,—I have already called your attention to it on p. 14,—the topic which may be treated either by Narration or Description. But this, as we have seen, is not really an exception to our principle. A thing which is really a succession of parts may be considered without any reference to that succession. The Revolutionary War, for instance: one might narrate the events of which it is made up, or else one might think of what sort of thing it was as a whole, without any special regard to the time sequence. Or a yacht race: one can say, "It was a good race; a fair test; very exciting; a beautiful sight," or what not else, and all that will be descriptive. If, however, you speak of the course of events, of the start, the beat to windward, the run home, the finish and all, you have then Narration. But this matter hardly needs any long discussion.

EXERCISES.

- a. The following topics will give an opportunity for Description in Narrative Form. Some of them are merely meant to suggest such subjects as must be ready to the hand of every student. In each case the Description should be of some particular object known to the writer

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| 1. The Campus.
2. The Town.
3. The Fifth Ward.
4. Chinatown (or the French Quarter, or Little Italy).
5. The Canal.
6. The interior of some house or public building.
7. Such and such a Garden or Park.
8. The Canal.
9. The Railroad up Mt. Washington. | 10. The Black Hills.
11. The Bad Lands.
12. A Coal-mine (or any other kind).
14. Mammoth Cave.
15. The Yosemite.
16. The road from A to B from the bicyclist's standpoint.
17. The Yellowstone Park.
18. My Grandfather's Woods.
19. The Salt Ponds.
20. The Garret in the House we used to Live in. |
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d. Take one or another of the following topics as subject for a Description. You will observe that they may equally well serve as subjects for Narration. It will depend upon how you consider them.

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| 1. A Yacht-race, (or some athletic event).
2. The last Hare-and-Hounds Run.
3. Our First Class Meeting.
4. The Chicago Fire.
5. The Johnstown Flood.
Any other Fire or Flood, will be as good practice.
6. The Chino-Japanese War.
7. The Invention of the Steam Engine.
8. The First Transatlantic Steamship Voyage. | 9. The Early Life of De Quincey. See <i>Autobiographic Sketches</i> .
10. Macanlay in India. See Trevorlyan's <i>Life</i> .
11. The Armenian Massacres.
12. The Defeat of the Armada.
13. The Last Gladiator Show.
14. Xerxes' Invasion of Greece.
15. The First Crusade.
16. The Division of South Africa.
17. Dr. Jameson's Raid.
18. The Republican (or Democratic) Convention of 1896. |
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17. Description and Exposition. We have now come to some understanding of the nature of Description by comparing it with Narration. We have seen that Description has the problem of handling something which presents us with a number of impressions all at once, a difficult problem for language, which can deal with but one thing at a time. We shall get some further light on our subject if we compare Description with another kind of composition

that resembles it in some respects, namely, Exposition. Let us again begin with some examples.

"In all the universities of Europe, excepting our own, the languages and sciences are distributed among a numerous list of effective professors: the students, according to their tastes, their calling, and their diligence, apply themselves to the proper masters; and in the annual repetition of public and private lectures these masters are assiduously employed. Our curiosity may inquire what number of professors has been instituted at Oxford? (for I shall now confine myself to my own university;) by whom are they appointed, and what may be the probable chances of merit or incapacity; how many are stationed to the three faculties, and how many are left for the liberal arts? what is the form, and what the substance, of their lessons? But all these questions are silenced by one short and singular answer, 'That in the university of Oxford the greater part of the public professors have for these many years given up altogether even the pretence of teaching.' Incredible as the fact may appear, I must rest my belief on the positive and impartial evidence of a master of moral and political wisdom, who had himself resided at Oxford. Dr. Adam Smith assigns as the cause of their indolence, that, instead, of being paid by voluntary contributions, which would urge them to increase the number and to deserve the gratitude of their pupils, the Oxford professors are secure in the enjoyment of a fixed stipend, without the necessity of labour, or the apprehension of control. . . .

"The silence of the Oxford professors, which deprives the youth of public instruction, is imperfectly supplied by the tutors, as they are styled, of the several colleges. Instead of confining themselves to a single science, which had satisfied the ambition of Burman or Bernoulli, they teach, or promise to teach, either history or mathematics, or ancient literature, or moral philosophy; and as it is possible that they may be defective in all, it is highly

probable that of some they will be ignorant. They are paid indeed by voluntary contributions: but their appointment depends upon the head of the house; their diligence is voluntary, and consequently languid, while the pupils themselves, or their parents, are not indulged in the liberty of choice or change.”—Gibbon: *Autobiography*.

“ And such . . . is a University. . . . It is a place to which a thousand schools make contributions; in which the intellect may safely range and speculate, sure to find its equal in some antagonist activity, and its judge in the tribunal of truth. It is a place where inquiry is pushed forward, and discoveries verified and perfected, and rashness rendered innocuous, and error exposed, by the collision of mind with mind, and knowledge with knowledge. It is the place where the professor becomes eloquent, and is a missionary and a preacher, displaying his science in its most complete and winning form, pouring it forth with the zeal of enthusiasm, and lighting up his own love of it in the breasts of his hearers. It is the place where the catechist makes good his ground as he goes, treading in the truth day by day into the ready memory, and wedging and tightening it into the expanding reason. It is a place which wins the admiration of the young by its celebrity, kindles the affection of the middle-aged by its beauty, and rivets the fidelity of the old by its associations. It is a seat of wisdom, a minister of the faith, an Alma Mater of the rising generation. It is this and a great deal more, and demands a somewhat better head and hand than mine to describe it well.”—Newman: *Rise and Progress of Universities*, ch. ii.

We have here two very different pieces of writing, certainly, but they have one thing in common. They both aim to tell us something about a university. The difference, however, is obvious: Gibbon is speaking of the University of Oxford as it appeared to him in his own time, while Newman speaks, not especially of Oxford nor of any

other particular university, but of any university that is a true university in his understanding of the word. Gibbon's subject is particular, Newman's is general.

There's the difference between Description and Exposition; the first handles particular things and the second handles general ideas. Look a moment at what Gibbon says. He says that in one respect Oxford differed from all the other universities of Europe; he expatiates on the difference, and gives the reason for it. He points out a certain peculiarity (the tutorial system) which has arisen in consequence of this difference, and comments upon it. Newman, on the other hand, does not mention such peculiarities. He speaks of intellectual work, of inquiries and discoveries; of the office of the professor and his manner of teaching, of the hold exercised by the university upon those connected with it. These are all general remarks; they have not more to do with Oxford than with Heidelberg; they are appropriate to any true university.

So we get some idea of the nature of Description from our comparison. We see that a Description is a statement of those things which individualize anything, which make it itself. But Exposition is a statement of those characteristics which have put together a number of individuals into one class. Description deals with those things which make our subject different; Exposition deals with those things wherein a number of things are the same. Description in fact, strictly speaking, inserts just those things which Exposition leaves out; one mentions the particular characteristics, the other the general characteristics.

The student will be interested in reading Guy de Maupassant's account of the severe training he went through under the eye of Gustave Flaubert. He gives an account of it in the preface to his novel *Pierre et Jean*, pp. xxx-xxxii.

"Talent is one long piece of patience. It is a matter of looking at whatever one is to write of long enough, and with enough attention, to discover in it something which

has not been seen and spoken of by any one else. There is in everything an as yet unknown quantity, something as yet undetected, for we are pretty well accustomed to using our eyes merely with the recollection of what has been already thought about whatever we are looking at. The least thing has something about it that is as yet unknown. We want to find it. To describe a flame that is flickering away, a tree in a plain, let us remain before the flame and the tree until they no longer resemble, for us, any other flame or any other tree.

"This is the way that a man becomes original."

Maupassant goes on to tell how Flaubert insisted that he should render in a single phrase, "a grocer sitting by his door, a *concierge* smoking his pipe, a cab-horse among fifty others in the line." It was a hard apprenticeship, but the elder novelist was a good master and the younger a good student, and both are among the great writers of French fiction in the last half century.

EXERCISES.

To attain to individualization it is easiest, perhaps necessary, to begin with comparison. I have found that the best way to make this point clear was to give actual practice in comparison and in the selection of distinctive points. If possible, each student should be given a set of some half dozen pictures of things of the same class and asked to point out the individualizing characteristics of one of them. Where this is not practicable, larger pictures may be shown to the class. Every teacher will have to make up his own sets of pictures. I offer one or two suggestions which may be useful.

1. Photographs of Fujiama, Mont Blanc, the Matterhorn, the Jungfrau, Monte Rosa. The marked contrast between the Japanese volcano and the Alps will bring out strongly certain of its characteristics which, so far as this comparison goes, are individual. If you can note the qualities which make Fujiama individual to you, the exercise will have fulfilled its object, even if the qualities do not happen to be absolutely essential.

2. The Cathedral of Amiens: compare with Canterbury, York, Durham, Ely. Here again you may not reach absolutely essential individualization, but as far as it goes the exercise is good.

3. The Washington Arch in New York : compare with the Arc de Triomphe, Paris, the Brandenburger Thor, Berlin, the Arch of Trajan, Rome.

4. Napoleon as painted in his youth by Grenze : compare with other portraits of Napoleon at later periods. McClure's Life of Napoleon has a large number of pictures. I find great opportunities for exercises like this in the current magazines.

5. The Giusti Garden, Verona (*Harper's* for August 1893, p. 404) : compare with the gardens of the Quirinal, Villa Medici, Villa d'Este, the Boboli gardens, of which you will find pictures in the July and August numbers.

6. *The Virgin Euthroned*, by Abbott Thayer. Compare first with a Madonna by Botticelli, and note any characteristic differences. Then compare with *The Mother*, by Edward Simmons, and a Madonna by Francis Vincent Du Mond, and you will learn a few other things about it. The modern pictures may be found in the Christmas Century for 1892. There are also a number of Madonnas in the Christmas McClure for 1895.

18. The Processes of Description. Now this is an important matter. If we are quite sure that in writing a Description we want to mention those characteristics which only our subject possesses, we have got a good way. We know at least what to look for, when we think of describing anything. That tramp who came to the house the other day, what will you say of him? That he was ragged and dirty, that he hadn't eaten anything for three days, that he asked for work? That won't describe him: those things are as true of all tramps as of this one. Say that he not only asked for work, but actually sawed wood for an hour, even after he had eaten a breakfast. That will mark him among a thousand.

Sometimes the main aim of a descriptive writer will be the separate particularities. "The aesthetic critic, then," says Pater, "regards all the objects with which he has

¹ For the careful student of these problems Walter Pater is a very good author, on account of his constant effort after careful discrimination, as well as for other reasons that will be apparent later. The average Sophomore, however, will not be likely to find much that he can either appropriate or assimilate.

to do, all works of art, and the fairer forms of human life, as powers or forces, producing sensations, each of a more or less peculiar and unique kind." We might as well regard everything that we have to deal with in writing as being "more or less peculiar and unique," if we can only find out just how. We shall get to enjoy everything the more thoroughly the better we find ourselves able to discriminate between it and everything else.

"But," you will perhaps say, "I don't always want to know the peculiar and unique. I may know that; I may want to know the generalities about some particular thing. Take Queen Elizabeth: I know the unique thing about her; she reigned over England from 1558 to 1603. That identifies her; no one else did that. What I want to know is, What were her human qualities?" This is very just. When we read the description of the character of somebody—Queen Elizabeth, since we are speaking of her—we hear of qualities which the individual shared with other people. Elizabeth was a courtier, and a scholar as well; so were many others of her day. She was resolute and many-sided and popular and lovely. These are not peculiarly individual qualities, they are, on the whole, common. Wherein, then, lay Elizabeth's individuality? In the union of them all, I suppose, in the person of the Queen of England, daughter of Henry VIII. and Anne Boleyn. And that union is as much a particularization as is the fact that she reigned such and such a time. It is always getting at something particular, something unique, is Description, but that something unique may be of differing kind.

It will be well, however, to look at this matter a little more closely. Are we in Description to mention only those things which are absolutely particular? That is certainly hardly possible in some cases. And it will probably at

¹ By Green, for instance, in his *Shorter History*, ch. VII. sec. iii.

once occur to you that many descriptions of particular things contain mention of points that are by no means particular to the subject in hand.¹ Suppose I say, "It was one of those blue misty mornings not uncommon in October, but I shall always remember it from the solemn stillness in which everybody asked news of the President." Now certainly the first thing said there of that morning is not particular. By its very form it might have been said of many other mornings. Or if one should say, "The trees stood bare and gaunt and black in the driving rain, waving their branches in fantastic dread of some evil to come." There too the first things said are not particular, but might apply to many trees.

This objection is quite just, and brings forward another thing about Description that will be of value to us. Those remarks criticised are not particular, they are general. And yet they undoubtedly have their place in the description. What is that place? Why, those things serve to classify. They serve to place the subject of which we are speaking in some well-known class; when that is done, we can note the particular. First we put our subject into the class of "those blue misty mornings not uncommon in October," or, in case of the trees, into such as are "bare, gaunt, and black in the driving rain." That gives us something of an idea to start with, and we go on to make the idea more definite. Sometimes we can do our classification by a single word: as by the word *tramp* we understand a person who is ragged and dirty, who hasn't eaten anything for three days, and who is anxious for work. In such cases the exposition of the general term in question is already familiar to us. Often enough, however, we have to

¹ In discussing this point I speak in a popular manner and disregard the subtleties which are introduced into the subject by the Hegelian Logic. At the same time I would advise any one who likes to deal with a good problem, to consider the matter in relation, say, to the discussion of Hegel's philosophy in Royce, *Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, lect. VII, sec. iii.

say something of the class to bring it to the reader's mind.

These remarks which serve to classify may not seem to be Description in the strict sense of the word, but we see that they are practically necessary. A curious analogy which may serve as illustration may be observed in the method of identifying criminals in use by the Parisian Police.¹ This system provides for the measurement of criminals according to certain principles, and for the noting all private marks, such as moles, scars, tattooings, and so on. It is evident that these latter marks are the truly descriptive ones. If you find a man with a mole to the left of the larynx, the scar for operation for croup just below it, a deep scar an inch long lying obliquely on the right collar bone, and a particular tattoo mark on his left wrist, it is certain that he is the same man on whom those marks were recorded twenty years before. There you have the police description. But the question, when you have a criminal, is, How to get at the right description? There are over a hundred thousand such descriptions in the Anthropometric Bureau at Paris or at Scotland Yard in London. The man arrested to-day may have left his description among them, but how are you going to find it?

The descriptions must be classified somehow, if you are to be able easily to get at any desired description in a hurry. As a means for this classifying serve the measurements. The length of head is one means of division, the width of head of subdivision under that, then the length of the left middle finger, and so on; so by the time you get to the last measurement, the width of the right ear, you have reached a class that is comparatively small. There may be only half a dozen men out of the hundred thousand whose measurements² practically coincide. Among those half dozen you can easily enough find your man by the

¹ Described in the *Nineteenth Century* for Sept. 1891, pp. 356-370.

² They are almost all of bony parts which are constant in adults.

private marks. What this system—Bertillonage it is called—means, is, first Classification, and then Description. We may learn something from it.

We now begin to understand what we are doing when we describe. We are talking about some particular thing and we are saying particular things about it. That is the real Description. Furthermore, we say things that might be said, also, of some other subject, but those are only preliminary. To be strictly accurate, those things would perhaps come under the head of Exposition, though it would be splitting hairs always to insist upon the distinction.

If now you try to describe, try really to seize the individuality of anything, even of something with which you are familiar, you will see that you must sharpen your powers of observation.

EXERCISES.

The student may continue the exercises in 17 or go on to those of 19.

19. The Purpose of Description. We have so far been talking loosely of Description as though it were all a thing of the same kind. But there are really different kinds of Description, and it will help us to better ideas on method to note some of them. Here are two examples of Description: the first is a description of a man's face mostly according to M. Bertillon's method for detective recognition, and the other is a description of the same face according to very different ideas.

"Medium nose, wavy convex, drooping base.

Ears usually hidden by cap.

Medium forehead intermediate.

Eyes deep-set.

Cheek-bones prominent.

Mouth drooping."

"To me it is a most touching face; perhaps of all faces

that I know, the most so. Lonely there painted as on vacaney, with the simple laurel wound round it; the deathless sorrow and pain, the known victory which is also deathless; significant of the whole history of Dante! I think it is the mournfullest face that was ever painted from reality; an altogether tragic, heart-affecting face. There is in it, as foundation of it, the softness, tenderness, gentle affection, as of a child; but all this is as if congealed into sharp contradiction, into abnegation, isolation, proud hopeless pain. A soft ethereal soul looking out so stern, implacable, grim-trenchant, as from imprisonment of thick-ribbed ice! Withal it is a silent pain too, a silent scornful one: the lip is curled in a kind of god-like disdain of the thing that is eating out his heart,—as if it were withal a mean insignificant thing, as if he whom it had power to torture and strangle were greater than it. The face of one wholly in protest, and life-long unsurrendering battle against the world. Affection all converted into indignation: an implacable indignation; slow, equable, silent, like that of a god! The eye too, it looks out as in a kind of *surprise*, a kind of inquiry, why the world was such a sort. This is Dante: so he looks, this ‘voice of ten silent centuries,’ and sings us ‘his mystic unfathomable song.’” Carlyle: *Heroes and Hero Worship*, Lect. III

These two descriptions serve very different purposes. The first would enable one to recognize its subject in a crowd: I think that from it almost any one (understanding the terms used) could draw a recognizable profile. But useful as it may be for such purposes, it is, one is tempted to say, no description at all, compared with the second extract. Yet probably one would have difficulty from the description by Carlyle in reproducing the face on paper. The descriptions differ in the facts they mention. All the characteristics mentioned may be said to be in Giotto’s portrait of Dante: the first description selects certain traits for one purpose, the second selects other traits for another purpose.

Here are two examples more:

"*Chicago* (pron. *Shakahyoo*; 590 ft. above the sea, 15-75 ft. above the lake), the second city and largest railway-centre of the United States, is situated on the w. shore of *Lake Michigan*, at the mouths of the rivers *Chicago* and *Calumet*. It is 850 m. from Baltimore, the nearest point on the Atlantic, and 2415 m. from San Francisco. It covers an area of 181 sq. m. (more than any other city in the country), and in 1890 contained 1,099,850 inhab., an increase of 118 per cent in ten years, and actually as well as relatively greater than that of London proper in the same period. The city has a water front on the lake of 22 m. and is divided by the Chicago River and its branches into three portions, known as *North*, *South*, and *West Sides*. The site of the city is remarkably level, rising very slightly from the lake, and the streets are usually wide and straight. Among the chief business thoroughfares are *State*, *Clark*, *Madison*, *Dearborn*, and *La Salle Streets*, and *Wabash Avenue*. Perhaps the finest residence streets are *Michigan Avenue* and *Drexel* and *Grand Boulevards* on the S. side, and *Lake Shore Drive* on the N. side. It is estimated that not more than 300,000 of the inhabitants are native Americans; nearly 400,000 are Germans, 220,000 are Irish, 90,000 Scandinavians, 50,000 Poles, 50,000 Bohemians, and 45,000 English and Scottish."—Baedeker's *United States*, p. 281.

"Few Englishmen can realize what the scene of the rioting in Chicago is like, for an Englishman who has never crossed the Atlantic has never seen any city like Chicago. Conceive an enormous level region, bounded on one side by the great lake and straggling away in all other directions into the prairie. On this plain live 1,600,000 people. Railroads intersect it everywhere, the tracks running level through the streets. Conceive, also, dirty rivers and canals crowded with steamers and huge 'whale-backs,' over which the streets run by means of huge swing

bridges. Along the streets, which are villainously paved, run all day and most of the night little trains of cable cars crammed with as many people as can contrive to get a footing on them. In the centre of the city gigantic buildings tower up to the sky, twelve, fifteen, and twenty stories high. A pall of smoke hangs over the busy scene, rising from the factories, mills, iron-works, and steamers on the lake and river. Beer-saloons and cigar-stores are everywhere, most of them with German names over the doors. Outside of the central business part Chicago is very largely what Mr. Grant Allen calls London—‘a squalid village.’ The exceptions are the parks, which are for the most part admirable, the embankment along the lake, and the fashionable boulevards, which contain many of the most beautiful houses in the world.”—The London *Chronicle* for July 16, 1894.

Here are two descriptions of the city of Chicago, each presumably written by an Englishman for English readers, but very clearly with different objects in view. The two kinds have been called Description for Information and Description for Impression, and, although we cannot easily set any hard-and-fast defining line between the two, the distinction is of value.

Of Description for Information there are many examples. Descriptions of dresses or dishes in ladies’ papers are homely instances. The specifications of an architect or an engineer are more complicated cases. So also when a scientist happens upon something which he desires the learned world to know about, he writes a description of it. When he has some particular thing the peculiarities of which he makes public, then we have Description for Information. If he speaks of a thing as belonging to a class, mentioning only those points common to the species or genus, then I should call it Exposition. But there are of course plenty of examples of Scientific Description.

Rather more interesting to us, however, is what we call

Description for Impression. Not a very accurate distinction in the names, it must be confessed; for this latter kind of Description conveys information, and is meant to. But whereas the first kind of Description usually conveys a certain set of facts which are desired and appreciated as such, our second kind, if it gives us what are commonly called facts, gives them, as it were, by the way. What we desire and appreciate is not merely the fact as such. The architect who would build a House of Seven Gables for some patron gives many necessary facts to the builder. But Hawthorne, when he described his House of Seven Gables, hardly troubled himself at all about the facts, or more accurately, he was interested in facts very different from the architect's facts. He had nothing in especial to tell us for information alone, but much that should impress our feelings and imagination.

Now if we consider further the difference between the two kinds of Description, we shall see that the former has for its object to enable him who reads to construct or reconstruct the subject in all important details, either actually, as when the builder builds a house, or practically, as when a zoölogist places and classifies a new-found specimen. But such actual reconstruction is rarely the object of the second kind of Description.

This Description for Impression is the more common in literature, and we shall do well to remember that the object of literary description is very rarely to enable one either to construct or reconstruct the subject described. In the great majority of cases the thing cannot be done, and it is well to recognize the fact at once. Describe a splendid cathedral, a beautiful sunrise, a strange terror, a vivacious young woman, an interesting criminal,—by no means can you put the reader in the place of one who sees the cathedral or the sunrise, who feels the terror, who talks to the young woman or the criminal. You may

perhaps put the reader in the position of one who remembers those things, but not in the place of one who is experiencing them. You can, perhaps, make the permanent impression, but you cannot reproduce the whole impression of the time, either in yourself or in anybody else. It is, then, the right permanent impression that we want. When we hear that an author describes anything so that "he brings it before our very eyes,"¹ we may be sure that our authority is indulging himself either in nonsense or in a figure of speech. When we read that "he puts us in the place of his characters," that "we see them before us," we may be sure of the same thing. Description in language has its limitations, and we cannot attain its full power unless we recognize them, unless we cease to expect language to do what it cannot do, and make full use of the very great powers that it has.

Language cannot bring a thing before the eyes; it can, however, bring a thing before the mind, and that is really the important thing.

If we keep a tight hold on this idea, we shall find ourselves helped out of a good many difficulties. We want to describe a certain church, let us say, from the outside. Remember that we are not to try to bring it before the eyes, and at once we see that a number of details may be left out. What are left? Why, let us see,—the white, painted brick with the climbing ivy, the tall spire and the clock in the bell-tower, the doves flying in and out above, and the electric cars in the busy street below. Nobody could make much of a picture out of that. But that's what I remember of the church, and if the reader gets that he gets my idea. Or suppose it be a man. Give up the idea of a photograph either of his face or of his mind and

¹ Different people have very different power of visualizing their ideas; but no one has such power as really to have by recollection the same impression as by seeing.

heart. You remember some half a dozen things that have impressed you; they will make the right impression on the reader, for why try to make more of an impression on the reader than has been made on you? Sit down and try to describe your best friend: you will find that the main idea, and the best, is given in a few strokes.¹

If then we would describe, we must satisfy ourselves with giving an impression. So we want it to be the right impression, and the right impression we shall find it hard to give another unless we know what it is ourselves. So we do well to ask ourselves the question often, What is my impression of this street as I look down on it? of this view across the river as the sun sets? of that young woman I met last night? Ask yourselves these questions. Unless you can give some sort of answer to them, it is improbable that you will be able to give a good account to anybody else.

The prevailing series of impressions will be found to differ very strikingly with different people and under

¹ I subjoin an interesting passage from Souriau: *La Suggestion dans l'Art*, pp. 209, 210.

"Our little realistic writers, who run about the streets with notebook in hand, imagine that they have given a graphic description when they have noted down and mentioned everything that they have seen. Because their work is done from nature they imagine that it will give us the vivid impression of the reality. The chances are that they succeed in being merely obscure. Deceived as to the expressive power of the written phrases by the actual presence of their subject, one is unable to foresee the effect they will produce upon a reader who does not have the thing before his eyes and must reconstruct it on this information alone.

"Nothing is gained by increasing the amount of information. In such a case, the more of explanation, the less of clearness. If you cannot make yourself understood in one sentence, you will much less be able to do so in a hundred. A complicated description makes too great a tax on the memory to be grasped, too great a demand on the imagination to be visualized; the reader will give up the effort."

The treatment is followed farther very skillfully and suggestively.

different circumstances. Here are several short descriptions:

"A wooden cross bleached by many storms surmounts the pinnacle of the Eggischhorn, and at the base of it I now take my place and scan the surrounding scene. Down from its birthplace in the mountains comes that noblest of ice-streams the Great Aletsch glacier. Its arms are thrown round the shoulders of the Jungfrau, while from the Monk and the Trugberg, the Gletscherhorn, the Breithorn, the Aletschhorn, and many another noble pile, the tributary snows descend and thicken into ice. The mountains are well protected by their wintry coats, and hence the quantity of *dibris* upon the glacier is comparatively small; still, along it can be noticed dark longitudinal streaks, which are incipient moraines. Right and left from these longitudinal bands sweep finer curves, twisted here and there into complex windings, which mark the lamination of the subjacent ice. The glacier lies in a curved valley, the side towards which its convex curvature is turned is thrown into a state of strain, the ice breaks across the line of tension, a curious system of oblique glacier ravines being thus produced. From the snow-line, etc."—Tyndall: *Hours of Exercise in the Alps*, ch. vii.

"The two men rose, and followed Rheinhardt out into the garden, and thence on to the road, which wound behind the stables and hayricks of the old farm. The sun was sinking, hidden behind a thick bank of grey clouds, and below them was a rift of open sky, white, luminous, lustrous, into which gradually emerged the lip of the sun, slowly working its way, a great rayless ball of brilliant white, into this sea of white luminousness; the sky like a liquid, molten sun; the sun like a denser more lustrous sky, white upon white, metallic sheen upon metallic sheen, and all the while the clouds from whence the sun had descended grew dark, of bluish grey, and all the upper sky

of strange darkness; not the darkness of cloud, for it seemed scarce covered with mist film, but a metallie darkness as of burnished steel."—Vernon Lee: *Baldwin*, p. 42.

"It was a still summer evening in the slack between hay and harvest on the farm of Drumquhat. The Galloway moors rose in long purple ridges to the west. The sun had set, and in the hollows pools of mist were gathering, islanded with clumps of willow. The 'maister' had made his nightly rounds, and was now meditatively taking his smoke, leaning on the gate at the head of the loaning, and looking over a green cornfield, through the raw colour of which the first yellow was beginning to glimmer. From the village half a mile away he could hear the elink of the smith's anvil. There came into his mind a slow thought of the good crack going on there, and he erected himself as far as a habitual stoop would allow him, as if he proposed 'daunerin' over to the village to make one of the company in the heartsome 'smiddy.'" S. R. Crockett: *The Stickit Minister*, p. 114.

"But the Col de la Fauille, on that day of 1835, opened to me in distinct vision the Holy Land of my future work and true home in this world. My eyes had been opened and my heart with them, to see and to possess royally such a kingdom! Far as the eye could reach—that land and its moving or pausing waters; Arve and his gates of Chuse, and his glacier fountains; Rhone, and the infinitude of his sapphire lake,—his peace beneath the narcissus meads of Vevay—his cruelty beneath the promontories of Sierre. And all that rose against and melted into the sky, of mountain and mountain snow, and all that living plain, burning with human gladness—studded with white homes,—a milky way of star-dwellings east across its sunlit blue."—Ruskin: *Praterito*, ch. ix.

These descriptions are all four of some extent of country or something of the sort, but the different authors

have had very different ideas in mind. Tyndall had the forms in mind, Vernon Lee the colors, Crockett the feelings aroused, and Ruskin the thoughts associated with the sight.¹

EXERCISES.

These subjects are for short descriptions of perhaps 300 words. In each case—1-25—you should go and look at the place in question (of course these titles are only suggestive: you will select similar things which are familiar to you) and ask yourself:

a. "What is there that makes this place itself? different from other [Elms, or Mills, or Crossings]?"

b. "What are the most striking characteristics to me? What impresses me most?"

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| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The Great Elm at the Cross-roads. 2. The Abandoned Mill. 3. The Grade-crossing. 4. The Canal, looking from one of the Bridges. 5. The Bluff below the Rapids. 6. The Rapids (looking upstream) 7. The Old Revolutionary House. 8. My Grandmother's Flower-garden. 9. The Produce Store. 10. The Town Scales. 11. The Wood Market. 12. The Entrance to Green-tree Gorge. 13. The Lake from Huckleberry Hill. 14. The New Union Station. | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 15. The Edison Works at Closing-time. 16. The Aqueduct (from the river-side above). 17. The Old Graveyard. 18. The Science Building. (Take the most characteristic of the College Buildings and note the place from which to look at it.) 19. The Sunset (or Sunrise) over the Lake (on such and such a day). 20. The Campus in the afternoon from the Middle Building. 21. The Reading-room in the Evening. 22. The Quarry. 23. The Old Man opposite me in the Electric Car. 24. The Blue Gate. 25. The Campus by Moonlight. |
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¹ It hardly does as a class exercise, but it is worth while at other times than in class to try to think *with what purpose* you would render this or that.

These are all things one can see; it is not so hard to note some of their distinctive features. The following subjects are somewhat harder. They are (or were), however, just as much particular things, though not material.

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| 26. The British Constitution.
27. Hannibal's Hatred of Rome.
28. The Character of Oliver Goldsmith, or anyone else of marked individuality.
29. The Humor of Dickens.
30. The Style of Macaulay.
31. The Triple Alliance. | 32. The Present State of the Eastern Question.
33. The Educational System of Japan.
34. The Empire of Charlemagne.
35. Athens in the time of Pericles. |
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B. THE METHOD OF DESCRIPTION.

20. The Point of View. If we understand by this time what kind of thing Description is, what we may reasonably try to do when we describe, let us turn our attention to the way we should go about it. And first as to those Canons of Rhetoric that we considered in our study of Narration. If they are general principles, they will probably be of service to us here as well as elsewhere.

The Canon of Unity comes first, and this we might pass by as a matter of course, except that in this case there is a special application. Suppose we are talking about some fine building—telling about it, for instance, as we saw it from the front. We don't want to put in anything that might appear if we looked at it from behind, at least not here. The town is beautiful in the moonlight; let us say nothing of the things that are to be seen only by daylight. So-and-so was a great statesman; just at present it is of no concern to us that he also translates Horace. Except for contrast or comparison. True: but for contrast or comparison something quite different might be as much to the point; contrast or comparison are no violations of the Canon of Unity.

In other words, we probably have some Point of View. If we are talking of the façade of Amiens, or of Geneva

by moonlight, or of Gladstone as a statesman, let us hold to our point of view or else we shall give our reader but a blurred or mixed impression. Or, to take a more homely example, suppose we are writing a description of one of the college buildings from the front gate perhaps; let us not mention that it is one hundred and twenty-one feet long and sixty high. Aside from the fact that it is probably too much of a piece of information for your purposes, we should hardly be able to tell the exact dimensions from where we stand; it certainly makes no exact impression upon us. And let us not say that the steps have been worn down by the feet of generations of students nor mention minor facts about the bulletin board by the front door; we are probably too far away to see such things.

This is certainly an important point. We shall find, however, that we do not need counsel here so much as caution. If we bear the principle in mind it is easy enough in most cases to observe it. We shall find out that this matter takes care of itself if only we will define our subject carefully to ourselves, and stick to it. If we are unwilling to take so much trouble even as that, we can hardly expect to accomplish very much.

EXERCISES.

Take one of the subjects given in 19, 1-25, and write a description from a definite standpoint, as in Nos. 16, 18, 20.

21. Selection. More necessary is it to remember another Canon, which was of importance to us in Narration as well, that of Selection. We have been speaking of this matter already (Exercises, p. 43); is there anything more to say of it? We have seen that Descriptions of the same thing may be very different, according to the purpose that we have in mind. There are so many things that might be said about anything; how can we pick out only the right ones?

This is a place where, as you know already, a teacher cannot do very much more than give you his blessing. He cannot put himself in your shoes, and until he can do that you must do your selection of details for yourself. Don't feel as though your teacher failed you here. Be thankful that you have an opportunity to show your own originality. This is one of those happy chances that a man gets to show the stuff he's made of. We have already had a word or two about the matter. But you can hardly have too strong a sense of it. Our study is called constructive, but no study of rhetoric can be really constructive except in so far as it gives you a chance to construct for yourself. A distinguished teacher used to say, "Young men come to me and say, 'We should like to acquire a Style.' Acquire a Style! I have to say to them, 'Supply yourselves first with a good stock of Originality, and then we'll begin to think about Style.'"

Different people will notice very different things. Just why and just what are interesting subjects in Psychology, although in Rhetoric we cannot go into them. I happened once to be lecturing upon this subject at a university where I was not a member of the faculty. My classes were held in the Geological Lecture-room. I asked the class to describe the room. Some mentioned one thing, some another, its size, its height, its ventilation, its blackboards, the view from the window. My own idea had been that if I had had to describe the room, I should have spoken of the geological models, the photographs of canions, the pictures of primeval forests, the plans of different strata. You see lecture-rooms are pretty much alike in general characteristics, but I had never before held classes in a geological lecture-room, so I remarked things which escaped the attention of the students who were familiar with the place. It is always so with travellers: they notice things about a town which those who

have lived there all their lives would never think of mentioning. Everybody has a somewhat different standpoint. Here is an opportunity to make your writing represent yourself.

This matter of Individuality, which counts for so much in Selection, is of more importance in Narration and Description than in Exposition or Argument. The first two are the Artist's kinds of composition; the two latter belong rather to the Scientist. And we can see how the Canon of Selection plays a vastly more important part in the former two than in the latter. For with particulars there are always so many more things that may be said, there is so much more opportunity to select those things that must be said. Almost all the general characteristics of a general idea are important, and almost all the proofs of a truth; in Exposition and Argument there is not nearly so much room for selection, nor for the individuality which it expresses. I sometimes think that this is the reason why we are more apt to call our artists men of genius than our scientists. The first must make choice of what they will say, the second are content to tell us all the truth.

22. Sequence. As we consider these Canons of Rhetoric further we shall see that there is one which was not of so much service to us in studying Narration as it will be now. I mean the Canon of Sequence. We have seen that the very thing that made such a striking difference between the subjects for Narration and Description was that in the former there was a natural sequence, while in the latter there was not. In Narration we saw that there were sometimes reasons for varying from the natural order, but in Description there hardly seems to be any natural order to vary from. In some special cases, it is true, we saw a certain order more or less prescribed for us (16), but as a rule a single object does not offer us any such chronological sequence. We see everything all at once, or so

nearly so that the difference is hardly worth mentioning. Now in language we must have some order for our statements, and one question in Description is, What shall it be?

It sometimes seems to me as though that great writer Walt Whitman tried to get along in defiance of any such ideas.

“Now I see what there is in a name, a word, liquid,
sane, unruly, musical, self-sufficient,
I see that the word of my city is that word from of old,
Because I see that word nested in nests of water-bays,
superb,
Rich, hemm’d thick all around with sailships and steam-
ships, an island sixteen miles long, solid founded.
Numberless crowded streets, high growths of iron, slen-
der, strong, light, splendidly uprising toward clear
skies,
Tides swift and ample, well-loved by me, toward sundown,
The flowing sea-currents, the little islands, larger adjoin-
ing islands, the heights, the villas,
The countless masts, the white shore-steamers, the lighters.
The ferryboats, the black sea-steamers well-model’d,
The down-town streets, the jobbers’ houses of business,
the houses of business of the ship-merchants and
money brokers, the river-streets.
Immigrants arriving, fifteen or twenty thousand in a week,
The carts hauling goods, the manly race of drivers of
horses, the brown-faced sailors,
The summer air, the bright sun shining, and the sailing
clouds aloft,
The winter snows, the sleigh-bells, the broken ice in the
river, passing along up or down with the flood-tide or
ebb-tide,
The mechanics of this city, the masters, well-formed,
beautiful-faced, looking you straight in the eyes,

Trottoirs throng'd, vehicles, Broadway, the women, the shops and shows,

A million people—manners free and superb—open voices—
hospitality—the most courageous and friendly young men,

City of hurried and sparkling waters! city of spires and masts!

City nested in bays! my city!"

—Walt Whitman: *Mannahatta*.

Here, in spite of the connection of two or three thoughts into different groups. I feel as though Walt Whitman were saying, "This is the way you see things, all at a time, disorderly, confused. Take them as they come to me, these impressions, piling in one upon the other, all of a heap, chaotic. It is not my part to sort them for you." Whether that were Walt Whitman's thought or not, that is my impression of such parts of his work as I have cited.

It was a daring experiment, and only to a certain extent can we say that it succeeded. Successful with Walt Whitman or not, it is by no means an experiment to urge upon young writers. No, one would rather say, Try to find some good sort of Sequence.

It would probably be a futile search if we endeavored to find any general principle which would serve us here, as the chronological order serves us in Narration. But we have seen that in some cases this same chronological order may serve us in Description as well (16 a). It is so convenient that one is readily tempted to try to extend it as far as possible. In the example on page 35 we saw that the different particulars came to notice one after another. In that case it was quite noticeable, but of course the peculiarity may exist where it is not so marked. Here is a description by Walter Scott: —

"The library at Osbaldestone Hall was a gloomy room, whose antique shelves bent beneath the weight of ponder-

ons folios so dear to the seventeenth century. . . . The collection was chiefly of the classics, as well foreign as ancient history, and above all divinity. It was in wretched order."

—*Rob Roy*, ch. x.

Now here it would be dangerous to alter the order of the four particulars noted, because the order is really chronological. On entering the room one first perceives that it is gloomy, on looking round, that it is lined with folios; on looking at the books one sees what they are about, and not till then does one observe that they are in wretched order. Here the time gives us the order as before; it is a shorter time, that is the only real difference. Here is another example, a part of the description of Rashleigh Osbaldistone.

"His appearance was not in itself prepossessing. He was of low stature, whereas all his brethren seemed to be descendants of Anak; and while they were handsomely formed, Rashleigh, though strong in person, was bull-necked and cross-made, and from some early injury in his youth had an imperfection in his gait, so much resembling an absolute halt, that many alleged, etc. . . .

"The features of Rashleigh were such as, having once looked upon, we in vain wish to banish from our memory, to which they recur as objects of painful curiosity, although we dwell upon them with a feeling of dislike, and even of disgust. It was not the actual plainness of his face, taken separately from the meaning, which made this strong impression. His features were, indeed, irregular, but they were by no means vulgar; and his keen dark eyes and shaggy eyebrows redeemed his face from the charge of commonplace ugliness. But there was in these eyes an expression of art and design, and upon provocation, a ferocity tempered by caution, which nature had made obvious to the most ordinary physiognomist, perhaps with the same

intention that she has given the rattle to the poisonous snake. As if to compensate him for these disadvantages of exterior, Rashleigh Osbaldistone was possessed of a voice the most soft, mellow, and rich in its tones that I ever heard, and was at no loss for language of every sort suited to so fine an organ.”—*Rob Roy*, ch. vi.

The first thing noticeable about Rashleigh before one looked at him particularly was that he was shorter than his brothers, and slightly lame. As soon as one looked at his face one received a strong and disagreeable impression. A second look showed that his face, though plain, was not vulgar. So far he has not spoken; when he speaks his voice is at once remarkable.

These examples may give us a hint. It is no especial mannerism of Scott’s that they illustrate, and even if it were, the idea is a good one. If you are at a loss in the matter, describe a thing as you become acquainted with it. There you have a clue which may help you out of many labyrinths.

And as in these cases the time element may be of help, so also may the space element often give us some idea of Sequence. In Walter Pater’s few words on the façade of the Cathedral of Amiens, for instance, his eye runs from the ground upward:

“The great western towers are lost in the west front, the grandest, perhaps the earliest example of its species—three profound, sculptured portals; a double gallery above, the upper gallery carrying colossal images of twenty-two kings of the House of Judah, ancestors of Our Lady; then the great rose; above it the ringer’s gallery, half masking the gable of the nave, and uniting at their top-most stories the twin, but not exactly equal or similar, towers, oddly oblong in plan, as if never intended to carry pyramids or spires.”—*Miscellaneous Studies*, p. 104.

On a like plan, proceeding from beneath upward, is the

well-known description of St. Mark's, Venice, by Ruskin, which may be found in *Stones of Venice*, vol. ii., chap. iv., § 14.

But it must be admitted that there will be not a few cases where your own ingenuity must devise an arrangement which will seem natural. This is just as well. We certainly don't want to be too hide-bound. It is well to allow some play for natural ability. And, just a step farther, it must also be admitted that there are some cases where it matters very little what sort of sequence there may be.

"We spread a mat on deck, lighted our lantern, and sat down to supper, while the gentle north wind slowly carried our boat along through shadows of palms and clear spaces of moonlight. Ibrahim filled the shebooks, and for four hours we sat in the open air, which seemed to grow sweeter and purer with every breath we inhaled. We were a triad—the sacred number—and it would have been difficult to find another triad so harmonious, and yet differing so strongly in its parts. One was a *Landwirth* from Saxe-Coburg, a man of forty-five, tall, yet portly in person, and accustomed to the most comfortable living and the best society in Germany. Another was a Smyrniote merchant, a young man of thirty, to whom all parts of Europe were familiar, who spoke eight languages, and who within four months had visited Ispahan and the Caucasus. Of the third it believes me not to speak, save that he was from the New World, and that he differed entirely from his friends in stature, features, station in life, and everything else but mutual goodfellowship. 'Ah,' said the German in the fulness of his heart, as we basked in the moonlight, 'what a heavenly air! what beautiful palms! and this wonderful repose in Nature, which I never felt before!' 'It is better than the gardens of Ispahan,' added the Smyrniote; nor did I deceive them when I said that for many months past

I had known no mood of mind so peaceful and grateful."

—Bayard Taylor: *Central Africa*, ch. ii.

In that paragraph we could not well change the order of sentences very much. We could not have what the friends said before we knew who they were, and we should not know who they were until we knew where they were, and of course, of the three, Bayard Taylor put himself last. So we may account for some things in the order. But why should the Landwirth come before the Smyrniote? Well, there is no deep rhetorical reason for that. He came first because Bayard Taylor thought of him first, and he thought of him first because he liked him best; the book is dedicated to him. But otherwise there's no reason for that particular order, and the same thing may be said of other questions of Sequence.

III. EXPOSITION.

A. THE NATURE OF EXPOSITION.

23. Exposition and Description. We have already got a fair notion of what Exposition is from our study of Description. We have seen that the aim of Description is to remark as accurately as possible the distinguishing characteristics of any particular thing, and to make our reader apprehend them clearly and vividly. Exposition, on the other hand, deals in generalities. It deals, not with general things, for things are always particular, but with general ideas. Having clearly in mind the characteristics which are common to all individuals of a class, our aim in Exposition is to give that notion to the reader. It is true that in this case or that we may have some doubt as to whether we are really dealing with a particular or a general. But if we make up our own mind and then follow the method in order, we shall not go far wrong. For instance, let us suppose that one of us goes to Europe. We sail for Antwerp, say, and as we wind up the Scheldt we look at the great cathedral spire; the first thing we hear as we drive through the town is the silvery cathedral chime. So we see the Antwerp cathedral, and let us suppose that we have never seen a cathedral before. When we write home, we write an enthusiastic description of its beauty. A description it is, of course, even though we may happen to mention no particular which is not common to all cathedrals. Suppose we are impressed by its dark and time-stained exterior, its high-pitched roof, its flying buttresses, and when we come inside by its vast extent of pillars and its innumerable shrines, each with the twinkling candles before it. These may be the chief

points of our description. But these are no particular characteristics of the cathedral of Antwerp; we shall see them over and over again as we travel through Europe, we shall remark them at Amiens, at Notre Dame, at Cologne; they will become familiar to us, they will in time be among the ideas called up in our minds by the word Cathedral. But the first time they were particular impressions, and as long as they so remained they were the means of Description, although the description was not a very good one.

Exposition has to do with general ideas; its topics are general terms, names of classes. So long as we told what we saw in the Antwerp cathedral, we were describing. But suppose, having got home and wanting to write a paper on Gothic Cathedrals (to exhibit our photographs), suppose we say, "If one wants to know what is a cathedral, let him stand with me before the great cathedral of Antwerp." Then, even if we speak only of that building, so long as we use that building merely as an example of the general idea, we are dealing with Exposition.

This example will make you see a little more clearly perhaps just what was meant when on page 15 I spoke of Exposition which seemed to have a particular thing for a subject. The subject, you observe, is really the general class; the particular thing is only the means we take to express ourselves. So if ever hesitating as to whether such and such a topic is to be handled by Exposition or Description, ask yourself, What is the *real* subject? What is it that is to be done? Are we rendering particular impressions or are we generalizing?

Go out into the country and get one of the lads on the farm to show you how to catch a crayfish. If you never saw one before, it may interest you to describe it. But Huxley, in describing the crayfish,—and he says you ought always to have a real [particular] crayfish at hand while you are studying the book,—has given us an excellent ex-

ample of Exposition. Suppose you go to Switzerland and climb out on that great glacier that comes down from Mont Blanc, called the Mer de Glace. You might describe it afterward and make a very good description. But Tyndall, in telling of his excursions on the Mer de Glace, has managed to make out of it a capital exposition of the general idea Glacier.¹ In each case you mentioned the particular points you observed; for aught you knew they might have been distinguishing characteristics or points common to a whole class. But the scientists, although to be more readily understood they often take a special example (p. 95), lay stress only on those points that are found in everything else of the kind.²

EXERCISES.

The Exercises at the end of 17 may be used here by omitting the particular thing which was there the subject. Thus you will have:

1. The Alpine Peaks.
2. The English Cathedral.
3. Triumphal Arches.
4. The Personal Appearance of Napoleon.
5. Italian Gardens.
6. The Madonnas of the Old Masters, or the Madonna of Modern Art.

I add a few more suggestions.

7. The Stage Beauty (masculine or feminine).
8. An American State Capitol.
9. A Transatlantic Liner.
10. A Football Field.

¹ See the two volumes in the International Scientific Series:—Huxley: *The Crayfish*; Tyndall. *Forms of Water in Clouds, Rain, Rivers, Ice, and Glaciers*.

² What is said in this section of Description may be applied to Narration (p. 15), for both deal with particular things which may be taken as examples of general classes.

In each case you must look at all the individuals presented to you and endeavor to note the common characteristics, excluding everything that is particular to one of the specimens. After some practice of this kind you might as well go on to less obvious subjects, trying to treat them in the same way. In each of the following cases the student should name the individuals which serve as a basis for generalization.

11. The American Politician.
12. The Greek Orator.
13. The Spirit of the Modern Strike.
14. The Romantic Novel (or the Realistic Novel).
15. The Place of Athletics in American Colleges (actually, not theoretically).
16. England's Gain from Colonization.
17. The Good Fortune of Great Inventors.
18. The Characteristics of American Cities.
19. Success of College-bred Men in Business (or the reverse).
20. The Elizabethan Drama.

24. Exposition and Argumentation. But we have already considered this subject pretty carefully, and we have finished with Description for the present. Exposition is the technical name given to the expression of the meaning of a general term. That term may be simple in character as Wealth, Government, Danger; or it may be somewhat complex, as The Danger to American Government in the Present Vast Accumulations of Wealth. Or it may be of terms more complicated still, as will come to illustration later. When we regard Exposition in this light, we see that it is a necessary precedent to Argumentation. We cannot argue rightly without understanding the meaning of the terms employed, and these may be general—indeed they usually are.

“A University should provide instruction in the Fine Arts.” Here is an assertion which may be argued. We may be able to show that a university should provide the instruction mentioned, or we may be able to prove the converse, namely, that such teaching does not come within

the sphere of university activity. But we must first grasp firmly the conception of a University, of its Duties, of the Fine Arts. Before we have some definite opinion on these matters no argument is possible. We may believe that a university is an institution for the advancement of science, or for the general education of young men and women, or for the teaching of general knowledge. Unless we have some definite conception it will be foolish to argue. And we must understand, too, what are the Fine Arts. What Arts are they? are they merely Painting and Sculpture? or shall we include Music, Architecture, and Poetry? or shall we go further and include also Dancing, Landscape Gardening, Elocution? It is obvious that we must have an understanding of these matters before we can settle our question. Exposition, then, must precede Argument. The two are quite different in character, because their subject-matter is different. Exposition deals with general ideas, or general terms where they are expressed by one word or so. Argument handles propositions, statements, judgments, assertions—whatever name one may give to them—whether they involve general terms or not. Exposition, as we see, has no connection with propositions as such, nor can a term as such be the subject of Argumentation.

Exposition, however, must precede Argument, as we have already seen that it must precede Description (18, especially p. 48). Exposition, of an informal character it may be, wholly unexpressed but understood it may be, is a necessity to any sort of expression or indeed in some form or other to anything which we call Thought at all, except the most direct sensations. It is in this sense the most necessary of all kinds of composition. If it be only in the fact that all nouns (except proper names) are general terms so far as their meaning is concerned, we can see how necessary Exposition is to every one. When we begin to think of the meaning of words we begin Exposition, of

no very exact kind, probably, but still something that is of the very same nature as the most advanced and accurate forms.

I have already said that Exposition as a form of expression is a more advanced, a more intellectual, kind of composition. It is pre-eminently the mode of expression of the scholar. Knowledge exists in general terms and propositions. And these generalities it is the office of the scholar to grasp and to expound. It is true that Argumentation is also a mode of composition pre-eminently the scholar's. It is by the principles governing Argumentation that he advances in his art—the art of discovering truth. It is by argument itself, perhaps, by which he enforces the acceptance of the truth that he has discovered. But Exposition is of the first necessity. One may be a scholar and never argue; that is perhaps the highest sort of scholarship which knows and never feels need to strive or try. But one cannot be a scholar without understanding the meaning of general terms and without knowing how that meaning is to be attained and expressed.

25. The Subject-matter of Exposition.¹ We made this distinction between Exposition and Argument, that the former dealt with general ideas and the latter with propositions. This distinction, it must be confessed, is not in keeping with the opinions of several well-known writers on the subject. Thus Aristotle, who is seldom wrong on such points, remarks: "A speech" has two parts. It is necessary first to state the case and then to prove it. It is impossible therefore to state your case without proceeding to prove it or to prove it without having first stated it; for a proof is necessarily a proof of something, and a preliminary state-

¹ This paragraph is really not much more than a fuller and further handling of the subject of 24. The topic is so important, however, that it seems worth while to stick to it until it is quite clear.

* The speeches he had in mind were usually arguments.

ment is not made except in order to be proved" (*Rhetoric*, bk. iii., ch. xiii., Welldon's Translation, p. 274). So coming down to some of the recent books on the subject we find in Genung (*Practical Rhetoric*, p. 386) terms and propositions noted as subjects of Expositions, and among the examples, "The poet is born, not made." Newcomer (*English Composition*, p. 119) also speaks of terms and propositions, giving as an example, "The child is father of the man." And Scott and Denney (*Paragraph-writing*, p. 75) include propositions in the subject-matter of Exposition, giving as an example, "Education is beneficial in all the pursuits of life."

Some little consideration of this matter will be useful to us later on. It is very true that these subjects are capable of Exposition, and we can readily see that there is a great difference between explaining the meaning of a statement and proving the truth of a statement. But although these subjects just mentioned, and many others of like character may be treated by Exposition, clear thinking on the matter will lead us to see that if so treated, they are not considered strictly as propositions.

In many cases the exposition of a proposition amounts only to the exposition of the terms of the proposition. This is obviously the conception implied in Scott and Denney, p. 75, who in speaking of the subject say: "Or it [Exposition] takes a general proposition such as, 'Education is beneficial in all the pursuits of life,' and without assuming the truth or falsity of the proposition, it seeks to answer the question, What is education? to analyze it into its elements, and to classify the pursuits of life." In such a case as this we have the Exposition of several subjects which happen to come to our notice in conjunction; there is nothing to do with the statement, as such, in a treatment like this. Exposition of this kind sometimes goes by the name of Exegesis of Terms, and is very commonly met with.

But there are cases where the Exposition of propositions is not so obviously an Exegesis of Terms. In the example "The child is father of the man" no Exposition is necessary to make the main terms perfectly comprehensible. What, then, is to be expounded? I should say that the relation implied by the words *is father* is not that which is usually suggested by them. We must explain what is meant by the verb *is father*; it is but another case of Exegesis of Terms. When we get beyond such explanation there is no more Exposition; it is time for Argument. In many cases the matter may then be so simple that no formal argument is necessary. But the mind may, I suppose, be said to argue unconsciously in simple cases, where the process has become habitual to it.

In the remaining example quoted, we would seem to have one which does not fall under either of the cases mentioned. "The poet is born, not made." Here certainly the terms need not be explained, for everybody understands them. If this example can be expounded, it must be in some further way than by mere explanation of what is meant by the words used. If we consider the case, we shall see, first, that we may take this as subject for two expositions rather than for one only. We may resolve it into two propositions, "The poet is born" and "The poet is not made." If the terms of these propositions be properly understood there is no more Exposition. It may be that they will not be at once rightly understood, that neither *born* nor *made* is here used in its usual sense, and in this case Exposition is of course possible. On the other hand, we may feel that the statement should be regarded as a single proposition. We may say that the word *born* implies the not being made, that the being *made* would imply the not being born; that this relation is what we wish in this case to make clear. Now this relation between *born* and *made* is a subject that may be expounded. We have not any general term to express it, cer-

tainly; but that is the fault of our language, or rather of our own ingenuity in adapting our language to our thoughts. But the relation we are speaking of is perfectly general in character, and it is only because we have no particular word for it that it seems to us strange to call it a general term. And whatever we call it, it is obviously not a proposition.

There remains, however, the remark of Aristotle which we shall do well not to disregard. He says nothing about Exegesis of Terms: he says that one must state a case before proving it. The mark is so straightforward and sensible that it can hardly occur to any one to deny it. But the stating a case and explaining it, what is that but Exposition?

I think we may still call this "stating a case" the expounding a general idea. With the examples given we may, perhaps, expound the born-not-made characteristic of the poet, the father-characteristic in the relation of child to man, the beneficial-characteristic of education in all the walks of life. These are all general terms, though very clumsily expressed. But the essence of a proposition is truth or falsity, and truth or falsity are things which (except in the case of axioms) are attained by conscious argument. The essence of a proposition consists in the foot-note, "This is a Fact."

In fine, Exposition concerns itself with general terms, or general ideas if that make the matter clearer, and explains their meaning. Argument concerns itself with propositions and proves their truth.¹ If we are clear in our minds as to this point it is well worth the trouble we have taken in arriving at it. For there is great good, and great pleasure as well, in having clear-cut and definite

¹To disprove is merely to prove the negative. When one proves a statement to be false, he is really proving the negative to be true.

ideas. And if we left the subject feeling that we could expound a statement or prove it, according to our convenience, we should have somewhat hazy ideas on the subject. We should not be clear as to the precise dividing-line between expounding and proving, and our later work would suffer. Nor is this the only advantage. When we come to discuss the Method of Exposition, we shall be thankful that we have to deal with terms only: relations and actions being considered for our present purpose as terms, for if they are not such, it is through the accident of language. Strictly speaking, the Method of Exposition applies only to terms, and it is noteworthy that those writers who include propositions under the subject-matter of Exposition do not state how a proposition, as such, may be treated by Definition or Division.

EXERCISES.

Are the following subjects best handled by Exposition or by Argumentation? What would be the difference in treatment in each case? How could you expound them?

1. The American has not that respect for law that marks the Englishman.
2. The rapid thinning of our forests will have a bad effect on our climate.
3. Many persons now travel in Europe during the summer.
4. A young man in a week's vacation often spends more than he can earn in a month.
5. Honesty is the best policy.
6. When winter's come, spring is not far behind.
7. The Young think the Old are fools; the Old know the Young ones are.
8. Public opinion is the only means of sustaining the purity of politics.
9. The blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church.
10. History offers no real analogy to the Nineteenth Century.
11. Great wits to madness sure are near allied.
12. The present relations of Labor and Capital are full of danger to society.

B THE METHOD OF EXPOSITION.

26. Definition and Division. We are now dealing with a mode of expression somewhat more difficult to handle than those we have already considered. We shall at present, then, study only the general method of considering general ideas, leaving the particular means of expression that will serve our purpose for a later treatment.¹

The Purpose of Exposition is in some ways not unlike that of Description. In each we have a subject of which we desire to fix the place among things in general. We have to go so far in both cases: we have already spoken of Classification in Description; it has its place also in Exposition. Further, even is our aim very similar. In Description, having got through whatever classification we think of, we state the distinguishing characteristics of a particular thing, in Exposition the distinguishing characteristics of a general class. Further, however, in Exposition we may consider the subdivisions of the class in question—a process which is obviously not applicable to Description.

You see man is a classifying animal. We spend much of our time in putting things into pigeon-holes, so to speak. We divide up that great chaos of things in general by all manner of lines into all manner of classes, and endeavor thereby to make out of it a cosmos. By the aid of such classification Exposition works. In some of the sciences this classification is very complete.²

These are, however, only systematic and successful efforts, where in general we proceed in rather an unsyste-

¹ 39-42.

² Jevons mentions Crystallography as offering "perhaps the most perfect and instructive instance" (*The Principles of Science*, 685-689). Being perfect, it will be found to be somewhat abstruse. The systems of classification in Botany and Zoölogy offer more useful examples.

matic way. But just as in Botany, to know any species or genus thoroughly, we have to know—

- a. The classes above.
- b. The characteristics which distinguish it from co-ordinate classes.
- c. The classes below.

So it is with any other general notion. Exposition consists in noting that a, b, c about it. Suppose we wish to expound the Idea of a University as Cardinal Newman did. He began by saying: “The view taken of a University in these Discourses is the following: That it is a place of *teaching universal knowledge*.¹” (Preface to *The Idea of a University*.)

That is, he formed a classification something like this:

	Institutions.	
a.	Institutions dealing with knowledge.	Institutions dealing with other matters.
	Institutions for teaching knowledge.	Institutions dealing with knowledge in other ways.
b.	Institutions for teaching universal knowledge, i.e., Universities.	Institutions with other aims in teaching.

Here we have no (c), but in another book Newman treated of the rise and growth of universities (*Historical Sketches*), so we might add the further classification:¹

- c. Universities in Greece and Rome;
- in the Middle Ages;
- Paris, Dublin.
- in the Modern World;
- Oxford, Paris.

The two books together form a pretty complete exposi-

¹ The curious selection of particular mediæval and modern universities comes from another aim of that particular exposition, which need not be mentioned here. The point is not that we have here the best possible classification, but that we have some classification.

tion of the general idea University as Newman conceived it. It is worth noting that he pays chief attention to (*b*) and (*c*).

We have here an example of formalized Exposition, with its three steps, which we may call: *a*. Classification; *b*. Discrimination; *c*. Division. Of these the first two usually go under the name of Definition, and it is this part of the method of Exposition that is common to Description: it consists of a statement of the relation of subject in question to the superior classes and to the rest of its own class. In technical terms, it states the *genus* and the *differentia*. Division, however, as has been remarked, does not occur in Description, for the reason that with a particular object Classification has come to an end. We may divide a particular thing into parts, but not into kinds.

In following this method of Exposition we must always have in mind one point. We must never forget that our classification must be made on lines that will be serviceable. Here is the idea University in another classification:

<i>a.</i> Forces affecting Religious Thought at the Present Day.	
<i>b.</i> Universities.	Other Forces.
<i>c.</i> State Universities.	Private Corporations.
Those professing a Religious Character.	Upon a Religious Foundation.
Those not professing such a Character.	Upon a Secular Foundation.


We might expound the idea University according to this basis, but we see at once that our treatment, however interesting from a particular point of view, could not grasp the full scope of the general idea. This classification is made on lines that may be called accidental. Newman's

classification (except [c]) aimed at being essential in character. One of the difficulties of Definition and Division lies in determining an essential classification. But it would be going rather too far afield to show how this should be done.

Here are a number of classifications of various degrees of excellence:

I. The Novel.


1. Literature.




The Novel. The Short Story. The Fable.
The Idealistic Novel, the Romantic, the Realistic,

OR

2. Literature.




3. Writings.



II. College Spirit.

A. Enthusiastic Loyalty.



OR

College Spirit proper.

On the part of Undergraduates. On the part of Graduates.
B. Influences of College Life.

B. Influences of College Life.

College Spirit:

Books and College

Independence.

Work

is different according
as it appears in

as it appears in

The Small College

The University

The Professional School

OR

is different according as it appears in

The Athletic Manager. The Athlete. The Rooter. The Big,
etc., etc.

III. Aerial Navigation in War.

Aerial Navigation

Means therefor (Partition) Other topics

Flying Machines.

Balloons.

Flying Machines in War.

War Balloons.

Balloons for other Purposes.

This of course is only one way of limiting the topic Aerial Navigation. We might limit it in other ways:

Aerial Navigation

Its Dangers	Partition, not	Other topics.
	Division	

To Society in General

To those who Navigate

1. Increased facilities for burglary, etc.
 2. Increased difficulties in tracing criminals.
 3. Destruction of many conventions connected with terrestrial transportation.

These last examples are worth inspecting, because they introduce a new element to our consideration. Division notes kinds; Partition, of which we here have two examples, notes the parts, which may and usually do belong to every kind. Partition belongs first to Description. We cannot, as has been said, carry on any division into kinds when we have got down to an individual, but we can divide it into parts and speak of each part separately. So we may also, of a class as well as of any thing, speak of the parts. In this case every kind of Aerial Navigation must have some means; in like manner every kind of Aerial Navigation may have its dangers. But the Means of Aerial Navigation is not some kind of Aerial Navigation, nor are the Dangers of it some kind.

Partition, then, may always be convenient. It does not take the place in the Method of Exposition that Division does, but it often serves its purpose very conveniently.

27. Examples of Exposition by Definition and Division. In order to be sure that the foregoing treatment will be useful to us, and that it is not merely a piece of scientific discussion that has little to do with the art of writing, let us consider some topic that is likely to come before us for treatment, and see whether we gain anything by handling it according to the principles in the text. Let us take such a topic as is likely to be given out as an essay-subject: for instance, "Americanism." That is something we hear more or less about; we are not unlikely to want to write or say something about it.

In the first place—since it is already in form a proper subject for Exposition—we want to put it in a classification. To do this we must understand clearly the meaning of the word, and this word is used in more senses than one. Putting aside the meaning, "a word or expression current only in America," let us ask if we are to understand by the word Americanism—

1. The patriotic feeling of an American, or the attachment and sympathy of a foreigner for our land and our institutions? As if we should say "The sturdy Americanism of Washington would admit no interest before that of his country."

Or 2. The type of character which best represents America, the ways, habits, thoughts of a true American? "The striking characteristic of Franklin, Emerson, Lincoln, was their Americanism, their representative quality, that which made them typical of their time and their country."

Suppose we take the last meaning. Then we may make a classification something like this.

The Type of Character representing Nationality.

Americanism:	The English Character.	The Greek.	The Roman.
Developed into different forms in			
The Statesman.	The Man of Affairs.	The Man of Letters.	

Having made such a classification we must examine it narrowly to see whether it is sound, whether the discriminations are sensible and not merely formal, and so on. Suppose this one stands the test. We want then to consider our particular topic in relation to the superior class and the coördinate divisions, and to consider the inferior divisions. We may then note down

1. The Type of National Character, what it is, and how it can be manifested in an individual.

2. Americanism is the appearance in our own country of what has always appeared in every nation having a strong national life.

3. We may compare Americanism, if we choose, with some other types.

4. We may think of examples of other national repre-

sentatives, Plato, Cæsar, for instance, Sir Philip Sidney, or Palmerston.

5. Thinking especially of Americanism we see that it may develop into somewhat different forms under different circumstances,—the same characteristics working themselves out in different ways.

6. Looking for examples of typical Americans, we think of Washington as the Statesman, or would some one of our own day be better? of Franklin as the Man of Affairs, or perhaps of one of our more modern industrial barons; of Emerson as the Man of Letters, or, even here, we may have some contemporary in mind.

7. The consideration of all these examples is in itself valuable. Those mentioned above are almost the first that come to mind, but if we criticise them severely we may learn something. Why is Cæsar a typical Roman? Was Sir Philip Sidney a better example than Sir Francis Drake? We might have said Lincoln instead of Washington; the former had a sort of homely plainness very different from the somewhat cold and aristocratic line in Washington's character. Which of the two was the more American? In a topic like this we may not be able to demand absolute universality, but we may ask what qualities are the more typical, the more widely spread.

Thus we have got together a number of ideas on our subject, and, unless our earlier work is at fault or our classification made on wrong lines, they ought to be ideas which will bring out some of the essential points. They are not arranged in very good order for presentation, it is true; but so far we are only gathering material—we are not drawing up a plan for an essay. That is something to come later (p. 117).

To take another example:

“The Extension of Education must on the whole result in Good” :—this is a proposition to which, perhaps, some

people might not agree unreservedly; but aside from proof or disproof, let us expound the idea which we have in mind when we affirm. We will state what it is that we believe (if we make the statement) without saying why we believe it.

As it stands we cannot very well put it into any classification, we cannot define it nor divide it, nor can we very well note any general characteristics of the proposition that would be of use to us. But we have learned (25) how to deal with such matters; we want, at first, either to select certain of the terms for Exposition or else to convert the proposition into a general term. If we follow the first plan we have the ideas Extension of Education and Its Good Results. If we follow the second and try to find some general term which will give the idea of the proposition, we have Good Results of the Extension of Education, with the proviso that the good results are to be on the whole necessary. But this last limitation evidently requires argument, so we may disregard it at present. We are left then with the general term Extension of Education limited by the modifier Good Results, which practically amounts to the same thing as our former analysis.

As to a classification, we must think over the characteristics of our topic with a view to getting hold of really essential points. Neglecting the universal aspects of the case, I suggest that we confine ourselves to a more modern, more empirical treatment, and construct the following:

Modern Movements in the Spirit of Christian Democracy.

Extension of Education.	Opening of Political Privileges.	Broadening of Religious Thought.	Movements aiming at Industrial Reform.
The American Common-school System.	Increase in Technical and Trade Schools.	Opening of Higher Education to Women.	University Extension and Summer Schools.

Now whether this classification be accepted or rejected (and according to one's standpoint one may be as inclined to do one as the other), it at least serves, if not to throw a good deal of light on our topic, to open to us certain aspects which may not before have been obvious. Suppose, however, we accept it. We must remember, then, that we are dealing with the topic only in so far as regards its results, in fact its good results—we gain the following views :—

1. The Extension of Education is one of those things which, good or bad as they may be, have marked the Nineteenth Century, and America, perhaps, more than the rest of the world.
2. We may consider some of these movements: The extension of the franchise in England, the growth of constitutionalism on the Continent, the increase of coöperation, the emancipation of slaves and serfs, modern scientific philanthropy, the advance in Christian liberalism, and so forth.
3. Of all these movements there have been obvious good results, tending on the whole in the same direction, i.e., that of Christian Democracy.
4. Although the Extension of Education has so much in common with these other great tendencies of our time, it is distinguished from most of them not only by the difference of its field, but by the fact that it has not excited by any means the same opposition as many of them.
5. Although our idea of the Extension of Education may have been somewhat confined, there are really many different forms of it, our common-school system, etc.
6. Of these some have been so long established that their good results are matters well-known and undisputed. We may therefore concern ourselves chiefly with some of the other divisions.
7. We have now to look more particularly for the Good

Results of some of these last divisions. Here doubtless if not before we find that we need more information. We have at least found some of the directions in which definite information is to be sought.

EXERCISES.

Consider the following subjects by Definition and Division; i.e. give each its place in a classification and note, as above, the ideas resulting.

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. The Value of Vacations to Americans.
2. The Cheap Magazine of the Present Day.
3. A College Education is of great Benefit to a Business man.
4. Our National Spirit of Money-getting.
5. The Fall Weather in New England is very delightful.
6. The Main Tendency of the 19th Century has been in the direction of Scientific Discovery.
7. Corruption in Polities.
8. Education will prove the | Solution of the Present Labor Troubles.
9. Rhetoric may be pursued either as a Science or as an Art.
10. Improvements in the Means of Travel in the last fifty years.
11. The Aim of the Orator.
12. College Athletics are tending toward Professionalism.
13. The Racing of Ocean Steamers.
14. Hypnotism may be used in ways very harmful to Society.
15. American Humor. |
|---|--|

These examples should be sufficient to make plain the process of Classification which lies at the foundation of Definition and Division, and to show how these processes are useful in giving us ideas upon whatever topic we have in hand. In these two processes the most important parts are the discrimination between co-ordinate classes and the division into inferior classes. This is because as a rule the general position of our idea is well enough known. We do not need to spend any time in showing that a University is an institution (p. 79), nor in showing that it is especially an institution dealing with knowledge; so much everybody knows. The interesting point is in the discriminating be-

tween the university and other institutions dealing with knowledge; in Cardinal Newman's preface, between the university and learned academies, scientific associations, and the like. Thus though Exposition differs decidedly from Description in its subject and in the study that must precede it, we have seen that there is something analogous in this part of its method. Exposition notes those things which separate one general idea from other coördinate ideas. Description notes those things which distinguish one thing from others of the same kind.

Such is the general method of Exposition. I am far from saying either that this method must always be followed or that it is sufficient for all cases. It is an old and well-known process. My idea of it is that it offers a systematic way of thinking out a subject that gives one a good deal of mental strength. Practice in this sort of thing is not amusing, I admit with readiness; but I have no doubt that it gives the mind a power and flexibility that are necessities to good work, and I think it gives one the best way of getting at the essential points of any general idea that may be presented to us. Practice with simple ideas will enable us to do good work with more complicated subjects, even though we do not proceed in a strictly methodical manner. I am very far from offering the above classifications as good plans for essays. Nor do I offer Definition and Division as a wholly sufficient method of Exposition. What is known as Exposition by Partition may also be employed. But this process so resembles Description that the slight note of it already made will probably be enough for practical purposes.

C. EXPOSITION AS WE FIND IT IN LITERATURE.

28. Different Kinds of Exposition. Exposition is a very common thing in this world; people who never heard

the technical term make use of it constantly, although as in the case of amateur argument, their speculations are often valueless from their not comprehending the application of the principles of common sense to what they are talking about. But whether it be well done or ill done, it is Exposition, or Argument, and of course our desire is to find out how the thing may be done best.

If we turn to Literature to see how it actually has been done we shall find Exposition in great abundance of very different degrees of excellence and of very different kinds. But I incline to think that the following short analysis will be found to mark at least the most important types, and that, by noting characteristics in a way that will be of value to us.

I. Exposition with a view to the Subject.

- A. Scholarly Exposition.
- B. Popular Exposition.

II. Exposition with a view to the Reader.

- A. Easy-chair Exposition.
- B. Pastoral Exposition.

Of course the main divisions are made according to the most obvious tendency. Every sort of Exposition, as every sort of writing, must have a view both to reader and to subject. But there are kinds of discourse where one or the other seems the more important.

To speak of these last forms of Exposition first. Easy-chair Exposition is the name I give to such expounding as is done by Addison in the *Spectator*, by Charles Lamb in the *Essays of Elia*, and by Thackeray in the *Round-about Papers*, as well as by thousands of others who have followed their example. In such a case the author need have no very serious desire to gain a clear and full understanding of the extent and meaning of his subject. How could one attempt to grasp the true extent and meaning of the term "Roast Pig," or "Ribands," or "The Whims

of Lottery Adventurers"? There is rarely any especial attempt to treat the subject ; the author has a subject for form's sake, but its main use is only to suggest a train of thought which shall be pleasing and agreeable to his reader, with possibly a dash of something more serious. That is the reason why I have put it under the head of Exposition with a view to the Reader. The author is more concerned with amusing and entertaining his reader than in elucidating and illustrating his subject.

Of somewhat the same character is what I call Pastoral Exposition, the difference being that here the writer's desire is rather to improve and benefit his readers than amuse and entertain them. I call it Pastoral because it is common with spiritual shepherds. Of this character is the great bulk of the pulpit discourse of the present day. The real desire in the pastor's mind is to benefit his congregation, not merely to understand the subject of his sermon. That is the reason why so many sermons nowadays have no necessary connection with their texts. But the best examples of such exposition are to be found in the writings of such men as Emerson. One need never go to Emerson to find any definite treatment of some special subject. Emerson used his subjects as pegs on which to hang discussions of those ideas which were of interest to him and which he felt convinced would be good for his hearers or readers. His whole mode of treatment shows that he rarely took a subject for consideration with a view to setting down the results. He took almost any subject, looked in his commonplace-books to see what he had said on the matter, and put his remarks together. For this reason it is that Emerson's Essays rarely have any direct or consecutive train of thought. For this reason also is it that unless you look up at the top of the page now and then, you are apt to forget just what is the subject of the particular essay you happen to be reading; it may be His-

tory, it may be Self-reliance, it may be The American Scholar. Hence so far as concerns the particular subjects which he treated I should say Emerson's work was Exposition with a view to the Reader. If we take Emerson's whole work, however, we have a splendid Exposition with the strictest attention to the Subject, i.e., the Emersonian Idea. With what definition and illustration does he present it to us, with what skill he applies it to the various circumstances of life, with what consistency does he keep to the highest plane. Indeed, in so far as his work may be said to show the place in Emersonian thought of such ideas as History, Circles, Books, Manners, how luminous is his Exposition. Still, as far as his method is concerned, we may say that he writes rather with a view to the reader than to each particular subject.

Theoretically, however, Exposition is a consideration of some general idea and an explaining of its meaning and its connection with other ideas; and when the writer has evidently the desire to see clearly what is the nature of his subject and to express that idea, we may put his work into our first division. But such work is different in character and method according to the audience for which it is designed. At the present day much of the attention given to general ideas is given with a view to making them familiar to a class of readers who are not already at home in the particular sphere of thought in question. Such we may call Popular Exposition. It is scientific in character in that its aim is to bring the subject in hand into clear comprehension. In its manner of presentation it is popular, and so differs from that more scholarly exposition which may to advantage be employed by a student writing for those who are to some degree familiar with his particular interests. Between the two no hard-and-fast line can well be drawn, but the difference between the extreme examples is very great. There are very many writers who

deal ably with Popular Exposition, but the work of Tyndall and of Huxley is as typical as any. They are distinctly representative of those scientists who hold it their duty, not merely to advance the boundaries of knowledge, but to make the territory thus gained as familiar as may be to the world at large. As to Scholarly Exposition, there are of course unnumbered examples. If we confine our attention to such recent work as may fairly claim a place in Literature, the names of Spencer, Darwin, and Mill would come to mind. Matthew Arnold and Cardinal Newman, fine masters of Exposition with a view to the Subject, would be rather hard to put in either group, for they have much in common on both sides.

Of these four kinds that which will be of most use to us at present is that last mentioned; it is the only one that we shall find it useful at present to practice. I do not in any way mean that it is the only kind of writing we are ever to do; very probably few of us may be ever called on for much work in Scholarly Exposition, outside of examination papers and theses. But this last is really the form that is of the most value as exercise for our power of thought, and as we have it at present for our aim to strengthen our power of thought, to develop the best ways of thinking, rather than anything else, we shall get most from this kind of writing. It will give us a certain mastery over our subject-matter that will be useful in whatever sort of Exposition we may afterwards attempt.

29. Devices of Popular Exposition. Popular Exposition has for its consistent aim the coming to a clear comprehension of the subject. To this end, however, it adds the desire to present the material in such a way as shall be readily understood by those who are not students of the subject under discussion, and to recommend it to their attention. The devices by which different authors accomplish this purpose are worth noting, and, as they lead us to

another topic which should be brought to our attention as soon as may be, we may allow some violation of systematic arrangement, as we have allowed it before. It is especially worth while to note them here, for it is in Exposition that they will be found to be most useful. You may find them exemplified over and over again in much of the Exposition that is so prominent a part of our reading to-day.¹ I will merely give a list of the more common devices.

1. The use of the lecture-form or of direct address. The author wishes the reader to feel as though a friend were talking to him.
2. The use of the first person plural; the writer assumes common interest on the part of the reader.
3. The use of the second person singular (the plural form); the writer appeals to each reader individually.
4. The use of the first person singular; the writer carries on the thought in the personal form, i.e., takes himself as an example.
5. The Question raising a difficulty; the writer looks at the question from the reader's standpoint.
6. The Question which develops the idea; the writer assumes the position, perhaps not of the reader, who might not think of a helpful question, but of an intelligent scholar who is studying the matter.
7. A turn toward colloquialism in phrase and expression; the reader is not to be scared away by fear of abstruse notions and technical terms.
8. Avoidance of a learned title; based on the same idea as 7.
9. Explanation of technical terms; often before it is necessary to use them, so that when they are necessary they will seem old friends.

¹ Most of them are made use of in this book. It would be a useful exercise to exemplify each point.

10. Joining of Narration to Exposition in order to keep up the interest.

11. Beginning with familiar matters and reserving difficulties as long as possible.

12. Description of a particular case used instead of Exposition of the general term. See p. 70.

13. The statement of laws in inductive form.

These artifices—as they may be called—all depend, as we easily see, upon two or three general principles.

1-6. The Appeal to Personality.

7-10. The Avoidance of Technicality.

11-13. The Approach of the Unfamiliar by way of the Familiar.

It would be hard in the space at hand to give examples which should illustrate all these points. Some of them, however, appear in the following extracts from Royce, *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, originally a series of lectures I choose purposely a somewhat abstract subject, and add for purposes of comparison a piece of scholarly exposition covering much the same ground. You will observe how much more pains Dr. Royce takes to be comprehensible than Dr. Harris.

1. "Examine yourself at any instant: 'I,' you say, 'know just now this that is now present to me, this feeling, this sound, this thought. Of past and future, of remote things, of other people, I can conjecture this or that, but just now and here I know whatever is here and now for me.' Yes, indeed, but *what* is here and now for me? See, *even as I try to tell, the here and now have flown*. I know this note of music that sounds, this wave that breaks on the beach. No, not so; even as I try to tell what I now know, the note has sounded and ceased, the wave is broken and another wave curves onward to its fall. I cannot say, 'I know.' I must always say, 'I just knew.' But what was it I just knew? Is it already past

and gone? Then how can I now be knowing it at all? One sees this endless paradox of consciousness, this eternal flight of myself from myself. After all, do I really ever know any one abiding or even momentarily finished and clearly present thing? No, indeed. I am eternally changing my mind. All that I know, then, is not any present moment, but the moment that is just past, and the change from that moment to this. My momentary self, then, has knowledge in so far as it knows, recognizes, accepts, another self, the self of the moment just past. And again, my momentary self is known to the self of the next succeeding moment, and so on in eternal and fatal flight. . . .

"The result of all this possibly too elaborate web-spinning of ours is not far to seek. We wanted to know who any one of us at any moment is; and the answer to the question is: Each one of us is what some other moment of his life reflectively finds him to be. It is a mysterious and puzzling fact, but it is true. No one of us knows what he now is; he can only know what he *was*. Each one of us, however, is *now* only what hereafter he *shall* find himself to be. This is the deepest paradox of the inner life. We get self-possession, self-apprehension, self-knowledge, only through endlessly fleeing from ourselves, and then turning back to look at what we were. But this paradox relates not merely to moments. It relates to all life. Youth does not know its own deep mind. Mature life or old age reflectively discovers a part of what youth meant, and sorrows now that the meaning is known only when the game is ended. All feeling, all character, all thought, all life, exists for us only in so far as it can be reflected upon, viewed from without, seen at a distance, acknowledged by another than itself, reworded in terms of fresh experience. Stand still where you are, stand alone, isolate your life, and forthwith you are nothing. Enter into relations, exist for the reflective thought of yourself

or of other people, criticise yourself and be criticised, observe yourself and be observed, exist, and at the same time look upon yourself and be looked upon from without, and then indeed you are somebody—a self with a consistency and a vitality, a being with a genuine life.” pp. 204–207.

“ This simple sense-perception in its first form without mediation—that is to say, without the act of comparison which traces out relations between its object and other objects and takes them into consideration in its knowing—is found to know nothing true. The evidence of any immediate act of sense-perception is refuted by the next act. What I see this moment is different from what I see the next moment, and unless I can adjust and reconcile these differences they cancel each other and reduce to zero. I accordingly explain the changes in the object first by referring them to myself, and not succeeding in explaining them by this means I discover that the object cannot be known immediately, because it is not a simple absolute being, but a relative being, mediated through its environment . . . ”

“ The being-for-others is necessary to the object in order to preserve its individuality—that is to say, without a multitude of distinctions and differences one thing coalesces with others—hence multiplicity belongs to it of necessity. Without these properties that arise through its relation to others there could be no being-for-itself. It would be null. I conclude, therefore, that the being-for-itself, which is the simple radical character of the object, is essentially in relation to others, and hence essentially multiplex within itself, and all my painstaking to escape the contradiction has been to no purpose. . . . ”

“ The truth reached is that the object is being-in-itself precisely in so far as it is being-for-others; or, in other words, that it is one in so far as it is manifold and mani-

fold in so far as it is one."—W. T. Harris: *Hegel's Logic*, pp. 58, 62, 63.

I fear that I may have omitted so much of the second extract that it is not quite clear, but the mode of expression is the thing of present importance. Another comparison of interest is between Tyndall's *Forms of Water in Clouds, Rain, Rivers, Ice, and Glaciers*, and Part II of the same author's *The Glaciers of the Alps*. Here the same writer has occasion to present much the same matter in different forms. The former is the more popular.

PART TWO.

THE PARAGRAPH.

I. THE NATURE OF THE PARAGRAPH.

A. IN GENERAL.

30. What are Paragraphs? So far our work will hardly have been of much service to us, except in the way of collecting our thoughts, as the idiom puts it. We have got some principles which will be of use in the gathering together of thoughts, to carry out the figure, and in the selection of the best ones, and we have to some extent tried to put them into practice. But only in a minor degree have we considered the best ways of arranging our material. Our Part One might have been called, "Where to go for Ideas and What to get when you're There," for we tried to determine the particular directions and the different ways in which a man should work according to the nature of his subject.

But so far we have not yet come to putting our ideas into writing. For practice' sake we have written a little, but the real object of Part One was to help our thinking. That seemed to come first. Before we started to write we wanted to have in mind rather a definite idea of what we were going to say. That was the reason for taking up the subject of Kinds of Composition first. The question comes first in any piece of writing. Different writers will differ much in the length to which they will go in thinking out

a subject beforehand, and with many the thinking and writing go almost together. But for young writers, for writers intent on practice, for writers who are trying to form good habits, for such it is best to think the matter out carefully before putting pen to paper.

It may seem at first that our present subject, the Paragraph, supposes that our pen is put to paper already. It does and it does not. Everybody knows what a Paragraph is,—it's the text between two consecutive indentations on a page. And that may seem at first to be merely the arrangement of the writer as he writes, or even of the printer who sets up the type. But, if you think of it, the Paragraph exists, or something so very like it that it may very well go by the same name, even where there are no indentations on the page, or little ¶ marks either. It is well known that the indication of the division of written language into words is a device of comparatively recent date. The Greek and Latin inscriptions were constantly written continuously, without any more space between the last letter of any word and the first of the next than between any letters that came together in the middle of a word. So the Runic inscriptions of our Teutonic ancestors. So the Gothic Bible of Wulfila. It seems to be the way nations begin to write. But although there is no division into words indicated, of course the separate words are there all the same. Each separate word is here as individual as ever. It's much as it is in spoken language. If you listen particularly to yourself as you talk, or to some one else, you will notice at once that you speak in groups of two or three words together, which have no pause at all between them. You will notice at once that you speaking groups of two or three words together.¹ In each case the words are just as much there,

¹ Any particular person may vary somewhat from this way: I set it down as I chanced to utter it when writing.

though not separated out each for itself. And in the same way there may always be a paragraph structure even though the writer or printer do not indicate it. In almost every good bit of writing there is this connection. It is a characteristic of the thought itself.

To tell the truth, the division of books into paragraphs is more modern even than the division into words. Our present mode of indicating the paragraph has not been in universal use for more than three centuries. In the sixteenth century the ¶ was almost as common as indentation, although neither were used very carefully. Indeed, even now there are plenty of writers whose paragraph division seems chiefly the result of chance, almost meaningless as far as the sense is concerned. Where a man writes carefully the paragraph is a guide to the course of his thought. But the mode of indicating the component parts of a piece of writing is somewhat new. Not new, however, is it that pieces of writing should have component parts, that they should be carefully constructed, that the thought should proceed step by step, that certain ideas should be more closely connected with each other than with other ideas which may also have their bearing on the subject. The basis of paragraph-division, the reason for it, is nothing new. It is one of the necessary conditions of good and clear thought. Let us see what it is and what relation it has to the matters we have already considered.

If we set to work to think about anything, unless we pursue a rigorously strict course of argument or something very like it, we shall find that a number of rather miscellaneous thoughts on the matter come into our mind. They all have something to do with the subject, perhaps, but they do not follow any reasonable or sensible order. If these thoughts are set down, however, it will often be found that they may be arranged in groups, although perhaps, in fact probably, not in the exact order of their com-

ing to the mind. Our course of thought is naturally not very regular, very logical, we call it; but when we reconsider it, where it takes its best form, it is a series of connected groups of ideas. The expression "a chain of argument" might well be extended; any piece of writing may be thought of as resembling a chain. There is one difference, however, between the two, and that an important one. In a chain every link is connected with the link before and the link after, and one link is as important as another. But in our course of thought the ideas form themselves into groups and these groups gather into larger collections which have no analogy in a chain.

When we think of any question in this way, when we join thoughts together into groups, and join those groups into larger divisions, and so on, we are said to consider it synthetically. We are rather more familiar perhaps with the analytic point of view: that is, with the division of a completed piece of work into its parts. You will find something on the making of analyses on pp. 115 ff. At present, if you do not feel quite clear as to what an analysis is, it will be enough to consult the specimen given on p. 118.

It is these larger or smaller groups of thought formed by synthesis, or revealed by analysis, that may be indicated by paragraph structure. And now we are ready to turn our attention more directly to the paragraph as we generally think of it. The first question about it would be, "What good is it? What is it here for? Why shouldn't we get on just as well if we didn't bother about paragraphs at all, but just move right along without any?" We have already said something that would serve as answer to the question. But to be more particular, the answer would be that the indication of paragraph structure is a convenience and assistance to the reader and to the

writer as well. We will think of each of these points in turn.

No exercises are offered to illustrate this paragraph and the two following. It will probably be better to continue the exercises in Exposition, of which there can hardly be too many. The principles of these sections will be more particularly applied in 33.

B. THE PARAGRAPH FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE READER.

31. The Paragraph as an Aid to the Reader. First, as to the reader. How is the paragraph to be made a convenience and assistance to him? If we think of ourselves, for a moment, as readers rather than writers, if we imagine ourselves opening a book and turning page after page of solid blocks of type, going on and on, as though over the Desert of Sahara, with never an indentation for oasis to get a bit of rest and refreshment in,—we have all looked into books something like that, and been tired before we began to read them,—if we just bring that to mind we shall easily see one way in which the paragraph may be a convenience. It may serve for a slight rest,—a very short period for re-collection and, perhaps, re-creation of thought as one goes on. It may form a convenient stopping-place. That seems very clear. We have all had actual experience of that use of the paragraph.

But if we try to see a little farther into the matter, we come up against this question: Why is it any easier to rest on a paragraph than anywhere else? Why should a solid page seem so tiresome? Can't you stop where you want to and rest as long as you like? Is a paragraph useful only because you're not so likely to lose your place? Well, there is one answer to this question which may seem superficial, but I am convinced that it expresses human nature accurately. It is, for one thing, easier to stop at a paragraph, just as it is easier, when you are walking, to rest

at some set point, a milestone, a fence, a tree, than anywhere by the roadside or in the middle of a field. You are tired, but you say, "Well, I'll walk to that next fence and then sit down." It's more natural to stop at a definite point than at a point that one chooses merely by chance. This probably has something to do with the matter. But there is a reason somewhat deeper than this—perhaps the reason for this reason. When we get to a paragraph we have an instinctive feeling that we have got to the end of one stretch and may pause before we begin another. Just as when you are walking in rolling country or in the mountains, as long as you can see but a little way ahead, you keep on. But at the top of every rise, at every point that has a little view, there is always a feeling for stopping and looking around. So it is with the paragraph. We feel that we have got through with one bit and we begin another. Between whiles we may stop to consider what we have gone over, to summarize, to grasp more firmly.

At bottom that is the reason why every intelligent reader likes to see paragraph divisions. It is not that he couldn't stop wherever he might wish, whether the paragraph-mark were there or not. It is that he prefers to have the author mark the best stopping-places. He has an instinctive, unconscious desire to pause in his reading, for a longer or shorter time, at the best place. The paragraphs seem made with that end in view.

If you study out your feeling as a reader about paragraphs, especially in books that are rather hard reading, I think you will find that your feelings come to about that. You feel that the paragraph presents places where you can pause a moment in the course of thought, where you can look back a minute and forward.

Now then, as a writer, your duty is plain. The reader will depend upon you to indicate such places to him,

whether you like it or not. If you take no trouble about the matter, if you merely leave it to chance, he is likely enough to be deceived, confused, muddled. And then it's all up with you. That reader will never sound your praises.

Keep the Golden Rule in mind. Remember the relief afforded you by the paragraph-marks in Mill's Political Economy or Paley's Evidences, when you first read those great works,—and be kind to your reader. In other words, let your paragraph structure be, in some degree, the index to the structure of your thoughts.

We have seen already that this is natural enough. There is but one matter further to settle. You are going to indicate to the reader as far as may be the grouping of your thoughts, in some sort to give an analysis of your work. How far will you carry this indication? Will you indicate only the large divisions? Or the subdivisions, too? Or the sub-topics? Or will you go on and mark every minor group of thought? Here again you must think chiefly of the reader's convenience. The paragraph is only the mark of a group. It doesn't say whether this group is a chief division or a minor point. It indicates the beginning of a chief division and of a minor point in the very same way. There are other means of showing the higher stages of division. Mill divided his "System of Logic" into Books, Chapters, Sections, and Paragraphs. Where the aim is chiefly to convey information, the division will be more carefully and particularly marked. But in any case the paragraph is the last means of division before getting down to the sentence. In what you will have occasion to write, division by paragraph will probably be sufficient. When you are writing an examination paper it will be convenient to separate the answers to the different questions. But, as a rule, you will be content with paragraphing, to indicate all divisions. So, to return to our

question, How far should we indicate our analysis by the paragraph?

The answer is, Go as far as will best suit the reader; on which matter you must yourself be judge. In considering the question, bear this in mind. If you paragraph at all you must take some position between two extremes. One extreme is where no paragraphs at all are indicated, and the other is where every sentence stands as a paragraph. The first extreme is not often met with nowadays, but is not uncommon in old books, or in manuscripts written in the days when parchment was dear. The other is, however, quite common. In English it is generally confined to such work as is paid for by the yard. It may be well to offer an example.

“She would see who it was that thus insulted the memory of her dead lover.

“Adelaide stepped forward and walked around to the other side of the cluster.

“There was no one in sight.

“The clump was small, not ten feet in area, flanked on one side by the brook, which laved the very roots of the bushes.

“Dare she peep within?

“The sun had slipped below the horizon. The grayish shadows of night were settling on the far-away prairie.

“Adelaide was just a trifle nervous, but she overcame her timidity, and drawing aside the green willows, looked almost sternly within.

“She could not discover anything there.

“The maiden stooped lower, and at last, pushing the bushes entirely apart, she walked bravely through the cluster and satisfied herself that nothing was or could be concealed therein.

“Suddenly she heard the voice again. It came from the

air above her head this time; but she could not see anything there. The voice said :

“ Beware ! John Graydocke is *a snake in the grass !* ”
—*Blue Grass Ralph*, ch. iv.

Here of course there is really no paragraph division at all. The sentences are marked in two ways, by the capital letter and period, as usually, and also by indentation. But they are not paragraphs. They are only donkeys dressed up in lion skins.

You will avoid both extremes. If you have only a few paragraphs in a long piece of writing you might as well have none at all, for they are hardly observable. If you have a paragraph to every two or three sentences, they have hardly more effect, for there are so many as to be confusing. About a paragraph, on the average, to a printed page is rather a common arrangement. One paragraph to a written page is convenient if your MS. is not going to the press. Down to that point whatever it may be, you can indicate your analysis to the reader; beyond that he must shift for himself. Supposing you have the following arrangement of topics :

WORDSWORTH.

- I. Life.
- II. Poems.
 - a. Lyrical Ballads.
 - b. Poems of the Lake Country.
 - c. The Excursion.
 - d. Sonnets.
- III. The Characteristics of his Poetry.
- IV His Philosophy as seen in his Works.
- V. Wordsworth's Place as a Poet.

We have here what would serve as the skeleton of an essay. If we were only going to write a few pages we

might write a paragraph on each heading. If we were going to write something rather longer we might subdivide these topics, e.g.

- a. Lyrical Ballads:
 - 1. Their conception.
 - 2. Their character.
 - 3. The prefaces.
 - 4. The reception accorded them.

And to each subdivision we could give a paragraph, although in our shorter treatment we had dealt with them all in one. In other words, our paragraphing should be according to the scale of our work. I may add one caution: Don't let your zeal for regularity in this matter carry you into a disregard of proportion. Suppose you give a paragraph each to 1, 2, 3, 4. I should say that that was out of proportion; that 2 should have as much space as all the rest together. You might carry your division farther here, as:

- 2. The Character of the Lyrical Ballads.
 - α . Their Subjects.
 - β . Their Language.
 - γ . Their Spirit.

Then give a paragraph to these subdivisions as you gave a paragraph to divisions 1, 3, 4. But on this matter your knowledge of the subject and your common sense will keep you pretty straight.

C. THE PARAGRAPH FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE WRITER.

32. The Paragraph as an Aid to the Writer. On this point there will be more to say later, and a word or two will

be enough just here. First, a good analysis beforehand¹ or a good paragraph structure is a real stimulant to thought. It enables you to fix your mind on a smaller topic more easily grasped than the whole subject. The whole subject was too extended to get hold of all at once. The divisions of an analysis, or the separate paragraphs, give you an opportunity to concentrate your attention upon the different parts. This is something you ought to do in any case. The analysis or the paragraphs are merely a help; they enable you to handle each part by itself without regard to the rest. In merely thinking over the question this is, for an ordinary man, rather a hard thing to do. You think of one point, and ideas belonging to some other point keep coming into your mind. Or, say, you have thought out one point and go on to the next; in a while you may have forgotten the first. Marking the paragraphs is merely pegging the point down, so that it won't get away.

There is also another convenience. When you are looking over your work, you want to keep asking yourself as you go along whether this or that is done as well as you can do it. Just as it is handy for the reader to have the separate parts of your work marked out for him, so it will be handy for you when you are looking over your work, to have different parts indicated that are really little wholes in themselves. Go through your work paragraph by paragraph and say to yourself at the end of each, "Is this well done?" When it is well done, you can go on with a light heart, leaving no nonsense behind you. Of course you could do this without any paragraphing at all. You could look over your work page by page, for instance. But a page is only a chance division. You may finish up one thing on a page and begin another, so that it would be foolish to do more than look over your grammar page by

¹ If you can do your work that way. See pp. 112-115.

page. If your paragraph gives you groups of thought, and of course it ought to do so, you can think your whole subject over, topic by topic. And as you think it over you will be surprised to see how ideas come to you. Such working is useful, not merely for purposes of correction. It is not only corrective, it is in a high degree stimulating. New material, new ideas, new ways of putting things, come to you. Your first sketch seems very thin compared with what you can gather in careful revision, and for such revision a good paragraph structure is one of the best bases.

II. THE METHOD OF THE PARAGRAPH.

So much for the purposes and possibilities of paragraph structure. Let us now turn to some particular points which may best be handled separately. Some of them we have already in a measure anticipated, but there will be no harm in putting each into its place in our treatment. We shall consider first the paragraph structure, regarding each paragraph as a whole, and next the internal structure of any paragraph.

A. THE PARAGRAPH AS A WHOLE.

I. THE UNITY OF THE PARAGRAPH.

33. Ordinary Paragraphs. The first thing to speak of when we think of the paragraph in general is our old friend Unity, as applied to this particular case. We have already seen (p. 23) that Unity in Rhetoric does not mean some particular quality of the paragraph, or of the sentence, or of anything else. It is the name which we give to a general principle which is of importance in Rhetoric as it is in almost any other matter of human interest, and in one department in Rhetoric about as much as another. It means primarily that you should keep your mind upon

the particular thing you are doing and not bother about other things which have no immediate connection with the case. Now, as applied to the paragraph, the principle of Unity would run about as follows: Every paragraph should have some definite topic. It should include all that is necessary on that topic, and nothing else. That is rather a rigid prescription, but on the whole it will hold good.¹

One must understand it thoroughly. "All that is necessary" may be open to misconception if we do not add "under the circumstances." But of course that must be understood. Suppose you are writing a sketch about American Universities and give a paragraph to the one of which you are a member. You can't say as much as though you devoted your whole sketch to the subject; you must omit a great deal. But you can't afford to leave out anything that is necessary. More or less will be necessary, according to the scale upon which your work is arranged.

Suppose, however, you happen to handle the same topic in several paragraphs. There is no especial reason why you should. But if you do, you will generally find that although it may seem to be the same topic, if it is handled in a succession, it is really a set of sub-topics. In one instance you may write three paragraphs on your own University, but it will be best to take the university buildings for one paragraph, the students for another, and the professors for another (if these be the subjects you speak of). If any such subdivision exist, you will find it well to observe it in your paragraphing. If it do not exist, there is no good reason for having more than one paragraph. But generally some such division may be made if you are clever enough to find out what it is. So, on the other hand, a paragraph may contain a number of matters apparently separate. But you will see at once that they all

¹ It is the definition of True Eloquence given by *Rocheſoncauld, Marquis*, ed. 1658, No. 250.

come under some more general head. Otherwise there is no good reason for lumping them in together.

And when we say that a paragraph should contain "nothing else," the matter is equally plain. This something else, unnecessary to our special topic, that we are tempted to add may be necessary to some other topic. In that case put it where it belongs. Or it may be unnecessary to any topic, in which case you might as well run your pen through whatever you have written about it. You may ask, "Shall we have nothing beyond bare necessity? Is there no place for ornament, for amusement, for humor?" That depends, I should say, on what your purpose is. If your purpose include humor, amusement, ornament, those things are necessities. If not, they are out of place.

All this is, perhaps, too commonplace to have spent our time over. A great deal that finds place in text-books on Rhetoric is commonplace if we look at it from the right point of view. If this is a commonplace, so much the better.

The best practice one can have in giving Unity to one's paragraphs consists in making analyses of the paragraph structure of other people's writing and making analyses of paragraph structure for one's self to follow. The first exercise serves to put into a practical form what we have been already thinking over, and the second serves to familiarize us with the process as applied to our own habits of thought. Some material for such work will be found a little later (p. 117); just at present there is a special word to say upon the latter process.

The making of analyses of whatever is to be written is a practice frequently commended to students, and by about three out of four of them rejected as wholly useless. Almost every teacher of English who has got to close quarters with his students has been told, often by the best of

them, that such analyses were a hindrance rather than a help. "I make them because you tell us to," one will say. "but it's ever so much easier to make them after writing the essays than before. I don't get any help from them myself. If I make one beforehand I can never keep to it. I go on for a page or two and then leave it." Now such a view has its foundation. It is not easier to write an essay on an analysis. It is often much harder. Nor is the particular essay always better. It may lack vitality and be very wooden. We may go farther and say that probably very few good writers ever make analyses of what they are about to write. They have a general plan in mind before writing, but not much more. Indeed, such writers may never have made such analyses; they may have acquired in wholly different ways their ability to handle even intricate questions with wonderful clearness. And even if one have made a very good analysis of a subject beforehand, one will very often see reason to leave it before one is half through. In spite of all this,—for all these points are well taken as far as the facts are concerned,—even allowing all this, there can be little doubt that making previous analyses is the best practice yet devised for cultivating general clearness of expression.

You see we have here two points which must be considered. Such work is practice work, for one thing, and, for another, it is to cultivate general clearness of expression.

As to its being practice work not much need be said. All the work in this book is practice work. This is not like a cookery-book by means of which a cook can learn to make an apple-pie in the course of half an hour. It is not a complete letter-writer which will enable you to concoct a respectable letter on almost any topic in fifteen minutes. It isn't a Royal Road to Rhetoric. It is not meant to enable you to turn out finished work at once any more than a book on painting or on football is meant to

enable you to paint a good picture at once, or to play half-back. But just as a book on painting or on football is meant to train the powers that you will need to use in painting a picture or playing half, so this book is meant to train those powers that will (if they ever get trained) enable you to express yourself well. Just read Ruskin on Perspective and go out and try to draw a clump of trees, or read Mr. Camp on football and go into a hard game, or, better still, read a book on swimming and jump into the water where it's out of your depth. In each case you will at once forget everything that was in the book and begin to battle for life. But in such cases, after careful study of the principles and much good practice, one begins to do things intuitively. Long and painful practice makes second nature. Some men get along without the principles and with only the roughest practice. For such a one who succeeds there are many who fail. And those who succeed, especially in writing, are generally men particularly well qualified. Here we do not assume to have any better heads than the rest of the world.

Then as to the second point. The object of such work is to cultivate clearness. If your aim be humor, or brilliancy, or ease, or anything else but clearness, this writing upon an analysis is not the best way to reach it. It may even be prejudicial to certain other good characteristics that you have. It may take all the naturalness out of your writing and make it conventional and stiff. It may take away all your spirit and dash and make you dried up and pedantic. It may do these things and worse, if you are not careful; and if you think that it is doing these things, and if the qualities that you are losing are of more value to you than general clearness of expression, or if you are sure that your writing is clear enough as it is,—why, then, you don't want to make any more analyses. They will help you to clearness of thought and perspicuity.

of expression. And those are very good qualities; when you think it over, you will see that clearness is a good thing in itself, that it is a great element in strength and ease. It is well worth trying for, even at a slight loss. And if you have your eyes open for the harm that may be done, you stand a pretty good chance of avoiding it.

Making analyses of the work of others and following careful analyses of your own will help you to form the habit of mind that will enable you to write clearly without such help. That's all that we can expect to get—the right habit of mind. When you have once got that, you may throw all your analyses into the fire.

A word or two on making analyses of what has been already written may be of practical service. I should go about it in this way. Take your subject, let us say Maurice's sermon *On Peace*,¹ and go through it paragraph by paragraph, trying always to set down the true topic of the paragraph in a few words that will be concise and clear.

Par. 1. Circumstances under which the gift of Peace was made.

2. Strangeness in the thought of peace at such a time.
3. Yet these circumstances interpreted the gift.
4. It was not Peace with the world, nor in their own body.
5. It was not freedom from internal conflict.
6. "My Peace." The nature of the Peace of Christ.
7. The Sin of the Disciples had made evident to them the nature of their need and where they must go for help. A contrast between the world's gifts and the gifts of Christ.
8. Such a consideration (as in 7) as pertinent in our case as in that of the Disciples.

¹ Lamont: *Specimens of Exposition*, pp. 133-143.

9. This Peace, originally a deliverer from strife, must be held fast in strife.

10. Bearing upon the service of Holy Communion.

From this statement you see that Maurice was not very careful about his paragraph structure. At least it is not a very definite guide to the structure of his sermon. Hence you see the necessity of reading every paragraph carefully and making sure that you have got its real intent. It will not do to read only the first sentence: some of these paragraphs have two topics.

Having got so far, we want some kind of systematic grouping of the ideas. Here Maurice himself has marked out the main divisions, and we may proceed without further difficulty to put our first notes (which were more of an abstract or memorandum) into an analytic form, with the following result, which you see is rather different from a mere statement of the subjects of the paragraphs.

Introduction. The conditions of this gift of Peace make clear its meaning. Par. 1, 2, 3, as above.

Part I. What that Peace was not.

- a. Not with the world.
 - b. Not among themselves.
 - c. Not freedom from internal conflict.
- } Par. 4.

Part II. What that Peace was. The Nature of the Peace of Christ. Par. 6.

Part III. The Conditions of the Interpretation.

The sin of the Disciples had made evident to themselves

- a. The nature of their need.
- b. Where they were to find aid.

Hence a consideration of the nature of the aid: } Par. 7.
contrast between the world's gifts and this
gift of Christ. }

Part IV. Application to our own circumstances. Par. 8, 9.

Conclusion. The Bearing of the above upon the service of Holy Communion. Par. 10.

Such is a simple example of an analysis which will give you an idea of how to proceed in more complicated cases. Don't try to make an abstract of the essay or whatever else you are at work on. An abstract aims to convey the same information as the original; an analysis aims only to give the course of the thought to note and arrange the topics. The two may not coincide; in an abstract, for instance, you may find it convenient to depart from the original order. An analysis, as a rule, contents itself with noting the topics; an abstract reduces the statement to lower terms. And lastly, an analysis makes obvious the system of division and subdivision of thought, the structure of the piece, which is not so commonly attended to in making abstracts.

EXERCISES.

1. Make an analysis, as above, of some essay or piece of writing that you are familiar with. Subjects are easily found; Macaulay and Burke are good to begin on, because of the care with which they observe the Unity of the Paragraph. Macaulay's Life of Johnson (Encyc. Brit.) or a part of it, Burke on Conciliation with America, are good examples. De Quincey is not so simple, but the essay on Shakespeare (Biographies), which will give us some good examples later, is less digressive and more regular in structure than much of his work. Ruskin's *Sesame and Lilies* and *Crown of Wild Olives* offer easy examples, for he marks the main parts of the analysis himself. The essays of Matthew Arnold and Walter Pater are good for later practice, being a little more difficult on account of the nature of their subject-matter.

2. Take one of the collections of material made in the exercise in 27 and arrange it in such form as would serve as a plan for an essay. Note down, as on page 107, each idea that is to serve as a paragraph-topic, and then arrange and group them together in the best way that occurs to you. You will often find that you have to

do a good deal of rearranging before you are satisfied with your result.

For example: I gather from the classification on page 81 the following topics:

College Spirit.

1. College Spirit, a feeling of enthusiastic loyalty for one's college.

2. Such a feeling, as such, a good and generous thing.

3. Akin to patriotism.

4. To personal loyalty.

5. To religious devotion.

6. College spirit proper differs somewhat in undergraduate and graduate.

7. The undergraduate shows it by taking part in intercollegiate contests, athletic or otherwise; by doing his college work in a superior manner; by always upholding the reputation and honor of the college.

8. Also in less excellent ways.

9. The graduate's loyalty.

10. One form of College Spirit is Class Spirit.

11. Almost destroyed at the large universities, it is a useful influence in the colleges.

12. Still different is Fraternity Feeling.

13. Which has its good points.

14. And its bad ones.

If I were going to write a paper on this material, it would take some such form as the following:

Introduction. (8) Many people imagine that College Spirit is nothing more than an impulse to steal signs and blow tin horns.

Main Discussion. I. College Spirit in General. It is akin to

(3) a. Patriotism.

(4) b. Personal Loyalty.

(5) c. Religious Devotion.

(2) It is a good thing in itself and has a generous influence on character.

II. Its manifestation .

(7) The manifestations of (8) are not the only ways of showing College Spirit: there are other and better ones. (Expand.)

(6) Not only does it influence the undergraduate, but the graduate.

(9) As is shown in different ways.

(10, 11) Class Spirit.

(12, 13, 14) Fraternity Feeling.

Conclusion.

(15) These last are only differing forms of the same thing.

(2) And that thing is one of the most effective influences of college life.

You will observe that I have shifted things about a little with a view of getting an arrangement which will appeal most to the reader. I have also compressed several topics, (10, 11) and (12, 13, 14). (7) I should expand into three paragraphs; (3), (4), (5) I should make rather short paragraphs. And I have introduced a new topic (15) which did not happen to be in the list of those suggested by the classification.

34. Paragraphs of Outline, Summary, and Connection.

In speaking of this question of Unity, I have hitherto ignored one minor matter that may at first seem to form an exception to the general rule. I am thinking of such paragraphs as present outlines of subsequent treatment, or summaries of what has gone before, and such as are merely connective. To such paragraphs our remarks heretofore do not seem very applicable. A man begins a consideration of the reasons leading to the recent commercial depressions. He may find it convenient to begin with a little paragraph which shall propose the line of treatment that he means to follow. Or such a paragraph may be useful at almost any point of one's work; it serves for clearness, it gives the reader an idea of what he may expect, it enables him to get hold of the particular points as they are presented more clearly and quickly. Here is a well known paragraph of this kind from Burke's Speech on *Conciliation with America*.

"But, Sir, in wishing to put an end to pernicious experiments, I do not mean to preclude the fullest inquiry. Far from it. Far from deciding on a sudden or partial view, I would patiently go round and round the subject, and survey it minutely in every possible aspect. Sir, if I were capable of engaging you to an equal attention I would

state that as far as I am capable of discerning, there are but three ways of procedure relative to this stubborn spirit which prevails in your Colonies, and disturbs your government. These are: to change that spirit as inconvenient, by removing the causes; to prosecute it as criminal; or to comply with it as necessary. I would not be guilty of an incomplete enumeration; I can think of but these three. Another has indeed been started, etc" [The three mentioned are then particularly considered.]

This paragraph and the subsequent treatment is well worth studying in just this place. Burke outlines the plan he proposes to follow. He specifies three modes of dealing with the American spirit of freedom. Each of these ways he discusses in order, prefixing to the consideration of each a concise statement of the question, in which he generally uses the very words which he has used in the paragraph above.

You can easily see the convenience of such a paragraph; you can probably see what kind of Unity it has, even though it seems a little pedantic to say that it has some definite topic, and that it includes all that is necessary on that topic, and nothing else. Of the same sort as these paragraphs of prospective summary are such as contain retrospective summaries. After you have finished some rather detailed treatment it is very useful to present a slight recapitulation; and such a recapitulation must stand by itself, for it is no more connected with one of the sub-headings than with another. The example below is also taken from Burke's Speech on Conciliation.¹

"Then, sir, from these six capital sources: of descent; of form of government; of religion in the northern provinces; of manners in the southern; of education; of remoteness from the first mover of government; from all these causes

¹ It is the conclusion to the part extracted in Lamont: *Specimens of Exposition*.

a fierce spirit of liberty has grown up. It has grown with the growth of the people in your colonies, and increased with the increase of their wealth; a spirit, that unhappily meeting with an exercise of power in England, which, however lawful, is not reconcilable to any ideas of liberty, much less with theirs, has kindled this flame that is ready to consume us."

Paragraphs presenting such outlines or summaries are very useful in anything that is to be spoken. They are a great help to the hearer, who has to depend on his power of memory much more than does a reader. But they are also useful in writing, especially in cases where the treatment is in any respect complicated or difficult to understand. Where the matter is sufficiently plain, as in the case of ordinary narration or description, for instance, such summaries are rather out of place and obtrusive.

There is another paragraph, too, very like these of which we have been speaking, which, instead of looking either backward or forward, looks, as one might say, both ways. When one passes from one main division of one's work to another, it is often convenient to express the connection in what may be called a paragraph of transition. There is in Ruskin's *Stones of Venice* a very interesting chapter on the Roman Renaissance (vol. iii, ch. ii), which offers many very good examples of various points of paragraph structure. As is often the case with Ruskin's work, the main divisions are very carefully marked. In § v he mentions four "moral or immoral elements which unite to form the spirit of Central Renaissance architecture." The paragraph is as good an example of prospective summary as the one from Burke. To each of the four elements mentioned Ruskin gives part of the Chapter marking the transitions with care. The connecting link between the first and second is expressed in the second paragraph of § xxvi; the connection between the second and third is prefixed to

§ lxxxvi; the connection between the third division and the fourth (which we shall find useful as an illustration on p. 126) is as follows:—

“ § xcii. These, then, were the three principal directions in which the Renaissance pride manifested itself, and its impulses were rendered still more fatal by the entrance of another element, inevitably associated with pride. For, as it is written, ‘ He that trusteth in his own heart is a fool,’ so also is it written, ‘ The fool saith in his heart, There is no God,’ and the self-adulation which influenced not less the learning of the age than its luxury, led gradually to the forgetfulness of all things but self, and to an infidelity only the more fatal because it still retained the form and language of faith.” The first three divisions were on certain forms of Pride; the last is on Infidelity.

Another example, chosen from Macaulay, will show a more informal application of the same idea. It is from the essay on *Addison*. Macaulay has been speaking of the *Guardian* and means to go on to speak of *Cato*. He interposes this little paragraph:—

“ Why Addison gave no assistance to the *Guardian* during the first two months of its existence, is a question which has puzzled the editors and biographers, but which seems to us to admit of a very easy solution. He was then engaged in bringing his *Cato* on the stage.”

Indeed such paragraphs are sometimes found as connection merely between paragraph and paragraph. But such a usage has not much to be said in its favor. Such is the following:—

“ It has been said that each of these poems has a purpose. Another circumstance must be mentioned which distinguishes these Poems from the popular Poetry of the day; it is this, that the feeling therein developed gives importance to the action and situation, and not the action and situation to the feeling.” —Wordsworth: *Preface to the Lyrical Ballads*.

EXERCISES.

Take now some of the plans you have already made according to 33, either of the work of others or of your own, and write for one or more of them :

1. A paragraph proposing the treatment.
2. One containing a summary.
3. One containing a connection between part and part.

For the purposes of this exercise you may well enough imagine that the essays contemplated in the plan are to be of any length you choose. Here is an example of a paragraph of connection written to come between I and II in the plan of p. 118.

"Nor is it on such general considerations alone that one may be sure that College Spirit is something more than the noisy ebullition of boyishness set free from restraint. One can see it in its manifestations and effects in college life."

II. CONNECTION.

35. The second matter that we must handle here is that of Connection. There are other things that may occur to you—the question of Sequence, for instance. But that belongs to another part of our study (43), and indeed we have already had a good deal to say concerning it. So with some other points you may think of. The thing of real importance now is Connection.

The paragraph has often been compared to a link in a chain (p. 102). Just as the links of a chain are connected together, so must the paragraphs of a piece of writing be connected. The analogy is a useful one, but we should mark one rather important difference. You cannot connect the links of an iron chain by conceiving of a connection in your mind. But you can connect a number of paragraphs in just that way. With an iron chain there must be material connection between link and link: in a chain of paragraphs it will very often be unnecessary to express any connection; it will be so obvious that it will be impertinent to state it. You may treat your reader as

a rational being. As Mr. Justice Story said to a lawyer who was full of detail on some simple matter, "Mr. ——, there are some things that even the Supreme Court of the United States may be presumed to know."

So, then, in many cases, though there should always be some connection of paragraph in a coherent discourse, it is not by any means necessary always to state it. In practice it is generally left unexpressed:

1. In Narration; because the chronological sequence is generally assumed. It is only a child who begins every new breath with "Then we went," or "Then we came."

2. In cases where the subject has already been clearly indicated by an outline (34). After a paragraph of outline, the connection of succeeding paragraphs may often be omitted.

3. In cases where the paragraphs actually or practically depend upon something preceding, as in the case of this paragraph you are now reading.

4. In works where the writer can count on the utmost concentration of attention on the part of his reader. Such are many technical works, text-books, and so on. Even if the connection be not obvious to the casual reader, the writer who is dealing with minds trained to his subject, and bent upon gaining his meaning at any cost, will often leave out the definite connections.

5. In any case where, as above noted, the connection is so obvious that a connection expressed would be only in the way.

But if you are not particular to indicate the connection between paragraph and paragraph, do not ever forget that there must be some connection. We can read a collection of wholly separate items in a newspaper, because we know we have to do with a number of unconnected things. But if we begin anything with the idea that it is the treatment of some subject, and find that it is merely a number of

wholly unconnected thoughts on the matter, we feel disappointed. A very slight connection is often sufficient. And some connection there always ought to be in your work between topic and topic. For if there be none, you can have little reason for the order you adopt. And if you can give no reason for your mode of treatment, it is improbable that any one else will try to.

So, then, there should always be some connection, and often enough it is useful to express it very plainly. You can see that this will often be the case in public speaking, where the hearer is never able to turn back to what has gone before; and so it is often in writing. It's worth while to save the reader the trouble of thinking back. And it may be added that even where it is not absolutely necessary it will often be well to express some connection. It takes away a sort of crudeness or abruptness that may otherwise exist—a quality very jarring to a cultivated taste.

Having it, then, in mind to express whatever connection exists, we consider next where to express it. Strictly speaking, the connecting link belongs as much to the paragraph which you have written, as to the one you are about to write. It might stand by itself as with the paragraph quoted from Wordsworth on p. 122. But this seems rather slow, even clumsy; in practice, connection is almost always expressed, if at all, either at the beginning of a paragraph or at the end.

36. Connection at the Beginning. The most obvious place for expressed connection is at the beginning. There are a good many ways of managing the matter. We may put in a connecting sentence, or even two; but this is rather formal and in practice not very common. We may use part of the first sentence, perhaps a clause before a semicolon. We may repeat some word or thought that has occurred toward the end of the preceding paragraph.

The simplest and commonest way is by means of a demonstrative pronoun or some conjunction which will point to what has gone before. If we keep the matter in mind we shall find little difficulty in contriving means.

It is always instructive to look in what you are reading for examples. In the chapter of Ruskin's *Stones of Venice*, of which I spoke a short time ago (34), there is a bit which is very illustrative (vol. iii, ch. ii, § xcii to the end). We have not room for the whole passage, but I think you will see how carefully he manages his connections from the endings and beginnings of the paragraphs, which, by the way, are all numbered.

" § xcii. . . . to an infidelity only the more fatal because it still retained the form and language of faith.

§ xciii. In noticing the more prominent forms in which *this faithlessness* manifested itself, it is necessary . . .

. . . two vast multitudes—one tending to Reformation, the other to Infidelity.

§ xciv. *Of these the last* stood, as it were, apart . . .
. . . and a thousand enthusiasms and heresies, etc.

§ xv. *But* the main evils . . .

. . . it was rendered tenfold more bitter by the natural but most sinful animosity of the two divisions of the Church against each other.

§ xvi. On the one side *this animosity* was of course inevitable . . .

§ xvii. *Besides this* . . .

§ xviii. Nor, *on the other hand*, was the opposition of Protestantism, etc.

. . . with the ashes of Jerome and the blood of Charles.

§ xix. Now all *this evil*, etc.

. . . grammar, logic, and rhetorice.

§ e. The study of *these sciences*, therefore . . .

§ ei. *But* it was not the grammarian and logician alone . . .

§ cii. *This fatal result.*

§ cihi. *But this was not all.*

Now all *this* evil, observe, etc. [This begins a paragraph; there are three in the section.]

I believe that in a few years we shall awake from all *these* errors,"¹ etc.

In each one of these fourteen paragraphs Ruskin took care to point out the connection with what had gone before. In §§ xciv and ci the connection is slightest; the connection in thought is indicated by the conjunctions. In §§ xciii and xvi there is a repetition of a word or idea coming near the end of the foregoing paragraph. In the others, as a rule, attention is called to what has preceded by a demonstrative pronoun or a similar expression, as in § xciv the words *the last*.

It may not seem to you necessary to be so particular about expressing connection; few writers are so explicit; Ruskin himself is not always. But the example serves to show what may be done and how to do it; and if you will look up the passage and read it carefully, you will see that the care has by no means been thrown away.

There are other ways of expressing connection than those used by Ruskin. A common device lies in the use of a short summary of what has preceded, a summary of a clause or perhaps a sentence. In the first example following, De Quincey has been speaking of Shakespeare's women. He turns to a discussion of the supernatural element in Shakespeare.

"In the great world, therefore, of women, as the interpreter of the shifting phases and the lunar varieties of that mighty changeable planet, the satellite of man, Shakespeare stands not the first only, not the original only, but is yet the sole authentic oracle of truth. Woman, therefore,

¹ The italicizing throughout is mine.

the beauty of the female mind, this is one great field of his power. The supernatural world, the world of apparitions, *that* is another; for reasons which it would be easy to give, etc."—De Quincey: *Shakespeare*. (The paragraph goes on to considerable length.)

The next example is from Macaulay's essay on *Bacon*. He has been speaking of the power exerted over us by "the great minds of former ages."

"Nothing, then, can be more natural than that a person endowed with sensibility and imagination should entertain a respectful and affectionate feeling towards those great men with whose minds he has daily communion. . . . [It is not for some little time that he comes to the real subject of the paragraph.] . . . But the fanaticism of the devout worshipper of genius is proof against all evidence and all argument. . . ."

EXERCISES.

1. Write a single paragraph on one or more of the following topics, supposing it to be a part of a longer essay, and indicating in the first sentence the connection with what has gone before, the subject-matter of which you must point out; e.g., preceding paragraph on the good results of written examinations.

"In spite of all this, and admitting readily that written examinations at stated times give certain advantages not so easily come at otherwise, yet it remains a fact that they have their drawbacks, and very serious ones. First in the list comes the evil effect of cramming," etc., etc.

In this example the connection is made rather too explicit and prominent. Try to manage your exercise more easily.

- a. The Humor of Lincoln (having spoken of his public character).
- b. Electricity as a modern means of Locomotion (having spoken of Steam).
- c. The Australian Ballot (having spoken of corruption at the polls).
- d. Japan goes to war with China (having spoken of her advances in civilization).
- e. Washington's refusal of a Third Term.

- f. The English march from Lexington to Concord.
 - g. The Private Character of Napoleon.
 - h. The place of the Small College in America.
2. Take a plan for an essay made in accordance with 33, and write one or more paragraphs, taking care, as above, to mark the connection : e.g., * 12 on p. 119.

"Somewhat like Class Spirit, in that it flourishes on the whole more at a small College than at a large University, is Fraternity feeling. Doubtless the same causes arouse and discourage both, etc."

37. Connection at the End. Since the connection belongs as much to one paragraph as to the other, it may be stated at the end of that which comes first. If you look over the examples of connection at the beginning of a paragraph, however, with a view to adapting them to use at the end of the paragraph preceding, you will find that they will not all serve your purpose. Demonstrative pronouns are of little use, for they usually refer to something that has gone before and not to what is still to come. The same may be said of the conjunctions, which have been useful as connectives at the beginning. And repetitions of a word or an idea will not be useful for much the same reason; you can't repeat a word that hasn't yet been written. When you have got so far it may occur to you that any of these devices may really be used as well at the end as at the beginning. It may seem as if it were merely a question of where you place the sentence with the connecting words, where you make the paragraph division. It may seem that they would do quite as well at the end of one paragraph as at the beginning of the next. But read the passage we have considered and try the effect of transposing the first sentence in each paragraph to the end of the paragraph preceding. I think you will see that the thing must be otherwise managed.

To find out how it is to be managed we may well enough turn to examples again. But as there is no writer who systematically puts his connections at the end of his para-

graphs, we shall not be able to find a whole passage to illustrate our point. A few examples must be sufficient, the following being from Macaulay's essay on *Bacon*. I quote the last two sentences of the paragraphs in question. The paragraphs are not consecutive. ". . . While Elizabeth lived, indeed, this disapprobation, though deeply felt, was not loudly expressed. But a great change was at hand." ". . . Neither on this occasion, nor on any other, could his bad actions be attributed to any defect of head. They sprang from quite a different cause." ". . . In the House of Commons he had many personal friends and many warm admirers. But at length, about six weeks after the meeting of Parliament, the storm broke."

The seventh paragraph of the essay in which Macaulay finishes general mention of Mr. Montagu, and turns to the life of Bacon, ends as follows:

" . . . We shall attempt, with the valuable assistance which Mr. Montagu has afforded, to frame such an account of Bacon's life as may enable our readers correctly to estimate his character."

Such connecting sentences are sometimes found in one of the early paragraphs of an essay. It is a not unusual mode of beginning an essay to mention something which is not the particular subject to be discussed. After such allusion the transition to the subject is made, and usually at the end of a paragraph. Here are the first two paragraphs of Matthew Arnold's essay on Tolstoi:

" In reviewing at the time of its first publication, thirty years ago, Flaubert's remarkable novel of *Madame Bovary*, Sainte-Beuve observed that in Flaubert we come to another manner, another kind of inspiration from those which had prevailed hitherto; we find ourselves dealing, he said, with a man of a new and different generation from novelists like George Sand. The ideal has ceased, the lyric vein is dried up; the new men are cured of lyricism and the ideal; 'a

severe and pitiless truth has made its entry, as the last word of experience, even unto art itself.' The characters of the new literature of fiction are 'science, a spirit of observation, maturity, force, a touch of hardness.' *L'idéal a cessé, le lyrique a tari.*

"The spirit of observation and the touch of hardness (let us retain these mild and inoffensive terms) have since been carried in the French novel very far. So far have they been carried, indeed, that in spite of the advantage which the French language, familiar to the cultivated classes everywhere, confers on the French novel, this novel has lost much of its attraction for those classes ; it no longer commands their attention as it did formerly. The famous English novelists have passed away and left no successors of like fame. It is not the English novel, therefore, which has inherited the vogue lost by the French novel. It is the novel of a country new to literature, or, at any rate, unregarded till lately by the general public of readers ; it is the novel of Russia. The Russian novel has now the vogue, and deserves to have it. If fresh literary productions maintain this vogue and enhance it, we shall all be learning Russian."—*Essays in Criticism: Second Series*, p. 253.

Here the subject is a Russian novelist, but we get no notion of it till the last sentence in the second paragraph. The third paragraph begins on the Russians.

EXERCISES.

Take the subjects of 36, 1, and without troubling about connection at the beginning, write paragraphs which shall distinctly turn the subject to the topic to be taken up next. Or, as in 36, 2, treat some of the paragraphs in the analyses in 33 in the same way.

This exercise is not so easy as the preceding. The usual difficulty is that the turn from one subject to another at the end of a paragraph is made far too abrupt and obvious. Often some very stiff sentence is tacked on to the end of the paragraph like this: "Let us now

consider whatever may be said in favor of written examinations," or "Having examined the defects of the present system we will turn to a study of its strong points." One must use some ingenuity to manage the matter without seeming bold. You must remember that the device is by no means a necessity of style; it is only a convenience, to be used now and then, for variety's sake or other reasons.

B. THE STRUCTURE OF THE PARAGRAPH.

Our paragraphs, then, the different links in our chain, must be all of the right stuff and each made fast to the one before as to the one coming after. That is what we must bear in mind about the paragraph as it stands as a whole in our writing. To turn next to the paragraph in itself, to its particular structure.

Of the internal structure of the paragraph there is much that has been very well said, and that in various ways. The subject has been considered from different points of view. But as, in writing, we have to begin every paragraph, to carry it through somehow or other, and then to make an end of it before we turn to another, let us think first of the beginning, then of the general structure, then of the end. Rather a rule-of-thumb order, perhaps, but one that will serve.

I. THE BEGINNING OF THE PARAGRAPH.

38. Beginning. *a.* The easiest way to begin a paragraph, and the commonest way too, is to say what you are going to write about,—something as if you were putting a title to a book, this is. In more formal language we might say: The topic of the paragraph is commonly stated or indicated in the first sentence. This is a simple idea to grasp; one may well enough wonder where else one should put the topic. There are other places, which we shall come to later. At present, without more explanation, here

are a few examples of paragraphs where the topic is stated plainly and directly at the very outset. It would take too much space to print the whole of each paragraph, so I will give only the first sentences.

In Emerson's essay on *History* many good examples may be found. Indeed at the beginning of the essay the first sentences may be taken as an abstract of the essay.

These four sentences might almost be the four sentences of a single paragraph, each one of which Emerson took out and elaborated.

"There is one mind common to all individual men."

"Of the works of this mind history is the record."

"The human mind wrote history, and this must read it."

"It is the universal nature which gives worth to particular men and things."

Later on the peculiarity is not so marked. I suppose Emerson cultivated this mode of expression to counterbalance another characteristic of his—a general lack of obvious connection between sentence and sentence. He wanted his reader to have the main idea well in mind before he began on his comparisons and examples and analogies.

Other good examples may be found almost anywhere; e.g., in Walter Pater's essay on the Italian painter Botticelli in "The Renaissance." The whole essay is worth studying from our present point of view. It consists of ten paragraphs. The first proposes the subject of the essay in the first and penultimate sentences. The second states its own subject in the first sentence. The third in the first two. The fourth not till the third sentence, owing to its bringing in a contrasting idea (p. 136). The fifth states its subject in the first and second sentences. The sixth in the first. The seventh has a connection in the first sentence and a statement of topic in the second

(p. 135). The eighth and ninth each states the topic at once. So does the tenth in the form of a question reverting, in the answer, to the subject of the essay as propounded toward the end of the first paragraph. Following is the second paragraph.

"In an age when the lives of artists were full of adventure, his life is almost colourless. Criticism indeed has cleared away much of the gossip which Vasari accumulated, has touched the legend of Lippo and Lucrezia, and rehabilitated the character of Andrea del Castagno; but in Botticelli's case there was no legend to dissipate. He did not even go by his true name: Sandro is a nickname, and his true name is Filipepi, Botticelli being only the name of the goldsmith who first taught him art. Only two things happened to him, two things which he shared with other artists—he was invited to Rome to paint in the Sistine Chapel, and he fell in later life under the influence of Savonarola, passing apparently almost out of men's sight in a sort of religious melancholy which lasted till his death in 1515, according to the received date. Vasari says that he plunged into the study of Dante, and even wrote a comment on the 'Divine Comedy.' But it seems strange that he should have lived on inactive so long; and one almost wishes that some document might come to light which, fixing the date of his death earlier, might relieve one, in thinking of him, of his dejected old age."

EXERCISES.

A. Take from the following topics¹ subjects for paragraphs, taking care to begin each paragraph with a sentence stating or indicating clearly the theme.

1. Fall weather.
2. Vacation amusements.
3. Cheating in Examinations.

¹ They are only suggestions, on which you can model topics of your own.

4. Student Honor.
5. Good Resolutions.
6. Benefits of Idling.
7. My Grandfather's Stories of his Boyhood.
8. The Origin of Thanksgiving.
9. Old-time Celebrations of Christmas.
10. The Rush to California for Gold.
11. Some good things about a bad memory.
12. Some bad things about a good memory.
13. Legends of the Hudson. (See Washington Irving.)
14. Leatherstocking. (See Cooper.)
15. Recollections of Scott's Novels.
16. The Boyhood of Franklin.
17. The Conversation of Dr. Johnson.
18. Independence in Politics.
19. Imagination and Scholarship.
20. The Monroe Doctrine.

B. Take the Outline for an Essay written in accordance with **33**, and write one or more paragraphs upon the heads noted there, being careful as in the preceding exercise to indicate or state the subject in the first sentence.

This way of beginning a paragraph is a matter very easy of practice and very well worth it. There are one or two variations and exceptions, which should be noted.

b. In the first place, we must remember what we have been saying about Connection. We saw that it was often the very first thing to have in mind. Sometimes it was enough to put in but a word or two, as in many of the examples which we looked at. Sometimes, however, we saw that a whole sentence was given up to the connection. In such cases the statement or indication of the topic would naturally be deferred. This is hardly an exception; it is usual enough to put the topic into the first sentence, but much the same effect is produced if it comes well up toward the beginning. And, of course, it is the effect that is your business; you want your reader to get hold of the matter in a certain way. No rules have any excellence in this re-

spect, unless they will ultimately help you in this direction.

c. There is another way of beginning a paragraph which is well enough to remember. Sometimes a writer, instead of stating his subject directly, will bring forward or suggest something else that will form a contrast. A contrasting idea often helps the understanding, and, of course, it may be brought in before the main idea or after it. Macaulay was very fond of bringing it in before. Here are the beginnings of some of his paragraphs in his essay on *Addison*:

Par. 1. "Some reviewers are of opinion that a lady who dares to publish a book renounces by that act the franchises appertaining to her sex, and can claim no exemption from the utmost rigor of critical procedure. From that opinion we dissent. . . ."

Par. 2. "Nor are the immunities of sex the only immunities which Miss Aiken may rightfully plead. Several of her works . . . have fully entitled her to the privileges enjoyed by good writers. . . ."

Par. 4. "To Addison himself we are bound by a sentiment as much like affection as any sentiment can be, which is inspired by one who has been sleeping a hundred and twenty years in Westminster Abbey. We trust, however, that this feeling will not betray us into that abject idolatry," etc.

Par. 5. "As a man he may not have deserved the admiration which he received. But after full inquiry and impartial reflection, we have long been convinced that he deserved as much love and esteem as can be justly claimed by any of our infirm and erring race."

Here out of five paragraphs are four beginning with the same device. In reading the essay all through, however, we shall not find many more examples. It is not very well suited to narration, and somehow Macaulay did not employ it frequently in the critical portions of the essay. It is, I

believe, a common opinion that this mode of expression, together with several others, was so constantly used by Macaulay as to be little more than a mannerism. A mannerism in style is a mode of speech that has become so habitual that it is used without thought as to whether it be especially suitable to the occasion or not. Whether this way of beginning were or were not used too often by Macaulay, it is one which you might as well acquire the use of. There is one kind of composition in which it is frequently a most natural one, namely, Argument. You will often begin a paragraph with some proposition that is the direct contrary of the one you desire to establish. In some cases this proposition is really the topic of the paragraph. But often this denial of the obverse is used merely to introduce the direct statement.

d. There is yet another exception to the practice of stating the topic at the beginning of the paragraph. The topic may be of such a nature that it cannot readily be stated in short form. Such is very frequently the case in narration. Open a novel at random and select a narrative paragraph: the following comes near the end of *The Lammas Preaching*, by S. R. Crockett:

“The minister wrenched himself free, and sprang along the trunk with wonderful agility.

“‘I’m intimated to preach at Cauldshaw’s this night, and my text is “Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might,”’ he shouted.

“He made his way up and up the slope of the fir-tree, which, having little grip of the rock, dipped and swayed under his tread. Ebie Kirgan fell on his knees and prayed aloud. He had not prayed since his stepmother boxed his ears for getting into bed without saying his prayers twenty years ago. This had set him against it. But he prayed now, and to infinitely more purpose than his minister had recently done. But when the climber had reached

the branchy top, and was striving to get a few feet farther in order to clear the surging linn before he made his spring. Ebie rose to his feet, leaving his prayer unfinished. He sent forth an almost animal shriek of terror. The tree roots cracked like breaking cables and slowly gave way, an avalanche of stones plumped down into the whirl, and the top of the fir crashed downwards on the rocks of the opposite bank.

"Oh man, call on the name of the Lord!" cried Ebie Kirgan, the ragged preacher, at the top of his voice.

"Then he saw something detach itself from the tree as it rebounded, and for a moment rise and fall, black against the sunset. Then Ebie the outcast fell on his face like a dead man."—S. R. Crockett: *The Stickit Minister*, p. 90.

In this longest paragraph we have a series of events connected together and having sufficient unity. They express the moment before the crisis. But it would be rather hard to state the topic at the beginning and any attempt to do so would interfere seriously with the flow of the narrative, which, at this place certainly, should not be impeded. And it may be added that not only do we often have narrative paragraphs where there could not well be any statement of topic, but in descriptions also it would often serve no good purpose.

e. A fourth exception to the practice is to be found in the paragraphs discussed in 34. They consist usually of two or three sentences only, sometimes only of one, and for this reason, as well as that their topic is usually much more complicated than that of an ordinary paragraph, the practice would not be very useful.

f. A last exception is in the case of paragraphs where the subject is not stated definitely until the end. Such paragraphs are not very common: we shall discuss them later. There is an example on p. 156.

II. THE MAIN PART OF THE PARAGRAPH.

a. AMPLIFICATION.

39. Amplification. It is now a matter of interest to consider the process by which our plan with its bare headings, or even its topic sentences, if we have gone so far, is to be enlarged, developed, filled out into a sufficient and satisfactory treatment. Something or other must obviously be done,—we have noted down our “heads” so that we see our idea taking shape, but of course we must in some way embody it, give it form and fulness, in a word amplify it, so that it may mean as much to everybody else as it does to us. One or another head serves to fix in our mind a good many ideas, although they may be but vaguely gathered about it; we must express them so that they will call those ideas into the mind of the reader. This is, to tell the truth, rather a question of fact than otherwise; the skeleton does somehow take form. If you take the work of any good writer you will find that you can always make an abstract, which shall be much shorter than the work itself and yet state all the important points, so that it serves excellently to call to mind the course of his ideas. Yet no one would think of stating his ideas in so bare a form as an abstract, except for a memorandum, perhaps, or for some such purpose. So in one way or another everybody goes through a process the reverse of making an abstract. And for the various processes which people follow naturally enough in working out their plan or analysis into a complete treatment rhetoricians have various names, the different processes being usually included under the general head Amplification. Of these processes I shall speak here only of Repetition, Obverse Iteration, and Explanation. Another and a very useful form of Amplification (it should perhaps be included under the head of Repetition) consists of Illustration and Figure, to group under a

double name things which are not very clearly distinguished. But this topic is such that it is worth while to treat it more fully than the others, and we will take it up later in Part Four; it is more difficult than the others, and to most people comes less naturally.

40. Repetition. The term Repetition and also the name Iteration, which is sometimes used, are both likely to be a little misleading. We certainly do not mean, by either of them, repetition of the same thought in the same words or in other words. Such real repetition may now and then be of value in spoken discourse, where it is more necessary to impress an idea upon the hearer, who can never pause over anything to consider it fully. In oratory it may sometimes, I suppose, be well to repeat the same thought in different words, or even in the same words. But even in oratory such a practice tends to lead the hearer to imagine that he is getting more than he really is. The English language with its store of words from different sources (p. 198) offers a constant temptation in this direction¹ which one must be careful to avoid.

The kind of Repetition which is useful is an enlargement of your idea, a stating all that is implied in it, a getting at different aspects of it, a development of it. Don't repeat the very same idea, except to impress it upon the attention; it's the way to become verbose. Enlarge your idea, however, develop its resources, look at it from another point of view, and you will make a gain. To speak exactly, this is not merely Repetition, but the name will serve our purpose. A good example which would come in here may be found in some remarks of Barrett Wendell on the character of certain forms of artistic expression:

(a) "To phrase an emotional mood an artist must, as it

¹ Even down to the using pairs of words which mean no more than one of them alone, as "will and testament," "aid and abet," "beg and beseech."

were, cut his nature in two. With part of himself he must cling to the mood in question, or at least revive it at will. With another part of himself he must deliberately withdraw from the mood, observe it, criticise it, and carefully seek the vehicle of expression which shall best serve to convey it to other minds than his own. The self who speaks, in short, is not quite the self whom he would discuss. To put the matter otherwise, an artist must sometimes be almost conscious of what modern psychologists would call double personality. To put it differently still, every art of expression involves a fundamental use of the art which is in least repute,—the histrionic. The lyric poet must first experience his emotion, must then abstract himself from it,—thereby relieving himself considerably,—and finally must imaginatively and critically revive it at will.”—Barrett Wendell: *William Shakespere*, p. 228.

Here the matter is first put in a figure. In the two sentences following the process is stated somewhat precisely. The matter is in the fourth sentence generalized. It is next put into the language of psychology. It is then put into connection with the science of aesthetics. Lastly, it is again stated in a somewhat abstract manner.

For another example we may take the second paragraph of Emerson's essay on *History*. We have already seen that the topic is stated in the first sentence (p. 133); we want now to see how that topic is amplified.

(b) “Of the works of this mind history is the record. Its genius is illustrated by the entire series of days. Man is explicable by nothing less than all his history. Without hurry, without rest, the human spirit goes forth from the beginning to embody every faculty, every thought, every emotion, which belongs to it in appropriate events. But the thought is always prior to the fact; all the facts of history pre-exist in the mind as laws. Each law is made by circumstances predominant, and the limits of nature

give power to but one at a time. A man is the whole encyclopædia of facts. The creation of a thousand forests is in one acorn, and Egypt, Greece, Rome, Gaul, Britain, America, lie folded already in the first man. Epoch after epoch, camp, kingdom, empire, republic, democracy, are merely the applications of his manifold spirit to the manifold world."—*Essays: First Series*.

Looking through this paragraph, we note that the important word in the second sentence is *entire*, which develops an idea implied to some extent in the first sentence. The third sentence brings us back from *mind* to *man* (cf. the topic of the first paragraph, p. 133): it is in a measure a connecting sentence. The fourth states the idea in somewhat figurative language and a little more at length; aside from the figure the words *the human spirit*, *embody . . . appropriate events*, convey the ideas *mind*, *record*, *history* of the first sentence. The fifth sentence has for additions to the idea the words *prior* and *pre-exist*. The sixth explains more fully how the idea comes to realization. The next two sentences are figurative. The last is a statement which suggests some particulars.

The forms of Repetition, then, as we observe them in these extracts, are as follows (the references are to the 1st, 2d, 3d, sentences, etc., in either extract):

1. More detailed statement, mention of how, when, where, etc.: *a 2, a 3, a 4*.
2. Necessary addition and completion, statement of something implicit in the first sentence: *b 2, b 5*.
3. Particularization: *b 9*.
4. Generalization: *a 4*.
5. The language of different standpoints: *a 5, a 6*.
6. Figure: *a 1, b 4, b 7, b 8*.

This is of course no complete enumeration; by analyzing other paragraphs you could find other forms of Repetition. But the above are the points to which attention is commonly called.

EXERCISES.¹

Take the following sentences as in the paragraph sentences first and amplify them by repetition. I indicate the forms of repetition which seem most available, except in the case of 5, which is not easy of practice, and of 6, in which exercises are deferred to Part Four. You need not, however, confine yourselves to the modes of repetition indicated :

a. Amplify (1) by more detailed statement and (2) necessary addition and completion .

1. The New York Central trains make very short time between New York and Buffalo.

2. England is the great colonizing power of the Nineteenth Century.

3. The great generals of the Civil War are now almost all gone.

4. The present working of our system of electing a President was not foreseen by the makers of the Constitution.

5. The past football season has done a good deal to raise the game in general estimation.

6. The American citizen has other duties besides voting.

7. European History during the last hundred years is full of attempts at revolution.

8. Lovejoy was not the only Abolitionist to suffer for his opinions.

9. The wholesale destruction of forests has a serious effect upon climate.

10. College life involves a good deal more than the mere acquisition of knowledge.

b. Amplify the following by particular examples (3) real or imaginary :

1. Great wealth has its responsibilities.

2. There may be too much even of a good thing.

3. The man who is always late robs his friends.

4. The same thing often looks very differently to different people.

5. Disappointment makes many penitents.

¹This form of exercise, used also in 42, was devised by Scott and Denney, and developed with much skill in their *Paragraph Writing*.

After the fashion of scholars, however, they have not patented their method, and allow me to avail myself of it. Two of the above sentences are taken from their book, as I have found them successful in class-room work.

6. Music has to a great degree the power of arousing recollection.
7. The world gives its greatest rewards to those who have learned to do without them.
8. America has of late produced many examples of enormous private fortunes.
9. When honest men fall out, then thieves may come by what is not their own.
10. Procrastination is a thief who hides his booty beyond finding.
c. Amplify the following by generalizing (4) and otherwise:
 1. Throw mud enough, and some will stick.
 2. Watt and Stephenson are both good examples of—
 3. Watering sand will never make good soil.
 4. A blackbird that can't sing and will sing should be put in a pie.
 5. In his early life, Lincoln, like many another American who has become eminent—
 6. Tennyson reflects the life and thought of his time. (How about other great poets?)
 7. Grant will be remembered as a general, not as a President . . .
A successful military leader is often—
 8. The early worm often gets caught.
 9. If shallow water is muddy, we may think it deep.
 10. Don Quixote was not of any one time or place. There have always been—

41. Obverse Iteration. One of the points of view often valuable is taken in what is sometimes called loosely Obverse Iteration. We may often do well in stating the obverse or denying the negative of our subject or some part of it. Even to a very minor point may the principle be carried. Emerson in the paragraph quoted in 40 says in the second sentence "by the entire series of days," but in the third "by nothing less than all his history." So also may the principle be used in a larger way. We have already seen (38, c) how it may be used at the beginning of a paragraph. A more normal use is in amplifying; such a statement of the obverse or denial of the negative may come anywhere in the paragraph. The following examples, which, like those previously cited, are from Macaulay,—the essay on *Bacon*,—come from different parts of the

paragraph. I do not quote the whole of every paragraph, because the obverse iteration only makes up a part of it.

"It cannot be pretended that the Houses were seeking occasion to ruin Bacon, and that they therefore brought him to punishment on charges which they themselves knew to be frivolous. In no quarter was there the faintest indication of a disposition to treat him harshly. Through the whole proceeding there was no symptom of personality or of factious violence in either House. Indeed we will venture to say that no state trial in our history is more creditable to all who took part in it either as prosecutors or judges. The decency, the gravity, the public spirit, the justice moderated but not unnerved by compassion, which appeared in every part of the transaction, would do honour to the most respectable public men of our own times."

"He was not on that occasion sitting judicially. He was called in to effect an amicable arrangement between two parties."

"‘The complaints of his accusers were,’ says Mr. Montague, ‘not that the gratuities had, but that they had not, influenced Bacon’s judgment, as he had decided against them.’"

"A person who, by a bribe, has procured a decreee in his favour is by no means likely to come forward of his own accord as an accuser. He is content. He has his *quid pro quo*.¹ He is not compelled either by interested or by vindictive motives to bring the transaction before the public. On the contrary he has almost as strong motives for holding his tongue as the judge himself has."

"The hundred who have got what they paid for remain

¹ These three sentences might be cited as Iteration. But they are not repetition of the same idea. The second sentence gives the reason for the fact stated in the first. The third in like manner gives the reason for the second.

quiet. It is the two or three who have paid and who have nothing to show for their money who are noisy."

I have said that the same principle is useful on a much larger scale; it is, for example, at the bottom of Macaulay's treatment of Bacon's philosophy. It is also illustrated by Matthew Arnold's lecture on Emerson, in his Discourses in America. He first speaks of what Emerson was not, then of what he was. So in Frederick Denison Maurice's sermon *On Peace* (see p. 115).

EXERCISES.

Develop the following topics into paragraphs with the topic-sentence at the beginning, by obverse iteration. A contrasting idea is indicated in 1-5 in a parenthesis.

1. Temperance ; (Abstinence is something different.)
2. Equality as a political idea ; (does not mean equality in all respects.)
3. Japan is now the greatest power in the East; (formerly she was less considered than China.)
4. Happiness as an end in life ; (does not mean that everybody should do just as he pleases.)
5. The ruling idea of the Puritan settlers of Massachusetts ; (not universal liberty of religious opinion.)
6. Necessity of some day of rest.
7. The value of a college education.
8. Moral bravery.
9. The laws such as they are should be enforced.
10. True economy.

42. Explanation. Another kind of Amplification sometimes mentioned is Explanation. It is a simple means, but a useful one. As the name implies, it consists of explaining the meaning of something which has been said. Sometimes it consists of repetition in simpler language of something which has been stated in somewhat technical terms or too concisely for full understanding, as in the case of a definition. Sometimes it consists of Exposition on a small scale, or the explaining of particular terms which would

not have been readily understood. Macaulay was a master of our first means. Matthew Arnold, with an intense striving after clearness, offers not a few examples of our second. Every reader of Matthew Arnold will remember how much care he takes to explain his definitions, his distinctions, his terms. For instance, one may recall his explanations of such dicta as that "the noble and profound application of ideas to life is the most essential part of poetic greatness" (*On Translating Homer*), that "poetry is at bottom a criticism of life" (Introduction to *Selections from Wordsworth*), that "life is three fourths conduct" (*Literature and Dogma*, ch. i), that "the grand style arises in poetry where a noble nature poetically gifted treats with simplicity or with severity a serious subject" (*On Translating Homer*), that "criticism [in a larger sense than as used above] is a disinterested endeavour to learn and propagate the best that is known and thought in the world" (*On the Function of Criticism at the Present Time*), or for example of explanation of particular expressions one will recall his effort to make quite plain just what he meant by Sweetness and Light, Philistines, Machinery, Curiosity, and many others.

Another form of explanation consists in offering the reasons for the statement which is to be amplified, or the causes of the phenomenon which it mentions. Such explanation may readily run into argument, but often enough it is merely a statement of the causes of some well-admitted events.

EXERCISES.

Amplify, as in the exercises to 40, but by explanation, the following topic sentences.

1. It is best not to judge on first appearances.
2. A written examination may be a poor test of a student's real ability.
3. Politics will always have an attraction for young men.

4. Toleration may often decline into Indifference.
5. The English constitution is not a written document.
6. We often hear the word Socialism nowadays, and often without any very definite meaning.
7. In certain circumstances, revolution may be not only a right, but a duty.
8. The true cause of earthquakes is even to-day not very generally understood.
9. The attractions to a business career are not so great as they were fifty years ago.
10. The amount of gold in the United States will vary according to Gresham's law.

b. PARAPHRAPH STRUCTURE AS CONDITIONED BY KINDS OF COMPOSITION.

43. Certain Limitations. There remains to be said a few words upon the structure of the paragraph, as distinct from its substance. We have seen that we may begin either by stating or in some way indicating the subject-matter of our paragraph, or else by expressing the connection with what goes before. We may begin by calling attention to something which will make our subject stand out more clearly by contrast, or we may begin at once with particulars, in cases where a general statement is impossible or inexpedient, or else where we desire to lead up to some direct statement at the end. If you notice especially the beginnings of paragraphs, either in classic authors or in current literature or in good newspaper writing of the day, you will find that one or another of these means occurs in the great majority of cases. Now having got a good start, how shall we go on? Here we have the question of Sequence as applied to the paragraph.

It would be very hard to lay down any special forms for the main structure of the paragraph; one can see at a glance that, what with differences in subject and in mode of treatment we should hardly be able to exhaust the possibilities. And even could we reach a statement of some

generalities on the subject, they would not be of much use. If they were broad enough to cover all cases, they would be so vague as to be of slight service. If they were narrowed down to cover each case, they would be so numerous that in practice it would be almost impossible to remember them. I cannot get much farther than this, as a direction for practice work: Have some sort of arrangement in mind. I believe that if you will work along for a time always with a view to giving some reasonable structure to each paragraph, you will find finally that you have acquired such a readiness that you will have no further trouble. When I say "some reasonable structure," I mean some arrangement of ideas such that any change in order would be for the worse. If you go on writing paragraph after paragraph always with the idea of putting each one into the best form you can devise at the time, you will pretty soon acquire an independence and self-reliance in the matter that will make you your own master as far as paragraph structure is concerned.

If you proceed in such a course you will find that although the form into which you put a paragraph is to some extent a matter of choice, yet there are certain modifying influences which will have their effect in spite of you. You want, of course, to know what they are, that you may take whatever advantage may follow from them.

These modifying influences come chiefly from the particular kind of composition you are dealing with. If the paragraph be really narrative in character, if it have for its subject a series of events, the chronological order will usually be the one to follow naturally and without any trouble (see 8). Not all the paragraphs in a narration are really narrative in character; many of them are descriptive, some may be expositional or even argumentative. But even if your paragraph be descriptive, the statement of the characteristics of some particular thing, the subject

itself will often be a guide. It is usually best to put **any** general remarks first (see 18), and to follow with the details. And even in the sequence of the details you will often be guided by the subject itself (22). In paragraphs that are really expositional in character, treatments of some general idea, the order will be much more largely left to you. Paragraphs that are really expositional sometimes occur in Narration or Description, and constantly in Argument, just as narrative, descriptive, and argumentative paragraphs may well enough occur in the exposition of a general idea. In a paragraph which is strictly argumentative in character, one which is devoted to proving the truth of a proposition, the line of argument will generally determine the order. If the argument consist of independent reasons, it is usual to put the more important ones at the beginning and end. But in any extended argument the paragraphs are usually expositional in character. The topics of the different paragraphs are usually steps in the argument. But in an extended argument the office of each separate paragraph is generally to expound its special topic, i.e., they are expositional. A truly argumentative paragraph is one which seeks to prove some especial point and which gives all the proof necessary to that point.¹

It remains still to think of those special forms of paragraph structure (34), paragraphs of outline, summary, or connection. But these are usually so short that their structure is not a matter of much difficulty. And whether they be short or not, they, more than others, are limited by their subject-matter. A paragraph which propounds your line of treatment should follow the order of treatment which you have planned. A paragraph of summary usually con-

¹ It may be the case that such proof is extended over several paragraphs, but in such cases the paragraph division is usually based rather on chance than on reason.

forms to the order of the material it summarizes. A paragraph of connection naturally puts first that which has gone before and follows with that which is to come. These paragraphs more even than others have almost of necessity a certain order. If you notice them as you read you will see that there could rarely be any doubt about them. Their career was determined long before they were born.

This will, I believe, make it clear to you that the nature of your subject considered in the light of what we have already gone over under the head Kinds of Composition, will often be a sufficient guide to you in determining the general structure of any particular paragraph. There remains, as we have seen, the most leeway in Exposition. Here one cannot easily lay down rules: still you have already enough to go on to determine in a general way how you will turn an ordinary paragraph. That ought to be enough for you. To give more particular directions would leave you no freedom. Your writing would become stiff, wooden, conventional. But if you have thought out for yourself the nature of each kind of composition as far as we have gone, and considered the kind of treatment necessary or convenient to it, you will have no more difficulty in constructing a good paragraph according to the "rules of Rhetoric" than in planning an essay. Each process depends very largely upon your having got into the habit of considering the nature of your subject and your aim in handling, and of being careful to be guided in your work by the dictates of common-sense.

EXERCISES.

It will be better to continue practice on **40, 41, 42**, paying especial attention to the order of the sentences.

44. Some Particular Devices. With all the limitations imposed by the nature of your subject, there is yet a cer-

tain leeway in many cases. Or perhaps it is more proper to say that there are certain devices of style of which you may often adopt one or another when you have room for choice. It will be useful to note them before passing on. They are not exactly forms of paragraph structure, at least not more than of sentence structure, or in the case of one or two, of the structure of pretty much anything else. Of these one is the device of Contrast, another is that known as Parallel Construction, and a third is Climax, or in some cases anticlimax. It is not always that these devices can be directly employed, but it does no harm to be thoroughly habituated to them, and you will often find occasions when you can use one or another to good effect.

The principle of Contrast is familiar enough. It is the means, for instance, by which you are enabled to read to best advantage the letters of this particular word that you are now looking at. We have already considered one particular aspect of the matter—its importance in beginning a paragraph. There is still a little more to say of it just here. You will sometimes find a paragraph topic that really consists of a contrast between two things. Even if such topics are not an absolute necessity in your treatment, you will see that the effectiveness of contrast in paragraph and its use in displaying a subject may well enough lead you to think up contrasts that will be to the purpose. The question is now, What does contrast have to do with paragraph structure? A paragraph which presents a contrast may do it in two ways. It may present first one thing and then the other, or it may present the contrasting points of each side by side. In the first case a stickler might hold that two paragraphs would be better than one, but if it is really the contrast that you want to present you will generally find that one paragraph makes the matter clearer than two. For examples of contrast one can always turn safely to Macaulay, for he could always perceive one, even between

things which to other people seemed exactly alike, even twins, for instance, I fancy. The following examples are taken from Macaulay's essay on *The Comic Dramatists of the Restoration*. They illustrate the two different ways spoken of above.

"It was thus in France about the beginning of the eighteenth century. Lewis the Fourteenth in his old age became religious; he determined that his subjects should be religious too : he shrugged his shoulders and knitted his brows if he observed at his levee or near his dinner table any gentleman who neglected the duties enjoined by the church, and rewarded piety with blue ribbons, invitations to Marli, governments, pensions, and regiments. Forthwith Versailles became in everything but dress a convent. The pulpits and confessionals were surrounded by swords and embroidery. The marshals of France were much in prayer: and there was hardly one among the dukes and peers who did not carry good little books in his pocket, fast during Lent, and communicate at Easter. Madame de Maintenon, who had a great share in the blessed work, boasted that devotion had become quite the fashion. A fashion indeed it was; and like a fashion it passed away. No sooner had the old king been carried to St. Denis than the whole court unmasksed. Every man hastened to indemnify himself by the excess of licentiousness and impudence for years of mortification. The same persons who, a few months before, with meek voices and demure looks, had consulted divines about the state of their souls, now surrounded the midnight table, where, amid the bounding of champagne corks, a drunken prince, enthroned between Dubois and Madame de Parabère, hiccupped out atheistical arguments and obscene jests. The early part of the reign of Lewis the Fourteenth had been a time of license; but the most dissolute men of that generation would have blushed at the orgies of the Regency."

" But in every point Congreve maintained his superiority to Wycherley. Wycherley had wit; but the wit of Congreve far outshines that of every comic writer except Sheridan, who has arisen within the last two centuries. Congreve had not, in a large measure, the poetical faculty; but compared with Wycherley he might be called a great poet. Wycherley had some knowledge of books; but Congreve was a man of real learning. Congreve's offences against decorum, though highly culpable, were not so gross as those of Wycherley, nor did Congreve, like Wycherley, exhibit to the world the deplorable spectacle of a licentious dotage. Congreve died in the enjoyment of high consideration ; Wycherley, forgotten or despised. Congreve's will was absurd and capricious; but Wycherley's last actions appear to have been prompted by obdurate malignity."

All that has been said of contrast as affecting paragraph structure might also be said of comparison in general. But comparison of like qualities is not so striking a device and is by means so often employed at any length as comparison of qualities unlike. For comparison in general see 79.

Our second device for paragraph structure is that known as Parallel Construction. Parallel Construction, as its name rather implies, means, when used of a sentence, that succeeding clauses will present the same order of grammatical parts ; when used of a paragraph, it means that succeeding sentences are similarly constructed. I do not think that one often comes across paragraphs that are wholly based on this idea, but it forms a convenient device often for a part; it is a good way to present ideas of a similar character. It has its basis in the fact that the mind accepts more easily an order of thought already familiar, that it is for a time more impressed by repetition of the same order of thought, than by new and different arrangements. Parallel Construction is an effective device to use now and then, but

it is too pronounced an artifice to be used often, unless we have our very best clothes on, and want to make a great impression.

"The poor boy at the village school has been cheered as he has read that the time was that Daniel Webster, whose father told him he should go to college if he had to sell every acre of his farm to pay the expense, laid his head on the shoulder of that fond and discerning parent, and wept the thanks he could not speak. The pale student who ekes out his scanty support by extra toil has gathered comfort when reminded that the first jurist, statesman, and orator of the time earned with his weary fingers by the midnight lamp the means of securing the same advantages of education to a beloved brother. Every true-hearted citizen throughout the Union has felt an honest pride, as he reperuses the narrative, in reflecting that he lives beneath a constitution and a government under which such a man has been formed and trained, and that he himself is compatriot with him." Everett: *The Death of Daniel Webster*; Wks., iii. 160. There is a concluding sentence which I do not reprint; this constitutes the main structure.

With Parallel Construction is sometimes joined our third device, Climax. So far as the paragraph is concerned, Climax means the arrangement of the sentences in order of continually increasing effect. It may, as I have said, be combined with Parallel Construction, or with Contrast. But it may also exist by itself. It has no especial connection with the paragraph; it is the same principle that has weight with the story-teller or the dramatist, or indeed sometimes with ordinary everyday people in common affairs of life. In the paragraph the continually increasing effect is obtained usually by increase of actual length or increase in weight of meaning, or, preferably, in both. You will find the principle of climax is often useful when you have a number of things to say which do not otherwise fall into any

order—a number of examples, for instance, or a number of amplifying sentences. But it can hardly be very frequently employed.

The following short paragraph from Rufus Choate's Speech on *Protection of American Labor* is arranged on the principle of climax, both of sentence length and of importance of the thought. Note the short sentence coming afterwards.

"Well, what are the proofs? Have you any evidence of experienced persons, collected by a committee? Have any witnesses been examined, any opinions taken, any parliamentary inquisition holden? Nothing of the sort."—Choate, Works, ii. 235.

The following paragraph from the same speech appears to be arranged on the same principle; it would be rather better if the third and fourth sentences were transposed.

"Besides, Sir, for the maintenance of the Doctrine to which I am devoted, and with the steady and constant practice of which the comfort, the prosperity, and the greatness of America are inseparably intertwined, more general discussion is needless. The defence of the system of protection is made. It has been made before and elsewhere, by ten thousand tongues and pens, and by that which is more eloquent and more persuasive than any tongue or pen,—the teachings of experience,—the lapse of time,—the revelations of events,—the past and present of our own country and of all countries. It has been made, here and now, by the senators from Maine, Connecticut, Vermont, Rhode Island, and Georgia, and by my friend and colleague, with a fulness and ability that leaves nothing to be desired and nothing to be added. If this Troy of ours can be defended; if these daily and indispensable employments of our people can be preserved to them, if these fields and shops of useful, honest, and respectable labor—labor which at once elevates and blesses the individual

operative, by hundreds and thousands, and, in its larger results, contributes to fill the measure of the nation's glory—if these can be defended, their hands will have been sufficient to make the defence. If theirs are not, my feeble efforts can avail nothing."—*Ibid.*, ii. 174.

Such, then, are some of the commoner devices of style which may often influence paragraph structure. I call them commoner, although I do not wish to give you the idea that it is by any means a good plan to use them often. But there is no great need of warning you against using them too often, for, as we have already seen, the character of your subject will most often indicate to you what structure may be most conveniently adopted. It will only be now and then that it will be possible for you to use either Contrast, Parallel Construction, or Climax. When you have the opportunity, you must suit yourself about their use. If handled well, they undoubtedly give a brilliancy that is often very much in keeping.

III. THE END OF THE PARAGRAPH.

45. Matter. So having, let us hope, made a good beginning to our paragraph, and having realized the opportunities and limitations of our subject sufficiently to get the general structure pretty nearly right, we approach the end. Now the end of almost anything is a matter of some importance, and it is in writing, whether it be the end of a book, a chapter, a paragraph, or a sentence. Even in single words the end is of importance, of more importance in a highly inflected language than in English. The end of any piece of writing is of importance in great part because the effect of the end remains in the mind a bit longer than of what precedes; in a measure, too, because the attention is more concentrated upon the end than elsewhere.

Wishing, then, to end our paragraphs with the very best

effect, we will think particularly what sort of effect we can give by manipulating the thought, and then what effect we can give by manipulating the style.

On the first of these points we have already had more or less to say. We have seen (37) that it may be convenient to end a paragraph with the connection with what is to come, and that usage we have discussed sufficiently. We have also seen (38, f) that in some paragraphs the statement of the topic may be reserved until the end, but this matter calls for a word or two more than we have given it.

Such paragraphs may be called "periodic," from the fact that that word is the technical adjective for those sentences that introduce modifiers and limiting clauses first, which maintain a grammatical suspense till the end. Herbert Spencer is strongly in favor of a style which deals chiefly in such sentences, as appears from the following:

"The habitual use of sentences in which all or most of the descriptive and limiting elements precede those described and limited gives rise to what is called the inverted style. . . . A more appropriate title would be the *direct style*, as contrasted with the other or *indirect style*: the peculiarity of the one being that it conveys each thought into the mind step by step with little liability to error; and of the other that it gets the right thought conceived by a series of approximations."—*The Philosophy of Style*, § 26.

One might imagine that this principle might safely be transferred to paragraph structure. But the periodic paragraph is practically uncommon. Spencer himself rarely approximates to it. His paragraph usually indicates the subject first and then proceeds to describe or modify it. Even De Quincey, whose sentence structure is highly periodic, does not make use of the periodic paragraph with any special frequency. The reason why the form is not

much followed is probably suggested by Spencer in speaking of the sentence. "When the number of circumstances and qualifications to be included in the sentence is great, the judicious course is neither to enumerate them all before introduceing the idea to which they belong, nor to put this idea first, and let it be remodelled to agree with the particulars afterward mentioned" (*op. cit.*, § 30). The paragraph, of course, has more "eircumstances and qualifications" than the sentence, so that it is with some difficulty that the mind apprehends the drift of all the modifying sentences, unless it have to start with a pretty definite idea of what it is that is to be modified. Periodic paragraphs are sometimes met with, however: they are, I imagine, of the most use in argument where one desires the reader to assent to one's proofs before their exact bearing is shown.

The following example is from De Quincey. The first sentence, it will be observed, is a connection, and to a certain extent indicates the topic by denying the negative (as in 38, c), but it is not till the very end of the paragraph that we have the statement which serves to explain the whole paragraph.

"It is therefore a false notion that the general sympathy with the merits of Shakespeare ever beat with a languid or intermitting pulse. Undoubtedly, in times when the functions of critical journals and of newspapers were not at hand to diffuse or to strengthen the impressions which emanated from the capital, all opinions must have travelled slowly into the provinces. But even then, whilst the perfect organs of communication were wanting, indirect substitutes were supplied by the necessities of the times or by the instincts of political zeal. Two channels especially lay open between the great central organ of the national mind and the remotest provinces. Parliaments were occasionally summoned (for the judges' circuits were

too brief to produce much effect), and during their longest suspensions the nobility, with large retinues, continually resorted to the Court. But an intercourse more constant and more comprehensive was maintained through the agency of the two universities. Already, in the time of James I., the growing importance of the gentry, and the consequent birth of a new interest in political questions, had begun to express itself at Oxford, and still more so at Cambridge. Academic persons stationed themselves at London, for the purpose of watching the Court and the course of public affairs. These persons wrote letters, like those of the celebrated Joseph Mede, which we find in Ellis's Historical Collections, reporting to their fellow-collegians all the novelties of public life as they arose, or personally carried down such reports, and thus conducted the general feelings at the centre into lesser centres, from which again they were diffused into the ten thousand parishes of England; for (with a very few exceptions in favor of poor benefices, Welsh or Cumbrian) every parish priest must unavoidably have spent his three years at one or other of the English universities. And by this mode of diffusion it is that we can explain the strength with which Shakespeare's thoughts and diction impressed themselves from a very early period upon the national literature, and even more generally upon the national thinking and conversation."—De Quincey: *Shakespeare; Works*, ed. Masson, vol. iv.

Here, then, are two forms of paragraph-ending; but neither of them is very common. It is far more usual to find connection and topic both expressed in the beginning of the paragraph. Even in the paragraph just quoted the obverse statements, of course, indicate the bearing upon the general topic of what comes afterward. Even where the topic is so expressed at the beginning you may often do well, especially if the paragraph be a long one, to state your

subject once more at the end, as by way of summary. I do not give an example of such a paragraph: it would naturally be of considerable length, and you can imagine it easily by inserting a sentence after the first in the extract above. Such care will seldom be necessary unless you are very scrupulous about being particularly clear. If it is your habit to write fairly long paragraphs, you will have more occasion to think of these things than when your paragraph structure is short. So if you write long paragraphs you may find it useful now and then to put at the end a re-statement of the topic.

Such things have more to do with the logical effect of the paragraph, with the way the matter is going to remain in the mind of the reader. And except for such matters you will find that generally, as far as the logical effect is concerned, the end of the paragraph will manage itself if you will let it. There are a number of ideas to be expressed: when you have expressed them, you can stop, as far as the thought is concerned. But there are certain forms of paragraph-ending which do not seem to be so properly logical in character, which seem rather to be æsthetic, one might almost say. It is rather hard to say, This has to do with the Thought, and, That has to do with the Expression. Of course it's all Thought (or ought to be) and all Expression too. (See 3.) But I think we may speak of certain paragraph-endings as æsthetic in character, meaning thereby that their effect is made by the sensation that they give the reader rather than by the distinct addition they make to his ideas.

46. Manner. We are all familiar with striking paragraph-endings. I need hardly call your attention to the device. As may be said of almost all brilliancies of style, more examples may be found in Macaulay than elsewhere. But the principle is sound enough and the mode of ending is a good one, if not used so often as to be tiresome. It's

rather the fashion nowadays to say that Macaulay did use it so often as to be tiresome. Whether this be so or not, so frequent a recurrence of brilliancy would most certainly become tedious were it not brilliancy of the first order. So unless your whip gives a most excellent crack don't crack it very often.

Here is illustration of one mode of such ending, by a figure, from an article by Frederic Harrison:

"Why do we not make a better use of our rich men? We waste them, and let them run to seed anyhow, a burden to themselves and a nuisance to the public. We ought to utilize them, and make citizens of them, lifting them from their condition of ineptitude and degradation to become respectable members of the commonwealth. Like the tides, the sun, or the negro race, they could do a great deal of useful work if they were properly turned to it. As it is, we let their vast motive power run to waste, like the waters at Niagara in noise and foam.

"They are not bad fellows—at least not all of them. Many of them are really anxious to do something and to become decent citizens. They bore themselves intolerably; and are grateful to any one who will show them how they can do something that men will care for, or how to spend their money in ways that cannot be called either selfish or mean. Many a man who has inherited millions is gnawed with envy as he watches a practical man turning an honest penny. How he would like to earn an honest penny! He never did: he never will: and he feels like a dyspeptic invalid watching a hearty beggar enjoying a bone."—*The Forum*, Dec., 1893, p. 478.

Now in each of these paragraphs the figure need not have come at the end; we can imagine the paragraph beginning with it. But a special force is gained by putting them at the end, which would be lost if they came at the beginning. It is not with such figures only that we may

make such an effect; epigram or hyperbole might be used, an antithesis or some concisely striking sentence would do. It is not at all hard to think of means.

But beside the striking end to the paragraph there is another form of paragraph-ending which, although not so obvious, must occasionally, I should say, be quite as effective. There are two ways of ending a piece of music, well known, I believe, to all musicians, which depend upon a principle of rather broad application. One is the striking ending in a burst of sound; all the different instruments are called on until the whole orchestra is worked up to a tremendous crash—followed by absolute silence. With that mode of ending a piece of music we are all familiar. It is analogous to the mode of paragraph-ending of which we have been speaking. Another way of ending which we have all heard is precisely the reverse. The sound is sustained with less and less strength, diminishes more and more, grows fainter and fainter, dies away—and finally there is silence, though we can hardly say when the sound has ceased. Each ending is effective in its way; one gives a powerful impression, the other stimulates the attention. The first effect is a means common enough in literature, but the second is by no means unknown. I sometimes think that Shakespeare had it in mind when he wrote the last act in *The Merchant of Venice*. It is well illustrated in a poem of Victor Hugo's called *Les Djinns*. It is a not uncommon mode of ending in the short story of current literature. I have thought that I saw signs of its being used nowadays as a means of ending the paragraph.

On some such principle would the paragraph seem to be constructed of which I will quote a part. And I have no doubt that if you keep the matter in mind you will be able to find plenty of examples, rather in contemporary writers, probably, than in the classic authors. It seems like an

effective device, although I should call it by no means an easy one.

The following is the last sentence of the penultimate paragraph of Walter Pater's essay on "The Poetry of Michel Angelo," *Studies in the History of the Renaissance*, p. 99:

"And of all that range of sentiment he is the poet, a poet still alive and in possession of our inmost thoughts—dumb inquiry, the relapse after death into the formlessness which preceded life, change, revolt from that change, then the correcting, hallowing, consoling rush of pity; at last, far off, thin and vague, yet not more vague than the most definite thoughts men have had through three centuries on a matter that has been so near their hearts—the new body; a passing light, a mere intangible, external effect over those too rigid or too formless faces; a dream that lingers a moment, retreating in the dawn, incomplete, aimless, helpless; a thing with faint hearing, faint memory, faint power of touch; a breath, a flame in the doorway, a feather in the wind."

NOTE.—I offer no exercises on this paragraph, because it does not seem as if the devices of style treated in it were such as it is worth while to give a class to practice. They are not easy to do well, and they take more practice than could be given in this course. They are sometimes worth trying, but I hardly think it worth while to insist upon everybody's trying them.

FIRST POSTSCRIPT TO PARTS ONE AND TWO.

SIMPLICITY AND CLEARNESS.

47. I place here as a sort of addition to Parts One and Two a few words on some matters which I have had in mind throughout our previous work, although we have not studied them definitely. Some rhetoricians (e.g., Bain) have considered the Qualities of Style at great length. But, as has been pointed out, the division which gives us Elements of Style (Words, Sentences, Paragraphs, Figures), Qualities of Style, and Kinds of Composition, is not a mutually exclusive division,¹ but in some degree a presentation of the same things under different aspects. I have therefore thought that we could consider some at least of the Qualities of Style under the other heads which I have adopted, and have tried to do so. It will be useful, however, to have in this place a statement on the Intellectual Qualities of Style. The Emotional Qualities we may neglect for the present, at least according to the views on which our work is based.

The Intellectual Qualities of Style are usually considered to be Simplicity and Clearness. These two words are common enough, everybody uses them constantly, and yet I find that students are always confusing them when they apply them to what they have written or to what some one else has written. They often use the words as though they were entirely synonymous. Now these words are understood at the present day by writers on our subject as standing for very different things. Rather the best treatment I am familiar with is to be found in Minto (*Manual of English Prose*, pp. 15-19), but you can find

¹ Minto: *Manual of English Prose Literature*, p. 3.

good discussions elsewhere. If you will study the subject with some care, you will find that—

1. Some things are both Simple and Clear, and some are neither.

2. Some things may be either Simple and not Clear, or Clear and not Simple.

3. The opposite quality to Clearness is Confusion, to Simplicity, Abstruseness, looking at it from one point of view, or Elaboration, from another. Abstruseness is more especially a quality of thought, Elaboration of style.

4. Some forms of Clearness are by nature quite opposed to Simplicity.

Of these four points the first I presume will call for no explanation. Examples of sentences which are both simple and clear can be readily thought of; expositions of familiar matters are not hard to find which are simple and clear. As to writing which is neither simple nor clear, we need not bother about it just now. This first matter presents no difficulty, but then it does not help us very far in discriminating between the qualities we are studying. (As to discrimination of synonyms see 62.)

The second and third points are best understood together. If the opposites of these two qualities are different, one quality and the opposite of the other may coexist in the same writing; i.e., something may be simple and confused, or clear, but ab-truse, or else elaborate. E.g., in the case of single sentences:

a. He reported of his interview with Dr. Fennessey that he had advised him not to invest in the enterprise.

b. In one case each molecule will be similarly related to all those which are next to it; in a second case it will be similarly related to those in a certain plane, but differently related to those not in that plane.

Here, aside from possibilities of context, it is not difficult to see that *a*, which is simple enough for any one, is

confused. We cannot tell from the sentence as it stands who advised and who was advised. And in *b* we can see readily enough that, although the thing is clearly put, the sentence is not at all simple to readers not acquainted with crystallography.

From single sentences we may extend our understanding of the matter. We can easily conceive of simple subjects being treated in a perfectly simple way, and yet being by no means clear. And, on the other hand, we can readily think of subjects which are handled in a manner which is not only clear but luminous to the specialist, but which is by no means simple, or of some piece of writing which, though clear enough, was so full of stately and dignified devices of style that we should not think of calling it simple. A child's account of anything complicated would almost always be simple and confused. Mill and Macaulay are almost always clear, although the former is often enough recondite and the latter usually elaborate.

So we see that some things may be clear and not simple, and other things may be simple but not clear. We may go one step farther: there is a kind of Clearness that often precludes Simplicity. I do not know that you would consider the qualities Minuteness, Exactness, Preciseness as modes of Clearness. They are, however, often so considered, and I believe rightly. Now you can see that such qualities are very often wholly opposed to Simplicity. The more you go into details, as a rule, the less simple you are; the more you dwell upon particular differences, nice distinctions, minor qualifications and limitations and modifications, by so much is your treatment removed from Simplicity. This will be most obvious in any matter of science or speculation ; you will notice it there at once. But if you consider it further you will see that the distinction is quite general.

48. Simplicity and Clearness in Relation to Kinds of Composition and Paragraph Structure. It will now be useful to us to see just how much connection the Qualities of Style have with the matters we have been studying. For convenience in reference I put the matter into the form of an outline. You can make use of it as a means for reviewing the preceding parts.

A. SIMPLICITY.

1. *Kinds of Composition.*

- a. Narration and Description are simpler than Exposition and Argument. 7.
- b. Narration of common and everyday affairs is familiar and in one sense simple. 9.
- c. Narration may be simple or complicated. 14.
- d. Description for Information is usually simpler, although it really depends on the subject. 19.
- e. Exposition by Example is a simple form. 23.
- f. Exposition of a term is usually simpler than Exposition of a transposed proposition. 25.
- g. Popular Exposition endeavors after Simplicity. 29.
- h. In general, any subject may be handled in a manner more simple or less; that is, Simplicity is in a measure independent of kinds of Composition.

2. *Paragraph Structure.*

- a. In general, paragraphs of moderate length are simpler.
- b. Statement of the topic at the beginning promotes Simplicity. 38 a.
- c. Explanation promotes Simplicity. 42.
- d. The particular devices of 44 are opposed to Simplicity.
- e. The periodic paragraph is not simple. 45.
- f. The devices for ending the paragraph are not simple. 46.

B. CLEARNESS.

1. *Kinds of Composition.*

- a. Description and Exposition are more likely to become confused than Narration and Argument. 8.
- b. Proportion (in all kinds of Composition) tends toward Clearness. 10, 12.
- c. Complex Narration may easily become confused. 14.
- d. Good sequence is Necessary to Clearness. 16, 22.
- e. Description for Information may easily become confused, through multiplicity of detail. 19.
- f. Holding one Point of View promotes Clearness. 20.
- g. Argumentation cannot well be clear unless the terms are understood beforehand. 24.
- h. Exposition may be rendered clearer by attention to Definition and Division. 26.

2. *Paragraph Structure.*

- a. The general object of paragraph structure as far as the reader is concerned is to promote Clearness. 31.
- b. Strict unity in paragraphs aids in Clearness. 33.
- c. Paragraphs of outline, summary, and connection are a gain in Clearness. 34.
- d. Statement of connection and topic at the beginning promotes Clearness. 36, 38.
- e. So also Obverse Iteration. 41.
- f. And the devices of Contrast and Parallel Construction. 44.

SECOND POSTSCRIPT TO PARTS ONE AND TWO.

STATEMENT AND SUGGESTION.

49. Different Forms of Expression. Having now gone over the chief means by which we carry our rough ideas on any subject through various stages to a full and complete expression, and having considered some of the qualities which we desire our writing to have, there is one matter more to which I would call your attention before passing to other divisions of our subject. And, as it is not a matter of such moment as to call for a separate division by itself, I put it here as a sort of appendix, for, in truth, it can be passed over for the present by any one in a hurry, although I suppose this is on the whole the best place to consider it. Now that you have come to an understanding of the processes of rounding out your ideas and giving them a sort of fulness of development, I would put the question, How would you state the matter?

It may be that the question will not appear intelligible, for certainly the simple and ordinary way to proceed is to state directly and plainly each point as it comes up, and in certain kinds of writing one might well ask with a little surprise, What else is there to do? In most Narration, for instance, in Description for Information and in Scholarly Exposition, plain statement would seem to be the natural thing. It is hardly necessary to give examples: the account of the football match (p. 24) even if improved in the ways suggested would be an example of Narration, Baedeker's description of Chicago (p. 50) of Description for Information; and as to Scholarly Exposition you may consult one of your text-books in Philosophy, say, or Chem-

istry, and imagine it written in any other way than by direct statement. But not only in these kinds of composition can we find examples enough; in all kinds of Description, in all kinds of Exposition, the direct statement is the most usual, to many the only natural way to write. Here are a few examples:

a. Description for Impression:

"Of the provinces which had been subject to the house of Tamerlane the wealthiest was Bengal. No part of India possessed such natural advantages both for agriculture and for commerce. The Ganges, rushing through a hundred channels to the sea, has formed a vast plain of rich mould which even under the tropical sky rivals the verdure of an English April. The rice-fields yield an increase such as is elsewhere unknown. Spices, sugar, vegetable oils, are produced with marvellous exuberance. The rivers afford an inexhaustible supply of fish. The desolate islands along the seacoast, overgrown by noxious vegetation, and swarming with deer and tigers, supply the cultivated districts with abundance of salt. The great stream which fertilizes the soil is, at the same time, the chief highway of Eastern commerce. On its banks and on those of its tributary waters are the wealthiest marts, the most splendid capitals, and the most sacred shrines of India."—Macaulay: *Lord Clive*.

b. Popular Exposition:

"The crocodiles are animals which, as a group, have a very vast antiquity. They abounded ages before the chalk was deposited; they thronged the rivers in warm climates at the present day. There is a difference in the form of the joints of the back-bone, and in some minor particulars, between the crocodiles of the present epoch and those which lived before the chalk; but in the cretaceous epoch, as I have already mentioned, the crocodiles had assumed the modern type of structure. Notwithstanding this the croco-

diles of the chalk are not identically the same as those which lived in the times called 'older tertiary,' which succeeded the cretaceous epoch; and the crocodiles of the older tertiaries are not identical with those of the newer tertiaries, nor are these identical with existing forms. I leave open the question whether particular species may have lived on from epoch to epoch. But each epoch had its peculiar crocodiles; though all, since the chalk, have belonged to the modern type, and differ simply in their proportions, and in such structural particulars as are discernible only to trained eyes." —Huxley: *On a Piece of Chalk; Lay Sermons, etc.*, p. 200.

c. Pastoral Exposition:

" Few substances are found pure in nature. Those constitutions which can bear in open day the rough dealing of the world must be of that mean and average temperature —such as iron and salt, atmospheric air and water. But there are metals, like potassium and sodium, which, to be kept pure, must be kept under naphtha. Such are the talents determined on some specialty, which a culminating civilization fosters in the heart of great cities and in royal chambers. Nature protects her own work. To the culture of the world, an Archimedes, a Newton, is indispensable; so she guards them by a certain aridity. If these had been good fellows, fond of dancing, port, and clubs, we should have no 'Theory of the Sphere,' and no 'Principia.' They had that necessity of isolation which genius feels. Each must stand on his glass tripod if he would keep his electricity." ¹ Emerson: *Society and Solitude*.

In these examples almost every sentence is a direct statement of a fact or an illustration. The writing is not bald or bare; Emerson's is figurative, Macaulay's brilliant, Huxley's, even, although the simplest of the three, has a

¹The first and last sentences of the paragraph are omitted.

character of its own. But in each the author seems to have seen each idea in turn clearly before him, as it were, and then to have stated it, not always simply, perhaps, but at least directly. And indeed direct statement is by far the most usual form of expression.

There are, however, other forms of expression which aim at putting the reader in possession of an idea a little less directly. Just now we need not consider why one should want to convey ideas indirectly; let us merely assume for the moment that such is the case, it may be from a pedantic love of obscurity, it may be for much better reasons. When the fact is made plain, we will see whether there be good reason for it.

If you will compare the two pieces of writing by Walter Pater which follow, you will perceive a great difference in the mode of expression. The two pieces were written, one not long before his death, the other early in his literary life. They are examples—especially chosen, of course, but still representative—of a real change of style in twenty-five years. If you examine them, you will observe that they are on much the same subject, both matters of exposition—one on the character of Greek sculpture, the other on the ideal of life of a Greek philosopher. The first passage consists of a number of careful generalizations quite precisely stated. The piece is as clear-cut as its subject. The second passage is nothing of the sort. We will go into its characteristics in detail afterwards.

"In it, therefore [he is speaking of Sculpture], not the special situation, but the type, the general character of the subject to be delineated is all-important. In poetry and painting, the situation predominates over the character; in sculpture, the character over the situation. Excluded by the limitations of its material from the development of exquisite situations, it has to choose from a select number of types intrinsically interesting, interesting, that is, inde-

pendently of any special situation into which they may be thrown. Sculpture finds the secret of its power in presenting these types in their broad, central incisive lines. This it effects not by accumulation of detail, but by abstracting from it. All that is accidental, that detracts from the simple effects of the supreme types of humanity, all traces in them of the commonness of the world, it gradually purges away."—*The Renaissance* (1st ed.), p. 188.

"Understand, then, the poetry and music, the arts and crafts, of the City of the Perfect—what is left of them there, and remember how the Greeks themselves used to say that 'the half is more than the whole.' Liken its music, if you will, to Gregorian music, and call to mind the kind of architecture, military or monastic again, that must be built to such music, and then the kind of coloring that will fill its jealously allotted space upon the walls, the sort of carving that will venture to display itself in cornice or capital. The walls, the pillars, the streets—you see them in thought! nay, the very trees and animals, the attire of those who move along the streets, their looks and voices, their style—the hieratic Dorian architecture, to speak precisely, the Dorian manner everywhere, in possession of the whole of life. . . . 'Stay then,' says the Platonist, too sanguine, perhaps,—'abide,' he says to youth, 'in these places, and the like of them, and mechanically, irresistibly, the soul of them will impregnate yours. With whatever beside is in congruity with them in the order of hearing and sight, they will tell (despite, it may be, of unkindly nature at your first making) upon your very countenance, your walk and gestures, in the course and concatenation of your inmost thoughts.'"—*Plato and Platonism*, p. 252.

Now doubtless this latter passage may not give you a clear idea,—the reason would be largely because we have pulled a bit right out of its connection,—but still you can see what a very different mode of expression it is from the

direct statement of the first passage. Instead of saying the city is to be thus and so, and it will have such and such an influence upon its inhabitants, he puts his ideas in all sorts of indirect forms; in other words, in every sentence he suggests some idea that he does not directly state.

If we contrast Suggestion with Statement as a form of expression, we shall have a pair of words that will serve to call to mind the distinction.

50. Some Modes of Suggestion. If now we inquire a little further about Suggestion, which is the less obvious form of expression, we shall find that there are many ways of giving a man an idea beside stating it to him directly. There is first the suggestion of the idea by the mention of something that will call it to mind; particular cases may serve to give the general idea, imaginary examples may show us better than if we had the whole exposition, the effect gives us the cause or the cause the effect, another man's thought may call up our own, we may state some resembling idea, or something which we know has always been connected with the idea in question. Such suggestions may even be expressed in the form of a statement and yet the style will not be exactly direct.

There is also Suggestion in form as well as Suggestion in idea, and this mode of expression is more susceptible of treatment than the other. There is, for instance, the Question, or perhaps we should rather say the Query.¹ We think of such an artifice as being poetical, Biblical, out of the way, perhaps. Not at all; it is very common in

¹ From our present point of view we may distinguish four kinds of Questions:

1. Questions asked only to be answered rightly.
 2. Questions to which the wrong answer is given in order to be corrected.
 3. Questions assuming the answer Yes or No.
 4. Questions to which no answer is either given or assumed.
- Of these 1 is the least, 4 the most, suggestive.

prose. Or not so very different from the Query is the Conjecture or the Supposition. Not out of place, you may think, in popular exposition where the writer and the reader are both following out a somewhat difficult inquiry; but it is useful elsewhere, too. Then there are Exclamations or Remarks—it is not easy to know just what to call them. One may give a personal impression from which the right idea may be easily inferred. You may bid the reader think or consider if this or that be not so. It is hardly possible to analyze all the devices of a suggestive style, but if you read carefully the following examples, and ask yourself sentence by sentence, Is this Statement or Suggestion? and if it be the latter ask again, How is the Suggestion given? you will come to something of an understanding of the matter.

EXAMPLES.

a. Narration.

... "And Nancy's deepest wounds had all come from the perception that the absence of children from their hearth was dwelt on in her husband's mind as a privation to which he could not reconcile himself.

" Yet sweet Nancy might have been expected to feel still more keenly the denial of a blessing to which she had looked forward with all the varied expectations and preparations, solemn and prettily trivial, which fill the mind of a loving woman when she expects to become a mother. Was there not a drawer filled with the neat work of her hands all unworn and untouched, just as she had arranged it there fourteen years ago—just, but for one little dress,

¹I have thought it would be well to select examples of Suggestion in the different kinds of composition from the work of the same authors. The real rhetorical value of reading comes as much from a careful analysis of a little as from a cursory reading of a great deal.

which had been made the burial dress? But under this immediate personal trial Nancy was so firmly unmurmuring that years ago she had suddenly renounced the habit of visiting this drawer, lest she should in this way be cherishing a longing for what was not given.”—George Eliot: *Silas Marner*, ch. xvii.

“The linaria must have been brought ‘home’ (the Simplon village inn was already more than to me than ever Denmark Hill), and painted next morning—it could not have been so rightly colored at night; also the day had been a heavy one. At six, morning, I had visited Signor Zanetti, and reviewed his collection of pictures on Isola Pescatore; walked up most of the defile of Gondo; and the moment we got to the Simplon village, dashed off to catch the sunset from the col; five miles uphill against time, (and walk against time up a regular slope of eight feet in the hundred is the most trying foot-work I know,) five miles back under the stars, with the hills not *under* but *among* them, and careful entry, of which I have only given a sentence, make up a day which shows there was now no farther need to be alarmed about my health. My good father, who was never well in the high air, and hated the chills from patches of melting snow, stayed nevertheless all next day at the village, to let me climb the long-coveted peak west of the Simplon col, which forms the great precipice on the Brieg side,” etc.—Ruskin: *Præterita*, vol. ii. ch. v.

b. Description.

“The questionable sound of Silas’s loom, so unlike the natural cheerful trolling of the winnowing-machine, or the simpler rhythm of the flail, had a half-fearful fascination for the Raveloe boys, who would often leave off their nutting or birds’-nesting to peep in at the window of the stone cottage, counterbalancing a certain awe at the mysterious

action of the loom by a pleasant sense of scornful superiority, drawn from the mockery of its alternating noises, along with the bent treadmill attitude of the weaver. But sometimes it happened that Marner, pausing to adjust an irregularity in his thread, became aware of the small scoundrels, and, though chary of his time, he liked their intrusion so ill that he would descend from his loom, and, opening the door, would fix on them a gaze that was always enough to make them take to their legs in terror. For how was it possible to believe that those large brown protuberant eyes in Silas Marner's pale face really saw nothing very distinctly that was not close to them, and not rather that their dreadful stare could dart cramp, or rickets, or a wry mouth at any boy who happened to be in the rear? They had, perhaps, heard their fathers and mothers hint that Silas Marner could cure folk's rheumatism if he had a mind, and add, still more darkly, that if you could only speak the devil fair enough, he might save you the cost of a doctor."—*Silas Marner*, ch. i.

"But outside the ramparts, no more poor. A sputter, perhaps, southward, along the Savoy road; but in all the champaign round, no mean rows of cubie lodgings with Doric porches; no squalid fields of mud and thistles; no deserts of abandoned brick-field and insolvent kitchen-garden. On the instant, outside Geneva gates, perfectly smooth, clean, trim-hedged, or prim-walled country roads; the main broad one intent on far-away things, its signal-posts inscribed 'Route de Paris'; branching from it, right and left, a labyrinth of equally well-kept ways for fine carriage wheels, between the gentlemen's houses with their farms, each having its own fifteen to twenty to fifty acres of mostly meadow, rich-waving always (in my time for being there) with grass and flowers, like a kaleidoscope. Stately plane-trees, aspen and walnut,—sometimes in avenue,—easting breezy, never gloomy, shade round the

dwelling-house. A dwelling-house indeed, all the year round; no travelling from it to fairer lands possible; no shutting up for seasons in town; hay-time and fruit-time, school-time and play, for generation after generation, within the cheerful white domicile with its green shutters and shingle roof, pinnacled perhaps, humorously, at the corners, glittering on the edges with silvery tin."—*Præterita*, vol. ii. ch. v.

c. *Exposition.*

"In the days when the spinning-wheels hummed busily in the farmhouses—and even great ladies, clothed in silk and thread-lace, had their toy spinning-wheels of polished oak—there might be seen in districts far away among the lanes, or deep in the bosom of the hills, certain pallid under-sized men, who, by the side of the brawny country-folk, looked like the remnants of a disinherited race. The shepherd's dog barked fiercely when one of these alien-looking men appeared on the upland, dark against the early winter sunset; for what dog likes a figure bent under a heavy bag? and these pale men rarely stirred abroad without that mysterious burden. The shepherd himself, though he had good reason to believe that the bag held nothing but flaxen thread, or else the long rolls of strong linen spun from that thread, was not quite sure that this trade of weaving, indispensable though it was, could be carried on entirely without the help of the Evil One. In that far-off time superstition clung easily round every person or thing that was at all unwonted, or even intermittent and occasional merely, like the visits of the pedlar or the knife-grinder. No one knew where wandering men had their origin; and how was a man to be explained unless you at least knew somebody who knew his father and mother?"—*Silas Marner*, ch. i.

"A not large room, with a single counter at the further

side. Nothing shown on the counter. Two confidential attendants behind it, and—it might possibly be Mr. Bautte! or his son—or his partner—or anyhow the Ruling power—at his desk beside the back window. You told what you wanted: it was necessary to know your mind, and to be sure you *did* want it: there was no showing of things for temptation at Bautte's. You wanted a bracelet, a brooch, a watch—plain or enamelled. Choice of what was wanted was quietly given. There were no big stones, nor blinding galaxies of wealth. Entirely sound workmanship in the purest gold that could be worked; fine enamel for the most part, for color, rather than jewels; and a certain Bauttesque subtlety of linked and wreathed design which the experienced eye recognized when worn in Paris or London. Absolutely just and moderate price; wear,—to the end of your days. You came away with a sense of duty fulfilled, of treasure possessed, and of a new foundation to the respectability of your family."—*Praterita*, vol. ii. ch. v.

51. The Value of a Suggestive Style. All this, however, does not give us assurance that a suggestive style is better than one which proceeds more by direct statement. Nobody's style, indeed, is entirely the one thing or the other; to tell the truth, there is almost always more direct statement than anything else; even in the examples above, especially picked out to illustrate the point, there is Statement enough. The real question is, Is it worth while to deal in Suggestion at all? and if so, How suggestive is one's style to be?

To this question, as to so many in our study, we cannot give a perfectly definite answer. It would be quite contrary to the general plan of our work to inquire particularly into just the effect produced upon the mind by direct statement and by ideas put in a suggestive form in order to learn which may be the more efficacious. Some of the more obvious considerations, however, will not be out of

place. We may say, first, that in certain directions Suggestion is really better appreciated by the reader, other things being equal, than direct statement; and, second, that some minds express themselves more naturally by such approximations than by efforts to go more directly to the mark.

The reason why Suggestion may often give the reader a better apprehension of the subject is that it is by nature stimulating. It arouses the reader's interest by making him a partner in the undertaking. It fixes his attention by offering a slight difficulty to the full grasp of the idea. It calls into play powers of the mind that are active rather than passive. The reader no longer has a constant succession of ideas to appropriate, no longer is it his sole function to understand and remember, he is no longer a mere absorber of facts. He must exert himself, the thought must be his thought, his mind must be in constant activity to seize the idea in all the varied forms of its presentation.

To a certain extent such a style is easily seen to be an advantage; even when carried to an extreme it has its attraction to some minds. The half-enigmatic sayings of the oldest Greek philosophers possess the same fascination for some people that the pregnant obscurities (as they are often called) of Browning have for others. The principle would seem to be the same in both cases, as in the many cases which have come between the two. The mind works better under some kind of stimulus, and even obscurity serves as a challenge to the reader who believes that his effort is to be rewarded. But you must remember that there must be some reward: a difficult style and no ideas behind it will not stimulate after its emptiness is discovered.

I would not have you imagine that even the most direct Statement, so far as form is concerned, may not often possess the quality of suggestion. If you will examine the quotation from Macaulay on p. 171, you will see that the

ideas, and even the words themselves, often suggest a good deal more than is expressed. "The Ganges with its hundred channels," "the verdure of an English April," "the noxious vegetation swarming with deer and tigers," "the splendid capitals and sacred shrines,"—these expressions suggest readily to the imaginative much more than they actually state. All language is suggestive in a greater or less degree according to the nature of the hearer. So even direct Statement often has to a considerable extent the advantages of Suggestion as we have considered them. We are dealing, however, at present, chiefly with the form of the presentation, not so much with the nature of the thoughts as the form of the thought and the form of the expression. And where these also are suggestive they have (with whatever drawbacks are incident) the advantage which I have mentioned.

"The form of the thought and the form of the expression," I said, and this brings us to the second point. A suggestive style is often the most expressive mode of presenting one's ideas; I mean that thus the course of thought is most accurately and truly represented. For everybody does not proceed from point to point by clear and definite lines, and indeed the points themselves are sometimes more nebulae than anything else. And doubtless there are many whose ideas move in a way that bears more resemblance to a suggestive style, to a series of queries, approximations, illustrations, than to a style more distinct, brilliant, and clear-cut. I have no doubt that such was the case with Mr. Pater, from whose work I quoted above (p. 174). I suppose that in the course of his literary career he became conscious that his style did not express his mode of thought. Either that or, it may be, his mode of thought underwent some change. Whichever were the case, he would seem to have made a distinct effort after a more representative style. In his opinion it was necessary, if writing was to

be a fine art, that one's writing should have a distinct personal quality. "For just in proportion," says he; "as the writer's aim, consciously or unconsciously, comes to be the transcribing, not of the world, not of mere fact, but of his sense of it, he becomes an artist, his work *fine art*; and good art (as I hope ultimately to show) in proportion to the truth of his presentation of that sense." (*Essay on Style*). Pater may or may not have been happy in his application of this principle to his own work, but almost any one will regard the theory as sound that the style of a great (or even of a good) writer is, in one way or another, representative of his way of looking at the world. Indeed, it is a commonplace of criticism, taking generally the form of the often quoted saying of Sainte-Beuve, "*Le style c'est l'homme.*" And to us certainly, who are especially interested in the connection of matter and manner, who have based our work in part on the principle that we would as far as possible recognize the importance of the development of thought as well as of that of style, who have indeed so far considered the subject in such a way that it would be hard to say which we had thought of most, the matter or the manner, to us this should be a reason of a good deal of interest.

These two ends, then, does a suggestive style tend to reach: it is often better apprehended by the reader, and it is often more really expressive of the writer. And so we come to the last question, Supposing we desire to use Suggestion as a means of expression, how far is it best to go?

Here there can be no absolute answer; different writers may naturally express themselves in differing degrees of suggestiveness, and different degrees of suggestion will seem appropriate to different kinds of writing. The poet is more suggestive than the scientist, and there are many degrees between. You must take the place that seems to belong to you. So Suggestion in Description is one thing

and in Argument another: you must have your eyes open for propriety. But whatever degree of the suggestive quality may exist in any piece of writing, it is well to remember that the element of direct statement is never lacking. On the other hand, the suggestive element, so far as form is concerned, so far as the devices mentioned above are concerned, very often is almost entirely lacking. It is lacking in Macaulay, who was a man of very positive and clear-cut convictions. It is largely lacking (except in passages somewhat ironic) in Matthew Arnold, whose object is always "to see the object as in itself it really is." It is largely lacking in Emerson, whose principle of self-reliance led him to desire to speak out his ideas in such formulations as were supplied him by his everyday meditations. On the other hand, it makes a considerable element in the later works of Walter Pater, in the persuasive writings of Newman, and to a less degree it may be noted in the lectures of Ruskin. But even in these last it is only an element, and never the main form of expression.

PART THREE.

THE VOCABULARY.

I. CONSTRUCTIVE WORK.

A. IN GENERAL.

52. The Constructive Standpoint. I suppose very many teachers of English Composition have noticed, what Wendell was the first to remark, so far as I know, that the questions usually asked about good writing by friends are almost always on matters of detail. I should say myself that they were commonly questions as to correct diction. “Is this word or that admissible?” says Wendell. “Why, in a piece of writing I once published, did I permit myself to use the apparently commercial phrase ‘at any rate’? Are not words of Saxon origin invariably preferable to all others?”—*English Composition*, p. 1.

If you have agreed with me so far, you will not regard these matters as the only matters of importance. A pure and exact diction is a very desirable thing, but we cannot regard it as the one thing needful for the writer. Doubtless many other excellencies follow naturally in its course, but it must, I believe, be admitted that one might have at his fingers’ ends the usage of the best authors in any given case, and yet be unable to give an intelligible treatment of a difficult matter; while there are not a few instances of writers who have made themselves great reputations for

their suggestive and vigorous ideas, whose mode of expression was at times almost barbaric. The most careful study of good usage in every conceivable case will not of itself make a man a good writer, and a man may well be a good writer, in a certain sense, whose usage is not excellent.

We have so far put two other matters before this question of Diction. The power of conceiving a subject, and the power of arranging it for presentation and in a general way of presenting it—these seemed to us to be things of prior importance, to be the things which one wanted before anything else. Therefore the first part of our work was largely given to practice in thinking over a subject, in getting the right things to say. The second was devoted chiefly to a general shaping of material and to putting what we had to say in a roughly effective form. But if you have mastered the subject so far, you will be very conscious of the difficulty with which we have now to deal—the difficulty of getting always the right words. However well thought out our ideas, however well arranged and ordered, our writing will always be crude, and to a great extent ineffective, unless we have just the right words in which to convey our meaning.

A very common way of looking at this particular part of rhetorical study consists in pointing out what words not to use, in excising from the vocabulary expressions that are useless or worse than useless, of a consideration of those matters which go by the names of Purity, Propriety, and so forth. All such work is valuable, but its place is hardly at the beginning of an effort to use words strongly.

I must confess that I have sometimes thought that the efforts of good teachers went rather astray when they spent so much time in an endeavor to refine and purify the diction of the students under their charge. Criticism and correction, the constant excision of illegitimate words and phrases, the most careful pains never to use doubtful

expressions, all these efforts have sometimes seemed to me to miss by a little the real need of a student. It is too negative. It assumes too much. For my own part I am a dozen times in difficulty for any word at all for once that I am in difficulty as to the "correct" word. As I have said before, I believe that the student's feeling often is, not "Is this expression sanctioned by the best usage?" but "What words are there anyway to express my idea?"

In other words, our effort here will be to apply constructive methods, can we find them, to the vocabulary. Our first effort will be to increase and strengthen the vocabulary, to render it broad and flexible. We may for a time neglect criticism as such, for it is our desire that our stock of words shall first grow and flourish, rather than that it be clipped and pruned and cut down. I am no authority on gardening, but I feel quite sure that if you have rather a weakly, stunted, little rose-bush, you will never get it into the best condition merely by picking off all the imperfect and useless leaves and flowers and branches. That's a good thing, I suppose, but what is most wanted is water and sunlight and manure. So it is with our words when we begin to write. Mere pruning won't do. We want to increase rather than to diminish. Our first effort, therefore, will be directed to increasing our stock of words, to enlarging our vocabulary; we will turn to critical work later.

I would not have you understand me to imagine that no one has ever endeavored to offer training of this sort. As we shall see later, there have been a number of suggestions made by writers upon our subject. The critical study of diction itself is put forward as being to a great degree constructive, and I have no doubt (64) that it is so. All these suggestions, however, have left me still with a desire for some method of enlarging our stock of words, of increasing our power of exact expression, which

is more definite, more systematic, than anything I have hitherto seen. To that end will the following section be devoted; but before turning directly to practical work, there are one or two things to say in a general way upon the subject.

53. The Value of a Good Vocabulary. The first thing is that we cannot expect to gain the most good from any method which attempts to offer us a vocabulary ready made. That is the way we generally acquire our first stock of words in a foreign language; we learn a number of words by heart. But evidently such a method will not do here. Unless we could go to work and learn all the words in a small dictionary we should hardly know even how to begin to get at a stock of words that would be useful to us. In this matter, as in those we have already studied, our real aim is to gain certain habits of mind. Just as our study of the kinds of composition was meant to train the mind to deal with any subject that might chance to come up, just as our study of paragraph structure was meant to train the mind to put into good paragraph form whatever we had to say, so our work on the vocabulary will have for its aim to give us a habit of mind that will enable us to go on increasing and strengthening our stock of words.

To the formation of such a habit some general ideas are very useful. And here I think I shall serve your purposes better if I quote some things which have been very suggestively said by masters in our art than if I attempted to express the same ideas myself.

Probably the contemporary writer of English who has thought most about the power of words is the late Walter Pater. He has been, it is true, somewhat adversely criticised for the way he carried out his ideas, and for some of the examples and illustrations that he chose for expounding them, but I think you will find nothing misleading in

the extract which follows, and much that is stimulating. He has expressed himself more directly and systematically on the subject in his essay on *Style*, an essay largely given to a consideration of words, and the right use of words, so largely, indeed, that it shows the paramount importance that Pater attached to our present topic. That essay is well worth your reading just now. But the following extract is taken from *Marius the Epicurean*, from the sixth chapter, that account so suggesting and inspiring of the young Roman who might have become a great man of letters had he not been too early cut off. Pater has been telling how Flavian and Marius had read *The Metamorphoses* of Apuleius.

"Its effect upon the elder youth was a more practical one: it stimulated the literary ambition, already so strong a motive with him, by a signal example of success, and made him more than ever an ardent, indefatigable student of words, of the means or instrument of the literary art. The secrets of utterance, of expression itself, of that through which alone any intellectual or spiritual power within one can actually take effect upon others to overawe or charm them to one's side, presented themselves to this ambitious lad in immediate connection with that desire for predominance, for the satisfaction of which another might have relied on the acquisition and display of brilliant military qualities. In him a fine instinctive sentiment of the exact value and power of words was connate with the eager longing for sway over his fellows. He saw himself already a gallant and effective leader, innovating or conservative as occasion might require, in the rehabilitation of the mother tongue, then fallen so tarnished and languid; yet the sole object, as he mused within himself, of the only sort of patriotic feeling proper or possible for one born of slaves. The popular speech was gradually departing from the form and rule of literary language—a language always

and increasingly artificial. While the learned dialect was yearly becoming more and more barbarously pedantic, the colloquial idiom, on the other hand, offered a thousand chance-tost gems of raey or picturesque expression, rejected or at least ungathered by what claimed to be classical Latin. The time was coming when neither the pedants nor the people would really understand Cieero; though there were some indeed like this new writer, Apuleius, who, departing from the custom of writing in Greek which had been a fashionable affectation among the sprightliest wits since the days of Hadrian, had written in the vernaenlar. . . .

"For words, after all, words manipulated with all his delicate force, were to be the apparatus of a war for himself. To be forcibly impressed, in the first place; and in the next, to find the means of making visible to others that which was vividly apparent, delightful, of lively interest to himself, to the exclusion of all that was but middling, tame, or only half-true even to him—this scrupulousness of literary art actually awoke in Flavian, for the first time, a sort of chivalrous conscience. What care for style! what patience of execution! what research for the significant tones of ancient idiom—*sonantia verba et antiqua!* What stately and regular word-building—*gravis et decora constructio!*"—*Marius the Epicurean*, ch. vi.

Now of course that is written of a Roman boy sixteen centuries ago. But it has its bearing here. The point here is this much: the best use of words is not a natural or an easy thing, it is not the possession of every one; it is something to be worked for, in other words it is an opportunity. The finding just the right words—there you have a chance. And now look at it from the other side. Here is an extract from Emerson's Journal:

"The secret of eloquence is to realize all you say. Do not give us counters of base coin, but every word a real value. Only whilst it has new values does it warm and

invite and enable to write. The essential mark of poetry is that it betrays in every word instant activity of mind. A man is sometimes enervated as much by words as by any other luxury. A thing represents nature and aboriginal force; but men transformed by books become impotent praters.

"Expression is what we want; not knowledge, but vent. But an utterance, whole, generous, sustained, equal, graduated at will, such as Montaigne, such as Beaumont and Fletcher, so habitually and easily attain, I miss in myself most of all, but also in my contemporaries. I don't know but I value the name of a thing, that is, the true poet's name for it, more than the thing. If I can get the right word for the moon, or for its manners and influences, the word that suggests to me and to all men its humane and universal beauty and significance, then I have what I want of it; for I have no desire that a road be made from my garden to the moon, or that a deed of its acres and square miles be made over to me."—Cabot's *Memoir*, i. 293.

There are two ideas. Have a word for every impression and have an impression for every word. We need not stop now for more than the suggestion, although it is well worth thinking over.

Emerson and Pater, the two men were very different, but they each had this zeal for the right words. This is what Lowell says of Emerson's vocabulary: "For choice and pith of language he belongs to a better age than ours, and might rub shoulders with Fuller and Browne,—though he does use that abominable word *reliable*. His eye for a fine telling phrase that will carry true is like that of a backwoodsman for a rifle; and he will dredge you up a choice word from the mud of Cotton Mather himself. A diction at once so rich and so homely as his I know not where to match in these days of writing by the page; it is like a homespun cloth of gold."—Lowell, *Works*, i. 351.

We can easily see, I think, the value to ourselves in a careful and accurate use of words, over and above the help we get in expressing our thoughts. I sometimes think that of all the means of expression, this one has the strongest moulding, formative influence upon the one who uses it. Let me call your attention to some things said by Coleridge in his essay on Wordsworth's poetry. It is in the *Biographia Literaria* (iii. 485), but too long to quote here. Some of his phrases haunt the memory: "an austere purity of language," "the result and pledge . . . of fine and luminous distinction," "fanaticism which masters the feelings more especially by indistinct watchwords." Good is the remark that "to a youth led from his first boyhood to investigate the meaning of every word and the reason for its choice and position, logic presents itself as an old acquaintance under new names." So, too, the hint at "the close connection between veracity and mental accuracy."

54. Methods Suggested for the Increase of the Vocabulary. The question now is, How to obtain any such mastery of words as has been here hinted at. Of course we must be careful and rigorous in excision, in pruning away everything that is not of the best. But how to get anything that will bear pruning? Well, of course, what you really want is to have at command all the words in the language. Then you can refine to your heart's content. But since this is impossible you must content yourself with something less. You cannot have at command all there are, but you can doubtless get at more than you are now familiar with. You can increase the number of words you have to choose from, and you can cultivate yourself carefully in the principles of choice. To these two ends, then, we will direct our attention.

The best way of cultivating the vocabulary would doubtless lie in a broad and systematic cultivation of our power of thought. Campbell in discussing Reputable Use re-

marks of the greater number of mankind that their range of ideas is necessarily limited, and proceeds to note that "as the ideas which occupy their minds are few, the portion of the language known to them must be very scanty. It is impossible that our knowledge of words should outstrip our knowledge of things. It may, and often doth, come short of it" (*Rhetoric*, p. 165). And Emerson says in a passage of *The American Scholar* which is worth turning to at this point, "If it were only for a vocabulary, the scholar should be covetous of action" (p. 98). And one would hardly doubt the pre-eminent excellence of a vocabulary got together by pertinacious inquiry into the facts of life, always with a view to the expression of them. But such a course of study and observation can hardly be conducted in a college class-room, nor, indeed, if it could be especially the function of the teacher of English composition. We must seek for some other means of reaching the same end, or rather of using the means at our control in such a way as to get as far ahead as we can.

Other writers on Rhetoric have made suggestions of a somewhat more practical nature—or rather have suggested plans which, being more particular, are more easily put into practice. Wendell, for instance, says:

"The way to increase your vocabulary is very like the way to increase your personal acquaintance. Put yourself in the way of meeting as many different phases of expression as you can,—read widely, talk with clever people,—and whenever you come across a new word or expression train yourself, so far as possible, to understand it, just as you would train yourself to classify and remember people you meet, gentle and vulgar, good, bad, or indifferent. Each one has its place in that great composite fact—human nature and human life.

"Some such process as this is consciously or unconsciously followed by pretty much everybody who has had

any experience in the art of verbal expression."—Barrett Wendell : *English Composition*, p. 52.

A. S. Hill offers suggestions somewhat different:

"Other things being equal, it is obvious that the writer who has most words to choose from is most likely to find in his assortment just the word which he needs at a given moment. It is therefore worth while for a young writer to keep his ears open while conversation is going on about him, and his eyes open while he is reading; and to note and remember every word that is new to him in itself or in the meaning given it. He may thus, while avoiding vulgarisms on the one hand and high-flown expressions on the other, enrich his diction from the racy speech of plain people and the best utterances of great authors, the two sources of what is most alive in language. If he is a student of other tongues, whether ancient or modern, he has at hand a third means of adding to his stock of English. 'Translation,' as Rufus Choate is reported to have said, 'should be pursued to bring to mind and to employ all the words you already own, and to tax and torment invention and discovery and the very deepest memory for additional, rich, and admirably expressive words.'"—A. S. Hill: *The Foundations of Rhetoric*, p. 171.

These ideas are obviously valuable and practical, too. They may be followed out, and there can be no doubt that if they were continuously followed out they would give excellent results. But as they stand they can hardly be brought into the discipline of the class-room, except, of course, the last method mentioned by A. S. Hill. They must remain part of that personal discipline which is really the only true means of acquiring any art. The class exercises only serve the sensible student of composition with help and hint.

Other exercises, too, have been described which lend themselves more to the necessities of the class-room, besides

being useful as suggestions for private study. I note one or two as showing the opportunities open to the student.

"Let the student read the selection but once, and then, putting aside the book, write what he can remember. After a little practice he will be able to reproduce the thought of a whole page, keeping the order of the writer. He should attend chiefly to the thought, using as many words as he can recall. In this way he will find his stock of words continually enlarging, as well as his power to express the thought in his mind."—E. R. Shaw: *English Composition by Practice*, p. 23.

In the same text-book, e.g., pp. 125 ff. occurs an exercise which in a developed form may be found in Genung's *Outlines*, p. 19, and elsewhere. In this exercise the student is continually placed in the position of having to decide between several words, the words to choose from being suggested. We all of us do something of the sort whenever we write: the position (often without the words to choose from) is one of the difficulties which meet all beginners. Exercises such as these, however, still leave open further possibilities.

B. EXERCISES FOR THE INCREASE OF THE VOCABULARY.

I. THE VOCABULARY OF A GIVEN IDEA.

55. Some of the Necessities for such Exercises. I have already said that it is hardly to be imagined that we shall get much farther along than the forming a good mental habit: we cannot expect to make great acquisitions in bulk, so to speak. In studying foreign languages one often begins by learning by heart lists of words. But with our own language we have all of us got well beyond that point. It would puzzle a teacher to draw up such lists, even if his students could be induced to learn them. The Earl of Chatham is said to have been in the habit of read-

ing the Dictionary before he made a speech, but it may be presumed that it was not merely to learn words out of it.¹ It is not the net gain in words that we are to have in mind; our real want is something that will give us the habit of mind which gathers about the nucleus of words already possessed stores of other words perhaps vaguely known before, perhaps quite unknown; which assimilates the new material with the old, and makes out of all a good working instrument. If our class-work can lay the foundation of such a habit, we may well be satisfied. We cannot rightly expect it to do more.

In certain directions, it is true, we can and habitually do make absolute acquisitions. When we interest ourselves in any new study or in any new occupation, we always have to familiarize ourselves with a new vocabulary which is of different value in different circumstances, is sometimes large and sometimes small, sometimes quite technical, sometimes more general. But of whatever kind it be we always have to make it our own, we have to make a direct acquisition. Such direct acquisitions, however, do not have very much connection with our present occupation. In the first place such acquisitions are not matters of difficulty, and in the second they do not make much addition to our general vocabulary. If a person desires an accurate knowledge of the technical terms of architecture, for instance, he can acquaint himself with them without great difficulty by reading some books on the subject. But after he has done so he is not very much better off as far as concerns his general vocabulary. He is better fitted to discuss matters of architecture, but the technical terms of architecture do not make a great part of that general vocabulary which is the object of our present study. In one respect, it is well to point out, is such study very advantageous even

¹ Cf. Emerson. "The Poet," *Essays, Second Series*.

in a general way. It encourages the habit of using words exactly. A person who distinguishes between the words *machicolated* and *crenellated*, let us say, has done something at least toward a habit which will be of great general value. But our desire is for something which shall affect the general vocabulary as directly as may be.

The ideal state of mind so far as vocabulary is concerned would be that—

1. For every idea should come to mind a word.
2. The word should correctly convey the idea in question to others.

Doubtless no one attains this ideal. Still it serves to show what we may aim at. Doubtless, also, we can hardly hope that for every idea there shall immediately come to mind one word only, and that the right one. We may well be satisfied if—

1. Every idea brings to mind a number of words somehow connected with it,
2. From which we are able to select the right one for our special purpose.

If, then, we are to pursue our work in an orderly way, we want some systematic way of accumulating around any idea the words that are in some way or other connected with it, and we want also some systematic arrangement of ideas that it will be useful to gather words around. Then next, we want to have in mind the principles that will guide us in particular cases to discriminate between words of similar meaning so as to use always the right word.

With a view of accomplishing the first of these ends I shall turn aside for a moment to a consideration of the English vocabulary from three standpoints, i.e., according to the origin of its words, according to their structure, and according to the grammatical function that they serve.

a. THE WORDS OF THE ENGLISH VOCABULARY.

56. According to their Origin. The vocabulary of the English language is of a very composite character; that is to say, the words have been got together, in process of time, from many different sources. It provides innumerable examples of what students of language have called "borrowed words."¹ When two peoples speaking different languages come in contact with each other for any length of time, each of them, as a rule, borrows words of the other. So also is there borrowing when a people interests itself greatly in the literature of another tongue. The English-speaking peoples have always borrowed words from other languages with great facility, and as a consequence the English vocabulary is made up of words from many different sources.

Whoever may have been the very earliest inhabitants of the British Islands, the earliest known to history were of Keltic stock, which about the time of the Christian era was spread over a great part of Western Europe. Cæsar calls them *Brittoni* (or *Britanni*) and the island *Brittania*, whence our words *British* and *Britain*. The Anglo-Saxon writers, several centuries afterwards, called them *Wealas*, whence the name *Welsh*.² The former was the Latinized form of the name that they gave themselves; the latter is a Teutonic word meaning "strangers," and in one form or another has been given by the Teutonic peoples to various of their neighbors.³ Both names have been preserved. The Keltic name is now shared by their Teutonic conquerors; the name given them has proved more permanent in its restricted application. The languages spoken by the Keltic

¹ The term "loan-words" is also used. The word seems to me rather barbarous and not very descriptive, for the words are not so much loaned by one nation as borrowed by the other, and that, as is often the way with borrowers, without the slightest intention of repayment.

² O. E. *Welisc*.

³ Or it may originally have been borrowed from Kelt. *Völcae*.

peoples of Great Britain are usually divided into Welsh and Cornish, which are closely connected with the Armorican, still existent in Brittany, and as another division Gaelic (Scotch), Manx, and Irish. As to the tribal division of the people, it probably corresponds in a general way with this division of the dialects, as would be inferred from a glance at the map.

Britain became a Roman province somewhat before our era and remained such for about five centuries. But in the fifth century came the great movement of the Teutonic tribes upon the Roman empire. (Cf. the extracts from Motley and Newman, pp. 267, 268.) Among the separate steps may be noted:

- 400-450. The Vandalic invasion, in which the Vandals swept through France and Spain into Africa.
- 376-410. The Visigothic invasion, following somewhat the same line, but coming to a halt in Spain.
- 490-552. The Ostrogothic kingdom in Italy, the result of the Ostrogothic invasion.
- 400-530. The Burgundian kingdom on the Upper Rhine.
- 568. The invasion of Upper Italy by the Langobardi under Alboin.
- 486. Battle of Soissons, marking the Frankish incursions across the Rhine.

Of these six peoples the Langobardi seem to have come originally from the region to the south of the Baltic, where they had previously lived in some tribal connection with the Angles, the Jutes, and the Saxons. They themselves took a southern course, but their neighbors were tempted westward into the province of Britain, from which the Roman legions had been withdrawn. This seventh great movement was very gradual, but by the end of the fifth century it was practically complete. The Anglo-Saxons, as they are henceforward to be called, were masters of the southern part of the island of Great Britain.

They were a Teutonic people¹ and spoke a Teutonic dialect of much the same character as that spoken by the Frisians, who lived not far from them. But while the other Teutonic tribes which had invaded the Roman empire gradually gave up their own speech and adopted that of the conquered people among whom they lived, the Anglo-Saxons retained their language, and it is the basis of the English of to-day.² They borrowed a few words from the Kelts and Romans with whom they had intercourse, but no great number. We may note a few groups.

a. *Borrowings from the Latin.*

1. Before leaving the Continent they had probably a few words of Latin origin. *Street* comes to us from *strata via* (a paved way), the name given to one of those great roads that the Romans pushed all over the known world. *Chest*, *sack*, *ark*, *shrine*, were probably borrowed from the Roman traders who had pressed up as far as the Baltic, whence they obtained amber. The last two words have now a special significance; at first they meant little more than *basket* and *box*. The wine-culture had early been established on the Upper Rhine, and the Anglo-Saxons probably had the word *wine* before leaving the Continent. I am inclined to add here the word *church* from the Greek *κυριακόν*, "[the house] of the Lord," and possibly *devil*, *angel*, *bishop*, from the Latin.

2. On reaching Britain they adopted a few geographical names which had remained from the Roman dominion, -*chester* (-*ester*, -*caster*), -*port*, -*wall*, -*wich* (-*wick*), which are now commonly found in names of places.

¹ I.e., of the same stock as the Gothic, Norse, and Germanic tribes, to which last they were most nearly related.

² They called their speech *Englisc*, from *Engle*, the name (in plural form) of the people whom we, following the Latin, usually call Angles. The *e* in the stem syllable is the result of *i*-vowel of an original *a*.—Sievers-Cook: *Grammar of Old English*, § 89, 1, and § 264.

3. With the advent of Christianity, which came not only from Ireland by way of the north, but also from Rome direct, came a number of words having to do with the church: *alms, apostle, clerk, deacon, disciple, mass, minister, monk, priest, temple*, and a number of others.

4. There are a good many other Latin words which appear in the language at this early date. The Roman legions had gone, but there were left many who still spoke the Latin language. Skeat gives a list of such words in his *Principles of English Etymology*, i. § 402.

B. Borrowings from the Keltic.

From the Keltie also did the Anglo-Saxons borrow words. But there are not very many Keltic words that can confidently be referred to this early period. Most of the Keltic words in English (and there are not very many) come from later intercourse with the Welsh, Scotch, and Irish, and, as a rule, are used only for Keltic things or imitations of them.

1. Early borrowings: *combe, down, crag, clout, cart, cradle*. Geographical names and household terms; the Kelts were a conquered people.

2. Much later borrowings:

From Welsh, *coracle, crumlech, methelin*.

From Scotch, *clan, claymore, collie, mackintosh, pibroch, plaid, slogan*.

From Irish, *brogue, shillelagh, shamrock*. These words are names of things of Keltic origin. The following are more general: Welsh, *flannel, kick*; Scotch, *cozy, quaiff*; Irish, *bog, fun*.

C. Borrowings from the Scandinavian.

These Keltic borrowings were, however, few in number. Somewhat larger is the number of words from another source, the Danish, or, according to the commoner expression, the Scandinavian.

The Scandinavians or Norse were great seafarers. The ninth and tenth centuries go by the name of the Viking Age in recognition of their prowess. They settled the Faroes, Iceland, and Greenland, they are said to have reached America, they crossed over to Russia, they established themselves on the coast of France, whence they penetrated into the Mediterranean and settled in Sicily, and they also harried the coasts of Great Britain and Ireland. (Cf the extract from Newman, p. 268, and the following paragraphs in the essay.) They made settlements in the Orkneys, the Isle of Man, about Dublin, and elsewhere, but their most important conquests were on the east coast of England, to the north and south of the Humber. Here they established kingdoms so powerful that from 1013 to 1042 the English throne was occupied by Danish kings.

With so much intercourse as naturally followed between the peoples it is not surprising that there are many Scandinavian words in England. How many belong to the period before the Conquest is doubtful; comparatively few appear in Old English literature. But we must remember that it does not therefore follow that they did not exist in the popular language. I shall note only a few divisions.

1. Seafaring terms: *bilge*, *keel*, *bow*, *stern*, *hawser*, *kedge*, *rig*, *tackle*, *thwart*, *windlass*, *abof*, *bowline*, *crew*, *harbor*, *lee*, *leach*, *raft*. It is to be observed that these are all particular terms; such general names as *ship* and *boat* are not Danish, for the English had ships (and names for them) before the Danes appeared. Nor are the names for the chief parts of the ship Danish, such as *mast*, *yard*, *sail*, *oar*, *rudder*. Probably the English learned a good many minor devices from the Danes and took the names along with them.

2. Geographical names in *-hy*, *-garth*, *-haugh*, *-ness*, *-thorpe*, *-thwaite* are generally of Scandinavian origin.

These suffixes were originally words signifying respectively village, stronghold, temple (?), promontory, village, a piece of land.

3. Words having some connection with law or institutions: *fellow*, *curl* (in a new sense), *husband*, *hustings*, *law* (as a simple word), *thrall*.

There are also a good many more words of Scandinavian origin, among them, curiously enough, the pronoun *they*, *their*, *them*, which did not get wholly acclimated all over England until the fifteenth century.

δ. Borrowings from the French.

The next great borrowing is of far greater importance. Even in the reign of Elward the Confessor there were Norman nobles of influence in England. But the real introduction of the Norman dialect into the country was in 1066 with William the Conqueror. I have called it the Norman dialect: it is more usually called simply French, or, by scholars, Anglo-Norman. It was a French dialect, and in course of time came to differ from the Norman of the Continent. We have here the beginning of the immense influence the French language has had upon the English vocabulary. It became at once the dominant language in England, just as English had six centuries before become the dominant language in the place of the Keltic. The outcome, however, was somewhat different.

To gain a correct idea of the way in which the French element found its way into the English language we must remember that so long as the French-speaking Normans were a separate and dominant class the influence of the language upon English was not very great. It was not until they began to become more and more anglicized that the English language began to take to itself numbers of French words. This is not very hard to understand. So long as the Norman noble spoke only French and tho-

Saxon freeman or serf spoke only English the mixture of language was not so very great. When, however, the Norman began to speak English, he spoke it with a strong recollection of the other tongue. Therefore the time when French had the most influence on English was the time it was falling into disuse. It is not in the last half of the eleventh century that most French words were borrowed. Even Orm and Layamon, writing in English about 1200, have very few French words. In the last half of the fourteenth century, however, when English was displacing French in the schools, the courts, the parliament, we find in Chaucer and Langland a vocabulary full of words from the French. I add two tables which will make the matter plainer.

I. Dates marking the disuse of Anglo-Norman in England:

- [1066. Battle of Senlac.]
- 1258. Proclamation of Henry III. in English. (An isolated case.)
- 1362. Pleadings in the law courts in English, although recorded in Latin.
- 1362 and 1363. Parliament opened with an English speech.
- 1385. Trevisa reports that English rather than French is used in the grammar-schools.
- 1386. Petitions to Parliament begin to be in English.
- 1400. Wills and such documents begin to be in English.

II. Number of French words in English authors:

- Orm, c. 1200. About 10 words in 20,000 lines.
- Layamon, c. 1200. About 100 words in 35,000 lines.
- Robert of Gloucester, c. 1280. About 100 words in first 500 lines.
- Robert of Brunne, c. 1350. About 170 words in first 500 lines.
- Mandeville, c. 1350. His work is in prose, but the proportion is about as in Robert of Brunne.

Chaucer, c. 1390. 440 words in the first 500 lines of the Canterbury Tales.

Langland, about the same time, has a somewhat larger proportion.

It will not be worth while to give a fuller account of these words from the French, except to remark that they are almost all either nouns, verbs, adjectives, or adverbs. Articles, pronouns (except *they*, etc.), conjunctions, prepositions, are all native English. So are the numerals, except *second* and *million*. But these last-named parts of speech make up a small part of the vocabulary. And in the other divisions there are a great number of French words.

All this time there had been presumably some borrowing of words from the Latin. But the chronology of our Latin element is not very definitely determined for these centuries. We are approaching a period, however, when there was a very decided influx of words not only from Latin, but from Greek as well. The Revival of Learning is the name given to that period in which men's minds were turned with a new interest to the classical literatures. With the increased study of Latin and Greek came new borrowing. Sir Thomas Elyot (in 1531) was openly of the opinion that the English language was poor and meagre, and that it should be steadfastly enriched by words from the polite languages. His ideas were combated by some, but followed by more, so that during the seventeenth century scholarly men like Milton and Sir Thomas Browne wrote in a style crammed full of Latinisms. Many of their borrowings were never adopted, but during these two hundred years a great many Latin words became acclimated.

e. *Miscellaneous Borrowings.*

The borrowing from the French went on, and in the sixteenth century we notice a tendency to borrow from Italian

and Spanish as well. Italy was the country of polite letters and accomplishments; its influence on English literature was very great from Wyatt and Surrey down to the Elizabethan dramatists. Spain was at this time one of the foremost countries of Europe, and one with which England had much to do both as friend and as foe. We must also mention the Dutch, who in the seventeenth century became great sailors and disputed with England the supremacy of the ocean and even of the narrow seas. It is to this period that we owe the Dutch words which are to be found along with the earlier Scandinavian in our nautical vocabulary.

In the seventeenth century begins England's immense commercial supremacy; America, India, Australia, each country as it became the dwelling-place of English people gave some words to the English vocabulary, at first perhaps only names of particular products, but later words of broader application.

This short sketch of the development of the English vocabulary indicates sufficiently the various origins of our English words and the reasons for such variety. One thing now is to be remarked as a consequence, that we not infrequently find in English several words from several sources meaning much the same thing. Theoretically one would say that no word would be borrowed which had a meaning already provided for, but practically this is hardly the case. We have not a few words from French and Latin which could not have been borrowed for any existing lack: *commerce* along with *begin*, *aid* along with *help*, *riches* beside *wealth*, *virgin* beside *maiden*. But usually in such cases we have in course of time discriminated between such words, so that, whatever they may have meant, they now represent different modifications of the common idea.¹ The importance of this fact to our present study will be seen later.

¹ A considerable list of such words from English, French, and Latin sources will be found in Earle's *English Prose*, pp. 3 ff.

57. According to their Structure. In using the word *structure* I have in mind the distinction between simple words, derivatives, and compounds. The English language possesses a great number of derivatives and compounds and a certain power still of derivation and composition. In this latter respect it may be said to stand between German and French. The use of composition in French is comparatively small, in German almost unbounded. French of course inherits many expressions from Latin which were at one time compound, but they are no longer regarded as such in the general consciousness. The language is, of course, not wholly without derivatives or compounds, but compared with German or Greek it has very few. German, on the other hand, still retains its original power of word-formation. It seems only necessary to put two words end to end and they grow together. One finds without difficulty in German words of great length consisting of a considerable number of prefixes, suffixes, and root-words. *Einwanderungsgesellschaft*, for instance, has two prefixes, two suffixes, and two roots (or kernels, as Jesperson, *Progress in Language*, p. 143, with much show of sense calls them). *Unabhängigkeitserklärung* has three prefixes, three suffixes, and two kernels, and any one who reads German can easily find examples quite as good.

Along with this frequency of compounds and derivations goes in German the still living power of word-formation. This power we have in English to a great degree lost; we have great numbers of compound and derivative words, but we do not form new words freely, according to analogy (pp. 242 ff.). This power was still existent in the earlier stages of the language, but fell largely into abeyance through the wholesale borrowing of words from all sources, of which we have spoken. Curious evidence of this state of things may be gathered from a comparison of

the Old English version of the New Testament with the Authorized version. The Anglo-Saxon translator when he found an idea in the Latin for which he had no equivalent manufactured a compound. But by the time of King James a great number of foreign words had become naturalized, especially in ecclesiastical uses, which served the translators' purpose quite as well. As a consequence we may make the following comparisons :

The Old English Translation of the
New Testament, 8th Century.

The Authorized Version of 1611.

leorning eniht	disciple
gold hord	treasure
sundor halga	Pharisees
rest dæg	Sunday

By the sixteenth century, at least, these older compounds had passed entirely out of use. Sir John Cheke, who in the earlier years of that century translated the Gospel of Matthew with the idea of excluding all foreign terms, uses none of the Old English compounds. On the other hand he does use some of the foreign expressions which were so familiar to him that he may have taken them for native English words. In our day we do to some extent originate new compounds, but comparing the possibilities in our case with those in the case of German, we see at once that we stand somewhat behind them in this respect. We have made up for the lack by our ease in assimilating foreign material.

If word-formation were more general in English than it is, there would be more value to the vocabulary in those studies which, doubtless, many of you have followed under the name Word-building or Etymology. The trouble with such work from our present point of view is that it does not increase the vocabulary with new words until we know whether the words in question are or are not in good use.

Thus I extract an illustration from a text-book on the subject. It is presented in the following form:

e	{	mot	{	or
com				ive
pro				ion

re } }

er }

If we could compound freely, we could by means of this illustration make twenty-four words. As it is, less than half of the twenty-four are in good use, viz., *promote*, *remote*, *motor*, *motive*, *motion*, *emotion*, *commotion*, *promotive*, *promotion*, *promoter*, unless our idea of good use is broad enough to include *commote*, *remotion*, *emotive*. One cannot be at all sure when engaged in word-building whether one is building card castles or more enduring structures.

For our purpose it will be enough to note that although we have to a great degree lost the power of ready word-formation we have yet in the language a vast number of compounds. Many of the Old English compounds have gone out of use, and their place has been taken by words from some foreign language. But we still have left numerous groups of words which present various modifications of the same idea, some of them being of words which have been formed either by derivation or composition in English, and others of words which, like most of those quoted on the previous page, have been procured ready-made.

58. According to their Grammatical Function. In considering words according to their grammatical function we may observe that there is a species of connection between nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs which such words do not have as a general rule with the other parts of speech, nor do the other parts of speech generally have any such connection existing among them. Adjectives and adverbs have only a formal difference, so that we may con-

sider the former as representing both. We may then observe that often enough a verb, a noun, an adjective, seem to be merely different forms of the same idea. This is most obvious in certain forms of the verb. The usual forms I come, I came, I shall come, I have come, I had come, these are all of the same character; but the participial *coming* is rather hard to distinguish from an adjective. It often amounts to little more than the adjective *future*. In like manner *coming* may be used as a noun like the word *advent*, which was itself originally participial in form.

Of this point, which is familiar enough to all, you may find numberless illustrations. The English language has so few inflections that sometimes the same word may be used as a verb, a noun, or an adjective. We may say:

To black boots.	Black is white.	A black man.
To iron collars.	Iron is a metal.	Iron bands.
To game away one's money.	A game of cards.	A game chicken.

A number of examples will occur to anybody who will stop to think of them.

Besides such cases, there are many instances where the connection is not so complete. *Walk, talk, rain, thunder, water, land*, and a great many other words may be used as nouns or verbs. In other cases either nouns are derived from verbs, as *maker, building, admiration*, or verbs are derived from nouns, as *tyrannize, originate*. In like manner are adjectives and nouns connected: *wise, wisdom; good, goodness; and less frequently adjectives and verbs: large, enlarge*.

Often it is difficult to tell which is the original form, as in the words *band, bind, bond, bound*. But this is a question of etymology and does not concern us at present. What is important for us to notice is that the same idea may apparently be expressed as a noun, an adjective, or a

verb, or, to use a somewhat more exact expression, we may often find noun, adjective, and verb which have a much closer connection in meaning with each other than with other words of the same grammatical function. If we formed groups of words according to the ideas they represented, we should often have to include nouns, adjectives, and verbs in the same list.

b. DEVELOPMENT OF THE VOCABULARY OF A GIVEN IDEA.

59. If now we return from this excursus to our original idea, the increasing of our vocabulary, we see readily enough that any given idea may be made the centre of a group of words expressing different modifications of it. Suppose we have some simple noun of English origin: we can very often find words from the Latin or French, or perhaps from other languages, with kindred meanings; we can usually find expressions for the idea in adjective-form or verb-form; and we can also readily enough find numbers of derivatives or compounds closely enough related to our original to be of use to us. Theoretically we should be able to develop any particular idea into at least eighteen different words by thinking of English, French, and Latin; noun, adjective, and verb; simple and compound (including derivatives). But practically there will be many more words sometimes, and now and then less. There are often synonyms from other languages than Latin and French which increases the number. And often the idea is not found in simple form in the three grammatical categories, which diminishes it. So there will be a variable number of words which may be grouped around any given word we may have in mind. The point to note is that we have here a systematic method of gathering whatever words the language affords as expressive of any given idea and its modifications and developments. In carrying out such a method one may proceed in various ways— one should use

whatever opportunities are at hand. Turn first to the dictionary; look up your word, and then look up all the synonyms that are given. Each one will lead you along, so that practically the difficulty is to know where to stop. It is rather an amusing occupation to hunt an idea through the dictionary, following all its turnings and twistings, its changes of form and changes of application, and those who do not find it amusing will find it extremely instructive. When you have finished with the dictionary, see if your knowledge of foreign languages will not help you. Think of the word in Greek, Latin, French, German, and any other language you know and see if it do not suggest some of our borrowings. Then try to think up compounds and derivatives; if you are helped by such work as that noted on p. 209 so much the better.¹

For the sake of an example let us take the word *house*. Our knowledge of French and Latin at once provides us with the words *mansion* and *domicile*. The Greek word for house appears in the word *economy*, but this is a little too far away in meaning to be of much real use to us. When we come to look for verbs, we have at first a slight difficulty. What is the house-idea in verb-form? To house, to put under cover, to shelter; this would seem to be the nearest idea. I have found, however, that it is more practical when the idea itself in verb-form does not seem as though it would be very productive to take some other verb-idea closely connected with that we have in hand. In this case the verb-idea which will be found most fruitful is, I believe, *to live in*, *to abide in*, *to dwell in*. From the French we get the word *reside*, from the Latin *inhabit*.

¹ The idea suggesting this exercise will be found in three curious books entitled *Handbook* [respectively] of *Anglo-Saxon Root-words*, *Anglo-Saxon Derivatives*, and of *Engrifted Words*, published in New York 1855, 1855, 1857, and ostensibly the production of a literary association, but really written, as I learn from the kindness of D. Appleton & Co., the publishers, by James Scott and John L. Chapman.

As far as adjectives are concerned we shall not find any in simple form. Where *house* is used as an adjective, it is in compounds, as in *house-dog*, *house-maid*, and so forth. We may proceed, however, with our simple nouns to form compounds or derivatives, nouns, adjectives, and verbs, and then with our simple verbs in like manner. At first we shall get something like this:

House.

		Simple.	Derivative and Compound.	
Nouns.	Eng.	House	Warehouse, and many other such compounds	Dwelling Abiding-place
	Fr.	Mansion	Mansion-house	Residence
	Lat.	Domicile		Habitation
	Varia.			
Adjectives.	Eng.			
	Fr.			
	Lat.	Domestic	I <i>o</i> mici <i>l</i> ary	Resident Habitable
	Varia.			
Verbs.	Eng.	To live [in] dwell abide reside inhabit	To house	
	Fr.		remain	
	Lat.		domicile	
	Varia.		domesticate	

Having arrived at this point, it is worth while to note one thing before going farther. You will at once observe that among the simple or primitive words I have placed a number which are not primitive. This I do for convenience' sake. Of course *inhabit* is not a simple word, if we consider its Latin origin. But if we think of it in English I should say that practically it was simple. It certainly is

not in the minds of most people compounded of *in* and *habit*. On the other hand such a word as *inhabitant* and, to a less degree, *habitation* are, I believe, generally thought of as compounds, and are connected in mind with the word *inhabit*. In like manner *reside*, though not really a primitive word, is practically primitive as far as we are concerned, for it is not derived or compounded from any other English words, and from it are derived the words *resident* and *residence*. So with *domicile* and *domiciliary*. This way of proceeding may seem to some rather easy-going, but it seems to me regular enough. We must stop somewhere in our search for primitives, or we shall be led to the ridiculous idea of inserting nothing under our first column but Aryan roots. I have found it in practice more convenient to consider as simple such as are practically so in English, whatever their previous condition may have been. The practice involves us in some difficulties, it is true, but not in so many as if we were stricter.

Having got so far, we may now proceed as much farther as we want, filling out our list in two different ways: first, by noting synonyms for expressions we already have, and, secondly, by adding as many compounds as seems worth while. It will be found that one must be somewhat regulated in this matter by a rough and ready feeling as to the usefulness of the words one gathers. Will they be of more use here or elsewhere? Are they not so far removed from our original idea that they will really be of no especial help to us? You must be guided by common sense in the matter. Your desire is to get together those words which will help you to express the idea *house* in its various modifications. It is well enough to have *domestic*, and so also *domesticate*, though it takes us a little out of our way. I should not, however, go on to set down *tame*. *Reside* is convenient for us, but it would go rather too far to insert also *residuum*, *dregs*, *lees*, etc.

One good purpose is served even by very considerable extension: it serves to familiarize us with the relations of a very wide range of ideas. In some of the examples following I have carried the development to a very considerable extent. But every one must suit himself in this respect; it will probably be well to have no hard and fast rule in the matter, but to proceed sometimes in one way, sometimes in another.

Mind.

		Simple.	Derivative and Compound.
Nouns.	Eng.	Mind Wit[s] Brain[s]	Witness, witticism, witling Thought, knowledge Understanding
	Fr.	Reason	Reasoner, rationale
	Lat.	Intellect	Intellectuality
		Intelligence	Intelligencer Judgment, opinion, argument Cogitation, speculation, etc., etc.
Adjectives.	Eng.		Mindful, witty, wittingly Understandingly, thoughtful
	Fr.		Reasonable, rational
	Lat.	Mental	Intelligent, intellectual Intelligible
Verbs.	Eng.	To think To understand To know To muse To meditate, reflect, consider, cogitate, speculate, estimate, contemplate, argue, ponder, etc., etc.	To reason
	Fr.		
	Lat.		

Here is an example where it will hardly be worth while to trouble about the verbs:

Nation.

		Simple.	Derivative and Compound.
Nouns.	Eng.	Kin Stock Land Commonwealth	Kind, kindred Kinsman, kinsfolk Kindness
	Fr.	Nation, country People, country	Countryman Native
	Lat.	Race, region State, tribe	Populace
		Territory	
	Kelt.	Republic (and many other names Clan of particular forms of government)	
Adjectives.	Eng.		Landed, kindred
	Fr.	Native Country	National, countrified Popular, populous
	Lat.		Racial
	Kelt.		Tribal, territorial Republican, etc. Clannish

It is often worth while to confine one's attention to one division, as, for instance, nouns only. In the following case the nearest verb I should say was *to go* or *to come* (p. 220):

Street.

		Simple.	Derivative and Compound.
Eng.	Street (originally from Lut.)		Road
	Way		Highway, roadway
	Path		Pathway
	Lane		Walk Thoroughfare Turnpike
Fr.	Avenue, boulevard, mall		
	Promenade		
	Alley		Passage
	Route, track, trail, journey		

To this may be added some special names for streets, as Row, Place, Court, Square, Road, Lane, and in England Gardens, Terrace, Circus.

60. Words to Work Upon. This proceeding is a systematic way of getting together the words expressing the various ideas that gather about any particular idea. In itself it does not go very far, but it does for us this much, it gets us to rummage out all the words we can think of that are connected with the word with which we begin. These undigested masses of words are not of themselves of great value, but they are very good material to work upon.

Meanwhile, supposing the process to be good so far, you will doubtless perceive one difficulty in the way of systematic work. If we have a base, as we may call our fundamental idea, we can proceed as systematically as you like. But how are we to proceed systematically to get the right words to use as bases?

This problem is a difficult one, and I am by no means wholly satisfied with the answer I am able to offer. What we want is a list of words which being developed will give us a vocabulary of from five to ten thousand words. Now it will take a good many words to do that. On the next page I place a list of words which I think will be useful. That it is the best list that can be devised I do not feel quite sure, although it was carefully made by comparing and checking various lists made both by experiment and by theory. I should here, however, mention some very considerable omissions:

1. Pronouns, numerals, prepositions, conjunctions, interjections, are omitted. Any one can make a list of them at his leisure by consulting a few good grammars.

2. Many opportunities for gathering the names of particulars are omitted. Parts of a house, for instance, kinds of houses, parts of the body (for where should we stop,

short of a course in anatomy?), occupations of mankind, and such matters.

3. A large number of names for emotions, dispositions, etc., are omitted as being rather difficult to treat by this method and more interesting to handle in an exercise which comes later (63).

In short, the main purpose of the exercise, as I have so often said before, is not to supply a ready-made vocabulary, but to give such means of forming a mental habit as will be in themselves useful. The following list of words can doubtless be improved; even as it stands, however, it will supply profitable work for any one until he has got along so far as to be fully able to shift for himself.

In general, it may be said that it will be hardly worth while to try to find simple nouns, adjectives, and verbs for every example. In some cases the co-ordinate words will be obvious: in the case of the adjective *rich* the noun *wealth* is naturally thought of, or in the case of the noun *friend*, the verb *to love*;¹ or, having the verb *begin*, the adjective *first*. But when some idea does not suggest itself readily it will be rather better to spend the time on something else.

EXERCISE.

Develop as above the following:

NOUNS. *Body, soul, mind, man, beast, family, friend, master, servant, house, street, city, nation, tree, flower, fruit, hill, valley, forest, meadow, land, water, matter, manner, whole, part, kind, past, future.*

ADJECTIVES. *First, last, full, empty, good, bad, great, small, happy, hard, soft, near, far, new, young, old, poor, rich, right, wrong, strong, weak, true, false, wise, silly.*

VERBS. *To be, begin, break, build, cheer, do, drink, cut, end, fall, find, get, give, go, grow, happen, have, hear, help, hurt, keep, know,*

¹ *Friend* was originally present participle of O. E. fréon, *to love*, as *fie d* was originally present participle of féon, *to hate*. *Friend* and *lover* are almost interchangeable even in Shakespeare.

learn, lie, lire, lose, mourn, plan, play, read, say, see, sleep, sin, sit, strike, suffer, teach, think, try, use, wish, work, worship, write.

61. The Grouping of Synonyms. Having now these rude, undigested masses of words, the question is how to get the good of them. To make them our own we must be familiar with them, and the real way to become familiar with words is to use them frequently. Now this is the best thing to do in this case, but, like a good many other things of the same sort, it can't readily be done in the class-room. We must have some sort of exercise which will, not take the place of practice, for nothing can do that, but aid and assist us in the use of the material we are accumulating. The best exercise I know of to this end lies in the discrimination of synonyms.

To proceed to the discrimination of synonyms from such collections of words as we have at hand requires some middle stage. Some of the words in a group we may profitably compare with each other,—*house* and *mansion*, for instance,—but it would evidently be useless to discriminate between *residence* and *inhabitant*, for the words are not such as any one would think of as synonyms. We must divide the larger groups into smaller groups of words that are really synonymous.

Suppose we take, with a view to dividing into sets of synonyms, the verbs collected about the idea *to speak*. Proceeding roughly, we can easily put together some small groups, e.g.:

- | | |
|--------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1. <i>Speak, say.</i> | 3. <i>Shout, exclaim.</i> |
| 2. <i>Tell, narrate.</i> | 4. <i>Answer, reply.</i> |

Of these the words in (1) convey little more than the general idea. We might join to them the word *utter*, and perhaps also *pronounce*, *articulate*, *state*, *express*. The words in (2) have the notion of speaking of something which has happened; we may add *relate*, *report*, *recount*, *reveal*, *disclose*, although here we are getting to a

new notion. The speaking of things which have happened may suggest to us another group (5) to *prophecy, foretell, predict*, and perhaps *announce and proclaim*. (3) may easily be enlarged by *vociferate, cry, howl, shriek, scream, yell, hollo*. They all have the idea of speaking in a loud tone and may suggest (6) *whisper, murmur, mutter, growl, grumble, mumble*. (4) seems to have rather a peculiar meaning: it means to speak to another in reply to something; if we leave out the last modification, we have to *address, impart, commune, converse, discuss, debate, harangue, lecture, rejoin, dictate*. But these are evidently too various in meaning. We may divide them into:

4. *Answer, reply, rejoin.*
7. *Converse, discuss, debate, talk.*
8. *Address, harangue, lecture.*
9. *Dictate, bid, command, charge, order, direct.*

These words all imply speaking to another; we have only (10) *soliloquize*, meaning definitely to speak to oneself. We may make other groups still:

11. *Chat, chatter, gossip, prate, prattle, jabber, babble.*
12. *Remark, observe, mention, allude, hint.*

We have here several groups of words so nearly alike in meaning that it is worth while to discriminate particularly between their meanings. This is one advantage of dividing up our lists of words. Another is that we generally increase their number; one list suggests another. When we have a very particular idea, it is easier to get together the words that will express it than when we have only an ill-defined conception.

I add another example of words got together into groups.

To go, to come:

1. To go away, withdraw, leave, retire, retreat, vanish.
2. To come, draw near (or nigh), approach.
3. To go up, mount, ascend, rise, climb, scale.

4. To go down, descend, fall, drop.
5. To run, rush, hurry, hasten.
6. To ramble, wander, roam, stray, meander.

Such groups can readily be made of the words which one had gathered about the main idea.

EXERCISE.

Divide into groups the words gathered according to **60**. This division, if you proceed with a certain amount of system, will not only put together the synonyms, but will also suggest new words.

62. Discrimination of Synonyms. Having now sorted out of the undigested aggregates which we had gathered together some groups of words which are so nearly alike that there is some possibility of their being confused with one another, we desire some method of proceeding farther. Of course the dictionary is always a resource, or some special work on Synonyms.¹ But the scholarly way of dealing with the question is to endeavor after the principles at bottom, to try to habituate the mind to particular discrimination, so that we may ourselves be able to have an opinion upon the subject that will be at least well based.

The problem is, given a number of words of similar meaning, how can we best bring out the special meaning of each one? For in almost all cases the words in question will be found to be different in particular meaning, although they may at first sight seem to mean about the same thing. For instance, let us consider the words *learning*, *wisdom*, *knowledge*. They are an interesting set of words, they are words that we ought to know a good deal about. They all have something to do with intellectual attainment, but they all have different particular meanings. Here are a number of rather interesting quotations:

¹ Crabbe's *Synonyms* is a well-known and useful book. I have found Smith's *Synonyms Discriminated* rather better. Neither of them, however, quotes very modern authorities.

"Let me be not learned, but wise."—Channing: *Life* (1-vol. ed.), p. 104.

"I am inclined to think that Shakespeare had more learning even, not to say knowledge, than is commonly allowed him."—Lowell: *Works*, ii. 295.

"But though Lochiel had very little knowledge of books, he was eminently wise in council."—Macaulay: *History*, ch. xiii.

Compare also the antithesis made by Tennyson in the Introduction to *In Memoriam*, between *knowledge*, sts. 6, 7, and *wisdom*, st. 11.

Evidently these three words are sufficiently different to be used almost antithetically.

In considering now, how best to familiarize ourselves with these minor differences we may well enough consider how it is that we are familiar with the more general meanings of words, and even how words come to have any meanings at all. In answer to the first question we may say that we hear and use a word in various expressions until we have by a process of exclusion which is usually unconscious brought it down to whatever sense we may assign to it. In answer to the second we may say that words only have the meaning which the common consent of usage gives them. We shall do well, then, to proceed by comparing these words as they are used; that is, our method should not deal merely in definitions, even with examples, but we should learn from the words themselves in the places where they belong. But as it is our aim to distinguish between the meanings of these synonyms, it will not be to our purpose to use one word where another will suit. It is only by using each word in circumstances where the others would not do that we shall make advance. Not to draw the matter out to a tedious length, it will be found convenient—

1. To determine the general meaning, if possible, of all the synonyms presented to us.
2. To determine upon the most general term, if there be such—the term of which the others are modifications.
3. To use each word in a sentence which will not admit any of the others.
4. To compare and consider our results.¹

In the case in point, (I add two more words):

A. Learning, Knowledge, Wisdom, Science, Erudition.

1. All five words have some connection with the subject-matter of the intellect, with its acquisitions, or with its habits. It would be hardly worth while to proceed further with a mere definition; we can come to a more exact understanding of the meaning of the word by the process that follows.

2. *Knowledge* is the most general term; the others seem to be kinds of knowledge.

3. (a) "A man of great knowledge." This sentence will not help us much, for any of the other words could be put in the place of *knowledge*. The meaning would doubtless be different, but we should still have to explain what the difference was.

"He had acquired a good knowledge of Latin, of botany, of seamanship, of himself," of almost anything, one might say. Here none of the other words would do.

(b) "The learning of Egypt, of India, of Germany, of the schools, of the universities." But evidently not "the learning of a carpenter, of a man of the world, of a boy." Learning would seem to be that kind of knowledge, or that form that knowledge takes in the schools and universities, or in countries which enjoy, or have enjoyed, repute for their pursuit of Truth. The sentence is not an exel-

¹ This exercise is a modification of the Definition by Elimination presented in Abbot and Seeley, *English Lessons for English People*, § 8.

lent one, for some of the other words could be substituted for *learning*.

(c) *Erudition* would do well enough in the sentences in (b). Here we must fall back on definition. *Erudition* is commonly used as meaning learning of a singularly deep and profound, sometimes of a pedantic, character. By some the word seems to be confined to learning in the direction of History, Literature, Philosophy, as opposed to the branches more commonly called scientific.

(d) "Botany is a science of great importance," obviously some systematic ordering of knowledge on some particular subject. "Science and Religion," the aggregate of such systems, or some meaning derived from it.

(e) "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom." Whatever idea may have been attached to the word *wisdom* by the translators of 1611, this sentence gives us nowadays the conception of a ripe, spiritual, well-tempered, and seasoned knowledge. But how about such a sentence as this: "He had arranged all his affairs with the greatest wisdom"? Here the word seems to be used in a sense that is hardly synonymous with our other words. It has more likeness to such words as prudence, sagacity, understanding. It is a mental quality; the other words are all expressive of the possession or subject-matter of the mind.

4. We gather, then, that—

Learning is knowledge acquired by study and books, in the schools and universities.

Erudition is learning of a singularly deep and advanced character.

Science is a system of knowledge, or the aggregate of such systems, or something easily deducible from these meanings.

Wisdom is knowledge of a ripe, refined, well-tempered character.

Let us now take some very different words:

B. Mansion, Domicile, Residence, House.

1. A building for people to be in.

2. House is the most general term.

3. (a) "He lived in a small house on — St." The other words could not be substituted here. But evidently a house need not be small; it may be, but need not necessarily be.

[How about such expressions as "the head of the house," "a business house," "the House of Hohenzollern," "the Upper House"? What is to be done with them?]

(b) "At the end of the avenue stood a stately, old-fashioned mansion." The sentence is not very good, for either *house* or *residence* might be used. They would not, however, seem so appropriate, which would go to show that the avenue, the stateliness, perhaps the old-fashioned character, have something to do with the idea *mansion*.

(c) "This part of the town was full of residences." It would not be very sensible to say "full of houses," for that would not especially distinguish any particular part of the town. We get evidently the idea of houses that are lived in, and rather respectable ones at that.

(d) "He had his domicile in an attic room." This evidently means that he was at home there; that would seem to be the distinctive meaning. But the use in this sentence does not conform to the general meaning noted in (1). This domicile is not a building, but only part of one. We may infer that when *domicile* does refer to a building it means particularly the place where one is at home.

4. House, a building for the use of people.

Mansion, a stately, magnificent house.

Residence, a house to be lived in, of the better class, (cf. *dwelling-house*).

Domicile, a house in the quality of being one's home.

C. Portion, Share, Fragment, Part, Bit, Factor, Piece.

1. Less than the whole.
2. Part.
3. (a) A part of the time, of the lesson, of the house, of anything.
 (b) Ten shares of stock. His share of the profits.
 (c) He gave each his due portion.
 (d) They gathered up the fragments that remained.
 (e) Not a bit. Broken to bits.
 (f) A piece of land, of wood, of pie, of anything material.
 (g) The prime factors of 78 are 2, 3, and 13.

Shrewdness is an important factor in his character.

4. Part, less than the whole.

Share, a part due any one.

Portion, a part after a division.

Fragment, a part that has been broken off.

Bit, a very small part.

Piece, a part of anything material.

[How about "a piece of advice, of one's mind"?]

Factor, perhaps a little different from a part. As addition differs from multiplication (if that makes the matter any clearer) so does *part* differ from *factor*. A number of parts one added to another make a whole. A number of factors also make a whole, but we regard each as being in a manner all-pervasive; the word has more likeness to *element* than to *part*.

D. To Gain, Acquire, Get, Obtain, Win, Earn, Buy.

The only things worthy of especial remark here are:

1. *Buy* differs from all the rest in such a way that it might as well be left out.

2. *Win* and *gain* are so nearly alike in meaning that it requires a little particular care to distinguish between them.

A statesman wins public confidence.

A general wins a battle.

A competitor wins a prize.

But in all these cases we could use *gains* as well, and should have still to explain the difference in meaning.

One wins the prize in a lottery, a race, a medal, \$5.00 on a boat-race.

One gains a livelihood, the victory, health and strength, \$5.00 by that transaction.

These are sentences in which the verbs could not well be transposed. They give us such an idea of the words that we could write:

The statesman won public favor by a single brilliant speech.

Or,

The statesman gained public confidence by years of devoted service.

Here the transposition of the words would hardly result in right usage. With such a number of examples of special usage we form a good idea of the word without any definition at all.

E. Irritable, Peevish, Ill-tempered, Captious, Peppery, Irascible.

These words are hardly synonyms—some of them at least. Nor can we mention one as being such a general term as includes the rest. But such groups of words have their use. They are to some extent representative of different degrees of a common quality. It will be useful to arrange them in some order; for instance, that of the intensity or violence of the general quality. I should arrange them as follows:

Irascible, peppery, irritable, peerish, captious, ill-tempered.

When we come to form sentences to illustrate their meaning we shall see that each has some peculiarity of meaning, as well as its especial degree of the general quality.

EXERCISE.¹

Discriminate between the following:

1. *Wages, salary, honorarium, fee.*
2. *Quick, fast, swift, brisk, rapid, hasty.*
3. *Religious, pious, devotional, holy.*
4. *Loyal, likely, liable.*
5. *Plain, clear, obvious, evident, manifest, apparent.*
6. *Authentic, true, genuine, very.*
7. *Phase, aspect, state, condition.*
8. *Dainty, exquisite, nice, delicate, refined.*
9. *Great, immense, monstrous, big, huge, vast, large.*
10. *Friends, companions, associates, comrades, acquaintances.*

63. Some Minor Exercises. We have now followed through an exercise which, if systematically carried out should enable us to reach one of our ends—the having a definite idea for every word that occurs to us. We are now able in the case of any given word to gather about it all words of kindred meaning and to discriminate between them with tolerable exactness. If we had time and patience, and the knowledge of precisely the right words to take into consideration, we could now make ourselves masters of the precise meaning of every word in the English language. Of course no one could give up to such an undertaking so great a part of his threescore years and ten as it would require. But it is not with a view to the actual gain in words and meanings that the exercise has been proposed. A comparatively small amount of practice of this sort gives us a way of looking at words which should enable us to do much unconsciously toward rendering precise and flexible our use of words.

We saw, however, another necessity to the perfect vocabulary, namely, that for every idea we should have the right words. Waiving the question whether it is possible for us

¹ Rather easier exercises in discriminating between synonyms may be found in Beuhler, *Practical Exercises in English: Exercises XVIII-XXV, LVI-LXII, LXX-LXXIV.* I prefer the exercise in the text on account of its general application.

to have any ideas without words expressive of them, let us see what can be done in this direction in addition to what we have already done. Perhaps we cannot have an exact idea without a word for it, but everybody knows by experience how it feels to have something (idea or not) floating about in the head without a word to fasten to. Our next task is to see what we can do here.

We have first a difficulty in getting to work. In proceeding from words to meanings we had something definite: there are so and so many words; all we had to do was to put the right meanings to them. But where are we to find any collection of wordless meanings? Obviously we must proceed by rather tentative efforts. Indeed, I know of no such systematic exercise as that we have just gone through. I can only propose some particular exercises which tend in the direction. The first part of the preceding exercise was somewhat to the point; it stimulated us to search out and find expression for related meanings. In some particular cases the same thing may be done in other ways.

a. I shall first call your attention to an exercise proposed first, I believe, by Abbot and Seeley (*op. cit.*, § 10). In their first chapter they have some discussion of antonyms. An antonym is a word which has, not something the same meaning as a given word, but an opposite meaning. This is rather a vague mode of expression, but it will serve our present purpose. *Good* and *bad* are antonyms, *rich* and *poor*, *fast* and *slow*, and so on with a great number of pairs of words. We can think of numbers of antonyms without difficulty.¹ If we do so think up antonyms we see very soon that some words have no antonyms at all. What is the antonym of *house*, for instance. We can

¹ See H. P. Smith, *Synonyms and Antonyms*, and also *A Standard Dictionary* where under many words antonyms are given as well as synonyms.

hardly conceive such an idea as *not house*, much less do we have any word for it. In fact the greater number of nouns have no antonyms; of a few only can we find anything that can be considered as such. *Lore* and *hate* and similar pairs might perhaps serve, but for a vast number of nouns there is nothing of the sort. The same thing may be said of verbs. If we now try another tack and look out for such words as undoubtedly do have what we think of as antonyms, we shall find that the most obvious class consists of adjectives expressing characteristics, and especially such adjectives as express personal characteristics. With these adjectives, of course, will go their coördinate nouns and verbs. *Good* and *bad* are again examples, or, to take less common words, let us say, *prodigal* and *parsimonious*. In this last case our authors point out that the two words seem to represent, one the defect and one the excess of some middle quality for which perhaps *thrifty* would be the right word. They therefore propose as an exercise the naming the Excess the Mean, the Defect, of various qualities. This exercise, although when one begins to reason out its logical and psychological basis one finds certain theoretical difficulties, has rather a stimulating effect. I find it useful in just this place, for it gives us practice in exactly explaining certain notions which we have or think we ought to have. If *passionate* indicate an excess, what indicates the defect? I should say *phlegmatic*, and give *even-tempered* as a mean. In like manner would I arrange:

bluntness	candor	hypocrisy
boorish or	cultivated	pedantic
illiterate		
skeptical or	open-minded	credulous
bigoted		
abstinent or	sober	intemperate
abstemious		
florid	ornate	plain

Exercise of this kind I think of value, although I have found that great differences of opinion are aroused by it.

EXERCISES.

Consider the following words with a view to the above. Which would you take to represent the Mean of some quality? Which the Excess or the Defect? Take each one and endeavor to fill out the three places, and if you cannot do so in any case, explain to yourself just why (cf. p. 229). Do any of them belong in the same series?

impassive	faint-hearted
obstinate	fascinating
generous	sharp
self-sacrificing	cowardly
uninteresting	serene
sympathetic	energetic
individual	pliable
eccentric	magnetic
audacious	clumsy
mean	opinionated
credulous	lazy
poky	boisterous
tactful	flippant
prudent	simple

A number of words are suggested in Abbot and Seeley, §10, some of which seem to me extremely difficult.

Before leaving the subject it must be remarked that one will sometimes find ideas which seem really to have no words for them. Such ideas are called *anonyms*; e.g.,

inquisitive — incurious

What is the mean here? We feel that there is some quality, but it is hard to give it a name.

It is interesting to think why *anonyms* should exist. It is not because the thing signified by the idea in question is not common. "The English do not have the word *ennui*, because they have the thing itself," said some Frenchman. James (*Psychology*, I, 195) remarks that the lack of a word often leads to the error of supposing that there is nothing which would be expressed by it if it existed. I should say,

however, that, though the lack of a word is no proof of the lack of the idea, it is a proof that there has been little exact speaking or exact thinking about the thing in question, at least during the earlier stages of the language. But such a matter although interesting must not detain us longer.

b. Another useful exercise in trying to get words for ideas I have found in the attempt to name all the colors, tastes, and smells that one can think of. The first is the only one that can be carried out to any great extent. It is rather interesting to try, upon looking at a sunset, to give names to all the shades of color that one can distinguish; so also when walking in the woods or on the beach, or indeed anywhere and at any time. For my own part I find a pleasure in the quickened observation which follows such efforts. In the class-room one may make a list of all color-names, grouping them in some way or other, not only for the sake of order, but because such a method is more suggestive. I may remark that such words as *cherry-color* should be allowed only when they really indicate a special color. *Cherry-color* does not mean the color of cherries, for some cherries are yellow and some are almost black. So *wine-color* is not necessarily the color of wine, nor is *plum-color* the color of plums, nor *flesh-color* the color of flesh. They are, by this time, as distinctive color-names as blue or red,—in fact more distinctive.

The naming of tastes and smells, although rather an amusing exercise is not productive of much result, for our vocabularies in these respects are rather small.

Some suggestive exercises are given in Abbot and Seeley, *op. cit.*, §§ 11, 12.

II. THE CRITICAL STUDY OF DICTION.

64. Its Constructive Value. Having followed out the exercises to which our desire for constructive work led us, we must turn back to the critical studies which for the time we passed by. Indeed in discriminating between synonyms we have already been doing work which is chiefly critical in its nature. To consider, however, the exercises more commonly contemplated in the critical study of diction.

The more we consider such studies the more shall we see that, although really critical in character, they have an effect which is truly constructive. If we had definitely set aside such work on the ground that it merely confined our vocabulary, that it merely lopped off excrescences, pruned away useless branches, refined it of all but the right stuff, we should, on the whole, have been in error. For the critical study of diction, although it does certainly have this effect, has it really only in a minor degree, and has also the effect of assisting the strength and growth of our vocabulary. In order to understand rightly just how far the critical study of diction confines and limits our vocabulary we must mention a matter which properly belongs later.

The usual division of the subject is under the topics Barbarisms, Solecisms, and Improprieties. Under each head we are told what forms of expression to avoid. In that respect, certainly, the process is confining and limiting. But as far as the vocabulary is concerned we must not suppose that this is entirely a weeding-out process.

So far as concerns the actual number of words at our command, we can lose but a very few in the severest study of diction, and on the other hand we gain a great many. A Barbarism is a word which, strictly speaking, is not a word, according to good usage. A Solecism is an offence against the grammatical use of words. An Impropriety is a word otherwise unexceptional used in a sense not warranted by good usage. If any one who meant to say, "Who do they think is bound by the agreement?" should write, "Who do they expect does it obligate?" he would commit all three errors. *Obligate* is a barbarism, *who* for *whom* is a solecism, and *expect* used in the sense of *think* is an impropriety. But if you will notice you will see that even in getting all the benefit from such criticism you lose but one word from your vocabulary. *Obligate* goes; but *who* and *expect*, although they were not rightly used in that sentence, are still at your service, and that in a way that they were not before. In other words, the only loss to the vocabulary under the most severely critical study is that of barbarisms. Now it has been remarked by various writers that the number of barbarisms in any person's vocabulary is, even in extreme cases, comparatively small. By far the greater number of cases that are brought to a teacher of rhetoric for his opinion are solecisms or improprieties. Few people remember many obsolete words; we have been pretty well laughed out of using foreign expressions; the chief source of danger is the tendency to colloquialism and to the formation of new compounds where we have enough good words without them. But a few barbarisms in any one's vocabulary make a great show; one is enough to taint a whole page. The numerical loss in getting rid of these will be very small, hardly more than one per cent with most of us. And this loss of barbarisms is probably made up by the restoration of other words to their true uses and a more accurate distribution of words to their ideas. On

the whole, I should say the vocabulary was the gainer in quantity, even by critical work.

In another way, too, though it is not often thought of, do we make a real gain by this critical work. We all of us have two vocabularies: one of words we readily understand, and one of words we commonly use, the latter being much the smaller. Every one who has studied a foreign language will at once see what I mean. Compare your readiness in reading Latin, for instance, and in writing Latin. There are plenty of us who can read what is written in a foreign language with ease, although we are quite unable to express ourselves in it. This is true not only of reading and writing, but of hearing and speaking. One learns to understand what is said to one long before one can talk intelligibly. Of course part of the difficulty lies in the syntax, which we rarely think of in reading and hearing, but which is a source of great anguish in writing and speaking. But a good part of the difficulty lies in our knowledge of the words.

As it is with a foreign language so is it in a minor degree with our mother tongue. Many words which we comprehend well enough as we read them lie entirely outside our speaking vocabulary. Probably every one has had the curious experience as a child when learning to read, of knowing perfectly well the look and sense of certain words which one never ventured to utter. It is much the same with us as we grow up, although we are not conscious of it. A simple proof of the matter lies in the ease with which we read Shakespeare. Shakespeare uses perhaps three times as many words as most of us do, and yet we recognize readily nine tenths of his words. That we are apt enough not to understand them in the sense in which he used them makes no difference; we understand them in some sense, but never use them at all. Now the more we study words and their meanings, even in the most critical manner,

the more do we familiarize ourselves with them, the more does our writing vocabulary approach our reading vocabulary. And this, from the rhetorical point of view, is a distinct gain.

Having seen, then, how far the critical study of diction is directly in the line of our aim, we may proceed to a short consideration of the points of most importance.

A. GOOD USAGE.

65. Good Usage is Changing. The first thing to be remarked is that here, as in every similar case, our first want is a standard. The very expressions "bad English," "an incorrect use," and so on indicate by their adjectives the existence of some standard. The standard always accepted in our case is that of Good Usage. Of the characteristics of good usage I will speak in a minute, but I would first call your attention to the fact that it is by its very nature fluctuating and changing. It is this which gives a vague and somewhat unsatisfactory character to this branch of our subject. We cannot set down once for all a statement of correct and incorrect usage; each new generation has the task in hand to begin upon. Excellent illustrations of the changing character of usage may be found by reading that part of Campbell's Rhetoric which refers to diction. Campbell was presumably a good judge; certainly his Rhetoric, although written more than a hundred years ago, is in some respects authoritative. In what he says on the nature of Good Use he is as valuable as ever; the latest Rhetoric that I have seen (J. M. Hart, 1895) follows his characterization. But his examples often show very strikingly how different is the standard of good usage nowadays from that of a hundred years ago.

For instance, Campbell says that *advice* meaning *information* is a commercial expression; it is so to-day. But

he says immediately afterward that *nervous* meaning *of weak nerves* is medical cant, and that *turtle* meaning *tortoise* is used only by sailors and gluttons. At present *nervous* meaning *powerful* and *turtle* meaning a kind of dove would, of course, be understood; but the meanings which in Campbell's day were not proper are now the commoner.

So also he remarks that *authenticity* and *vindictive* will probably soon take the place of—what? Of *authenticalness* and *vindicative*, words which nowadays no one would think of uttering.

He speaks of certain Gallicisms, and mentions in the same list *opine*, *ignore*, *fraicheur*, *adroitness*, *opinionatrey*. Of these the second and fourth are to-day in good use, the first is esteemed a barbarism, the third is rarely heard, and the last can hardly be pronounced by us. Such a difference has a hundred years made in the way of looking at things which once seemed all of a kind.

That good usage should be constantly changing is not unnatural. Language itself, although we do not notice it, is constantly changing. Words change their form and their meaning continually.

The change of form in words, that is to say, a change in their pronunciation, is very obvious. The oldest English texts are to-day unreadable by Englishmen who have not given particular attention to the subject, and that not merely because some words have passed out of use. About half-way between our own time and the earliest written English that we have comes Chaucer. His work would seem more unfamiliar to a West Saxon of the eighth century than it does to us. But we need not go so far back as Chaucer for evidence. We cannot read the poetry of the eighteenth century without perceiving that not a few words that once rhymed together have changed their form so that we have no rhyme at all or something that makes us laugh.

"Here thou, great Anna, whom three realms obey,
Dost sometimes council take and sometimes tea."

POPE : *Rape of the Lock*, canto iii. ll. 7, 8.

The change of meaning in words is one of the most interesting of linguistic studies. I will give example of but one kind of change, the nature of which is familiar enough to you already. The following words may be found in the first half of the seventeenth century with the meanings set against them:

To prevent	To go before
reiterate	go back and forth
err	wander
incense	burn
Retorted	Twisted back, as hair from the forehead.
Candor	Whiteness
Continent	Anything that contains, e.g., an apron with flowers in it.

In all these cases the physical meaning, if we may so call it, has wholly passed away, leaving only the metaphorical sense.

Language itself being therefore in such a state of perpetual flux, it is not at all remarkable that good usage should vary also. It is all arbitrary, all the result of unexpressed agreement. If we could all get together, we might make any changes in the language that we chose, and if we could hold to them it would be well enough. As it is, everybody approximates to what he hears from everybody else, and so a rough kind of balance is struck.

66. Characteristics of Good Usage. But since Good Usage varies we must get as near as we can to the good usage of the Present. The first point generally agreed upon concerning good usage is that it should be Present Usage. There is, perhaps, a little doubt as to just what we should call Present Usage. I should myself say the

usage of the best writers of the generation just passing away, such men as Cardinal Newman, Matthew Arnold, Ruskin, James Russell Lowell, Walter Pater. Of course a writer of an earlier time may be a better authority than one who comes later. Macaulay, who died in 1859, is still a better authority in this matter than Carlyle, who died a quarter of a century afterward. But that is for another reason. It is not because Macaulay was a greater man than Carlyle, or a greater author. It is mainly because in all those respects which mark one as fitted to be an authority on good English, Macaulay was the superior. Entirely aside from the comparative power of thought, Macaulay is, as a man of letters, of far greater reputation than Carlyle. One thing we are told of good use, namely, that it must be Reputable, such as is common to authors of reputation, and here the greater the reputation (using the words in their best sense) the greater the authority. I have said that in this matter Macaulay is a greater authority than Carlyle. So also must he be said to be a greater authority than Cardinal Newman, for he has a greater reputation, and therefore a greater influence. One may feel that Cardinal Newman is the better authority, but for one reader of Newman there are a hundred of Macaulay. Macaulay is, then, *de facto* more of an authority, and language almost always submits to a *de facto* government.

With these two characteristics of Good Usage—that it should be Present and Reputable, is commonly joined a third—that it should be National. This is the dictum of Campbell: in his day it was a simple and obvious idea; it excluded foreign expressions and provincialisms. But nowadays the English language is so widely spoken that this point is one of some difficulty. When we speak of National Usage, do we mean the usage of English authors only? or do we, here in America, mean the usage of American authors? or must we have a consensus of usage in Great

Britain, America, and the great British Colonies? The general tendency in America is, I believe, to cling to certain cherished Americanisms, and such a feeling appears to me to accord with the universal characteristics of language, which never yet endured an authority not of itself without harm. But English usage must always be a check upon us: though we need not talk of *coals* and *trams*, we must, at present at least, acknowledge that for one American author of national reputation there are half a dozen English authors. If, however, some difficulty exist in determining the precise meaning to give the term National in this sense, there is another sense in which the term is definitely understood. The word is used also to exclude any professional terms, or the slang of any particular set, or vulgar word belonging rather to a class than to the nation.

B. VIOLATIONS OF GOOD USAGE.

67. Mode of Treatment. So much, then, as to the standard which we acknowledge. It is a vague one; it is with difficulty that we attain to an exact knowledge of it in a given case; yet it is all we have, and we must do our best to gain a knowledge of it. I believe that a real knowledge can only be gained by constant and careful reading, by constant and careful self-criticism. Such a knowledge is rare, and we most of us refer largely to the dictionary. Of course the dictionary has the advantage of us, for it is made by a number of scholars; but just at present the dictionaries do not take great pains to inform us in regard to good usage. They commonly mark obsolescent words and slang words—which is something; but the modern dictionary-maker cannot be said to have a very delicate literary conscience. The real function of the lexicographer is, perhaps, rather the impartial recording of usage than the distinguishing between good usage and bad.

But having a standard, such as it is, the critical study of diction consists largely in remarking and correcting variations from it. And in such a task we see at once how impossible it is to be complete. Even could we give a complete list of errors that have been committed up to the time of writing, the ingenuity of man would devise new ones before the book had left the press. All we can do is to present in as orderly a way as possible the directions in which one is most likely to run into error.

The common classification, as has been already noted (p. 233), is into Barbarisms, Solecisms, and Improprieties.

68. Barbarisms are words of which the form is not sanctioned by good usage—words which are not in any sense used by good authors. Such words may be too old, they may be too new; they may be in use at the present time, but not in national or reputable use. The main divisions are therefore into Obsolete words, Coined words, Foreign words, Slang, and Low words.

Obsolete words are often called Archaisms. They are common enough in poetry, but in prose they are to be avoided. There is no great danger of using them, for people as a rule forget words as they become obsolescent.

Coined words, on the other hand, or Neologisms, as they are often called, are words that are too new. They are a constant source of danger, for we are always seeing them, and there is no way of knowing whether they would be acceptable to a good writer or whether they will in time be accepted into the language.

Foreign words, are often called Gallicisms, Briticisms, Americanisms, according to the language from which they come. Some twenty years and more ago there would seem to have been a great tendency on the part of young writers to use French words: at least all the writers on Rhetoric were full of cautions on the subject. I have not noticed that students are much tempted to use French

terms. Perhaps they have been laughed out of the habit by this time, or it may be that many of them are more familiar with German than with French.

You will most of you have an idea of what I mean by Slang; it may be well to remark that I use the word in rather a broad sense, to include all technical terms that are not in good use.

Low words are such words as can hardly be called slang, which sometimes occur in conversation, but seem hardly fit for writing. They are often termed Colloquialisms, which is, on the whole, a better name for them.¹

Such being the kinds of Barbarisms, it is more to our purpose to inquire why any one should have any desire to use them than to try to find out just what they are.

I am inclined to think that three heads will cover most cases.

1. There have been not a few authors who have felt themselves a bit cramped by the idea that they should use no words but such as were sanctioned by good authority. Such a one was Tom Nash in the time of Elizabeth, whose exuberance led him to the frequent use of coined words and slang. Such a one was Thomas Carlyle in our own time. Such a one also was Walt Whitman here in America. Walt Whitman desired to express himself in the freest possible manner, he wanted to do away with every sort of conventionality that could possibly cramp or limit his idea.

¹ I have noted above the points usually mentioned by writers on the subject. But the matter is rather confused, and we are as yet without any real basis of fact or principle on which to proceed. Why should it be a principle to avoid foreign words, when it is by using them that the language has always grown? What is the difference between Colloquialism and Slang, and how far may either be found in the work of authors of reputation? Why should Neologisms be strictly avoided? These questions and others may very profitably occupy the attention of students. The utterances upon them so far have been usually *ex cathedra*, and not based upon any particular presentation of the facts in the case.

It is not remarkable, then, that he should use words much as he pleased. I give a few examples (with the page references in *Leaves of Grass*, 3d ed., 1860) to show the particular directions in which he found himself led to use words which the rhetorician would term barbarisms. Whether he invented them himself, as in some cases, has nothing to do with the matter.

Coined words: *Libertad*, 7; *Presidentiad*, 239; *translatress*, 9; *oratress*, 189; *revoltress*, 394; *omnific*, 63; *spasmic*, 112; *harbinge*, 20; *promulge*, 107; *poemet*, 16; *tympans*, 240; *somnambule*, 409.

Foreign expressions: *en masse*, 11; *mon cher*, 12; *en arrière*, 163; *melange*, 13; *feuillage*, 106; *respondez*, 166; *allons*, 321; *habitan* (= inhabitant, so also *habitué*, 181), 172; *camerado*, *romanza*, 150.

Low words: *loaf*, 23; *gal*, 104; *yawp*, 104; *blatherer*, 113; *duds*, 86; *jour* (journeyman), 40.

I add, although they may perhaps be held to come more properly under the head Improperities:

Urge, 25; *pave*, 32; *merge*, 47, and others all used as nouns.

Birthed, 222; *preluding*, 287.

And such locutions as—

Chants democratic, 7; *Marches humanitarian*, 72.

2. Such is real exuberance. One feels that this is a natural (a needful, if you like) mode of expression. It does not make the words good English, but it is evidently necessary for such men as Walt Whitman to dismiss the care for good English from their minds and surge ahead. Another cause of the use of barbarisms does not seem to have this reason. A good many writers seem to use barbarisms from affectation. Most often is it in the poets that one meets with such affectation. A part of the severity of the *Quarterly Review* (vol. xix. p. 201) was directed upon Keats' barbaric vocabulary. A young poet is very

apt to feel that the ordinary language of everyday people is not refined and delicate enough to express his own especial sentiments. One sometimes meets with the characteristic in a prose writer. The affectation is usually for neologisms which may be invented by the author himself or adopted from the usage of somebody else. Here are a number of examples chosen from Robertson: *Essays toward a Critical Method*.

Dilettantist, 3; *stylist*, passim; *statist* (one who states), 13; *belletrist*, *fictionist*, *criticable*, 71; *likeable*, 171; *connoisseurship*, 4; *remarkableness*, 12; *lothness*, 41; *bodefully*, 19; *zealotry*, 134; *artifer*, 166; *bulking*, 84; *cultured*, 104. I may add such expressions as *category-confusing*, 84; *forward-reaching*, 9; *style-value*, 32.

3. But the commonest reason for the use of Barbarisms comes from ignorance or carelessness, or the two combined. I suppose that most of the newspaper barbarisms which the writers on rhetoric delight to quote arise from this cause. I find in Frink's edition of Phelps this remark, which seems sound: "Journalists are a class of writers of recent origin. They include in their guild very many rudely-educated men. They write much in haste; they write by short-hand; they write often in a somnolent state, in the small hours of the morning. . . . Theirs is not often leisurely and scholarly authorship. Very few of them attain to the first rank in literature" (*Rhetoric: Its Theory and Practice*, p. 29). In view of these statements, we should infer that the following words, which are extracted from a single number of the *Chicago Tribune* (May 13, 1895), were mostly used in ignorance of the fact that they are not recognized by good usage, or in carelessness of it, or more probably in some combination of the two. Possibly there may be also a bit of affectation, a desire to be spicy and smart.

Nomenclatural, *usable*, *silverite*, *pacerdom*, *spiritual*, *ren-*

*dition, arbitrage, fusionist, fake, bunt, boddle, fad, bilk, squelch, slushy, shutout, firebug, grub, scabs, deal, combine, straddle, joint, plant.*¹

69. Improproprieties. So much for the use of words which, as A. S. Hill puts it, are not words. But a perfectly good word may be used with a meaning which good usage does not attach to it. Such, strictly speaking, are the verbs used as nouns quoted on page 243 and the last words cited above. Words so used are called Improproprieties. We have already done a good deal of work which will help us here. Everything that we have done in the discrimination of synonyms, in studying out the right meanings of words, will be of service in avoiding the wrong meanings. And as I am inclined to think that we should fix our attention upon the right uses rather than upon the wrong, I shall not pursue the topic farther.

70. Solecisms. We come lastly to the so-called Solecism. As a technical term the word denotes errors in Grammar. Strictly speaking, then, it would as such have no place in a narrower conception of Rhetoric. But it is very hard to draw an exact line between rhetoric and grammar, and the study of solecisms has always been considered a part of rhetorical work. The topic, however, cannot well be treated from the constructive standpoint.

To Teachers. No exercises of a critical character for the gaining a pure diction are here given for the reasons pointed out above and on pages vii and viii. It is thought that with well-prepared students the matter will be sufficiently attended to in the correction of the exercises in previous sections. But if the student's preparation is such that he is unable to use words clearly and correctly it may be well to give some practice on the matter. The general opinion of the best teachers at present is opposed to the giving out

¹ Perhaps better classed as improprieties.

of incorrect work to be corrected, and various other means have been devised for attaining the same end. The teacher will find in Phelps' *Rhetoric: Its Theory and Practice*, ed. Frink, pp. 209-247, and Buehler's *Practical Exercises in English*, a great number of exercises which may be given to the class by dictation or otherwise, if it be deemed necessary.

PART FOUR.

FIGURE AND ILLUSTRATION.

71. Significance of the Topic. I often think that it is in his treatment of Figures of Speech that the writer on Rhetoric is most suspected of pedantry by the cold world, and sometimes, it seems to me, with good reason. It is hard in all cases for the average mind to acquiesce in the idea that rules (for as such are the principles of Rhetoric usually thought of) can in any way be a good thing in writing, except for the satisfaction of critics. And critics, it may be remarked, are commonly regarded as people who prefer to consider the things of literature according to the conventions of a scholastic senselessness rather than with the eye of common sense. The usual idea is that if a man wants to write well he should have plenty of practice. Then, if the Lord designed him for a writer, he will write well. Otherwise let him turn his attention elsewhere. That any one ever gains any help from Rhetoric is generally regarded as one of the delusions of academic folly.

To a certain extent there is good foundation for such a view in some treatments of Figures of Speech. Such presentations as are strictly scientific in character are not readily made of use by the young writer. The common division into Figures of Similarity, Contiguity, and Contrast, for instance, is useful, perhaps, from the psychological point of view, but I fancy no one was ever better able to use simile or metonymy thereby.

It is certainly difficult to conceive of a wholly satisfactory method. But we are confronted by the fact that many persons express themselves naturally by means of Figure,

and with excellent effect. Indeed one of the most powerful linguistic tendencies is that toward figure. The figurative element in common speech is very great. Take so many everyday expressions: a business house, a football team, chair of English, a man-o'-war, horse and foot, a red-coat, a bluejacket, a bigwig, consider the examples of metaphorical extension on p. 238, consider certain extensions of adjectives: quick as a flash, good as gold, hot as Tophet, cold as Greenland, or the great number of figurative proverbs (see p. 259), or recall some petrified metaphors: "a turn is given to our ways of thinking," "hence it follows" (more examples are given on p. 263), and you will see some of the directions in which the tendency to figure is most felt. Then, whether we like to study the question or not, about nine tenths of us will use figure consciously in our everyday conversation. The matter is well put by Emerson, whose own leaning in the direction of figurative expression may have led him to a little exaggeration. But on the whole there is much sense in what he says.

"We cannot utter a sentence in sprightly conversation without a similitude. Note our incessant use of the word *like*,—like fire, like a rock, like thunder, like a bee, 'like a year without a spring.' Conversation is not permitted without tropes; nothing but great weight in things can afford a quite literal speech."—*Poetry and Imagination*.

Whether this statement be somewhat exaggerated or not, it is obvious that people in general are in the habit of constantly using metaphors or similes. The phrase "like anything" or "like everything," which is not uncommon in youthful conversation, is evidence of the desire for figure without the necessary inventive capacity. So the common phrase "you never saw anything like it" is indication that ordinary things are well described by comparison. If more evidence of the popular nature of similitude in especial were needed, we should find it in its prevalence in slang,

in vituperation, and in caricature. The similitudes in slang are apt to be bold, and often impossible or disagreeable,¹ but they are almost always present in every slang phrase. So also in vituperation, where, although an exceeding ingenuity often removes the figure from easy comprehension,² the figurative element is evidently held to be both comforting to the speaker and disgraceful to the one addressed. As to the similitudes in caricature they are so common that I need only call your attention to them.

Going back to our extract from Emerson, I would remark that he was himself a remarkable example of the tendency of which he speaks. And this brings up another idea. The tendency to figure is a very characteristic thing. Try to imagine Emerson expressing himself in bare and unadorned statement of fact, or, to take another example, read Lowell and strike out all the figures, and think how very different it would be. In other words, in the work of a great writer the figures are not an adornment; they are not flags and bunting and wreaths of flowers that are hung and twisted about the building when it is completed. They are eminently characteristic, they are a quality of the author's thought. In Carlyle, for instance, the figures are very largely those of Vision, Apostrophe, and the like. That was because Carlyle's imagination was of such a character that he seemed to see the people he was talking about, and so he spoke of them as though in the very act of seeing them, or else he spoke to them. Macaulay, on the other hand, has nothing of that sort; he is constantly perceiving points of likeness and unlikeness between what he is thinking about and other things which arise in mind as he writes. Hence his figures are

¹ Chase yourself off. There are no flies on us.

² "With your face I wouldn't go out Sundays, for fear of breaking the Sabbath." The figure, I presume, comes by way of "breaking the camera" as an intermediate term.

chiefly of similarity and contrast. If one is studying an author's style rather than trying to learn to write, the study of figure is a very interesting matter, for it tells a great deal.

For these two reasons, then,—that figure is actually employed by most people in speech, and that figurative expression has a close connection with thought,—we must try to deal with the subject. And to what I have to say on the matter I shall add a consideration of some other modes of illustration. All figures of speech are not illustration, nor are all modes of illustration figures of speech. But the two have enough in common to make it possible to speak of them together. They have in the main this in common: that each implies an effort on the part of the writer to express his idea more effectively than by a literal statement and restatement of it in whatever sentence form. Of course Example, which is a common mode of illustration, could hardly be called a figure of speech; nor should we say that Hyperbole was precisely a mode of illustration. But we are not dealing with precise distinctions and definitions, and probably all the important differences will become obvious before we are through.

In regard both to Figure and Illustration there is one remark to be made concerning their general effect. That they are effective there can be no doubt; in many various ways, as will be shown later, are they a real help. But I believe we must bear in mind that in the end the figure always detracts from exact thinking. It is a great help at first, but if we keep to it it becomes a hindrance, for its essence is to substitute for the thing we are to think of, something else. So where exact thinking is necessary we need also exact writing, we need plain statements which give us the thought, and do not substitute symbols for ideas. As a rule such exactness is not necessary; but even speaking generally too great dependence on Figure and Illustration has the general tendency to make one some-

what slack in the search for the one expressive word, which is perhaps one of the most important things in a sound and scholarly style. And carried to excess the use of Figure and Illustration degenerates into a floridness and flamboyancy which are only distressing.

I. FIGURE AND ILLUSTRATION CONSIDERED WITH A VIEW TO THE QUALITIES OF STYLE.

72. General Summary. In considering figure and illustration it will be most useful to consider them in their relation to some quality of style that is of importance to us: they are not to be used for their own sakes, but with a purpose. The division of figures from the psychologic standpoint of which we have spoken (p. 247) has its advantages, but it is not immediately helpful to the student of the art of writing. It is their use and not their origin that is of interest to him. The painter does not class his colors according to their origin, having the animal, the mineral, the vegetable in separate groups. Of course he wants to know something of how they are made, in order that he may be sure that they will last, or that they will enable him to convey the effects he has in mind. But their use is what he aims at even when he studies their origin. Now a careful consideration of Figures of Speech according to their origin has no doubt its value, but it is not especially useful to the student who wants to use figure intelligently. He wants to attain certain qualities in his writing, and he is first interested in Figure and Illustration as helping him in the attainment of one or another of them.

The qualities that one most often seeks to attain are Simplicity and Clearness, which we have already considered from our former standpoints, and Force,¹ under which

¹ I omit consideration of the Ludicrous and the Pathetic. Constructive treatment of either would be example of both.

vague name one usually understands such qualities as Vivacity, Brilliance, Energy, Vigor, Dignity, Stateliness. These last qualities have a good deal in common, so that we shall not get confused in the present case by using a common term for them. There will be occasions where what is said will be more applicable to one form of Force than another; usually I shall have Brilliance in mind more than Stateliness or Energy. To consider, then, the most common forms of figure and illustration, with regard to these qualities of style: I shall first note concisely the important points and then explain them more fully.

SUMMARY.

A. If Clearness be our aim, we shall find that—

1. Simile is useful, and that in all kinds of composition.
2. Allegory while not making especially for Clearness does not detract from it.
3. Metaphor, / tend rather to Confusion than to Clearness.
Metonymy,
Synecdoche, }
4. Analogy, like Simile, is useful, but mainly in Description.¹
5. Comparison and Contrast are most useful in Description and Exposition.
6. Example is also useful, but only in Exposition (as to Argument by example, p. 275).

B. If Force be our aim, we shall find that—

1. Metaphor is rather the most useful of all the figures.
2. Allegory,
Synecdoche, / are more serviceable than in A.
Metonymy, }

¹ Meaning of course such passages as are distinctly descriptive, expository etc., without regard to the general character of the piece in which they occur.

² Metonymy and Synecdoche are very broad terms, and each doubtless includes some expressions which rather detract from force than help it. (See Campbell, *Rhetoric*, p. 331 ff.)

3. The devices mentioned in A, 4-6, are only in a minor degree useful.

4. The figure of Personification, and such modes of expression as Irony, Hyperbole, Epigram, Exclamation, Interrogation, Apostrophe, may be used to advantage.

As a rule, too, these devices may be used in any kind of composition, although in Argument the Force ought always to depend rather upon the accuracy of the reasoning than on the mode of statement. But Exposition plays so large a part in most argumentative composition that the exception is rather *pro forma* than otherwise.

C. If Simplicity be our aim, we shall find that—

1. Example is the great aid, although it can only be used in Exposition and Argument.

2. One form of Synecdoche may to some extent take the place of Example in other kinds of composition.

3. Devices of Style, such as Exclamation, etc., are opposed to Simplicity. (See, however, pp. 176, 279.)

4. The common figures are as such not productive of simplicity, but, on the other hand, are directly opposed to it. But although in form they are opposed to simplicity, they may often conduce to it on account of their material (p. 266): in general, if not carried to a great extent, they are no great drawback, and may at the same time be a considerable help.

The foregoing summary needs some words of explanation, and especially in regard to those figures involving a likeness between the idea under consideration and something else, i.e., Simile, Metaphor, and Allegory. A word as to Comparison and Analogy will also be needed, and another on Example.

A. SIMILE, ALLEGORY, METAPHOR.

73. Simile. In speaking of anything, a man may—

1. State the fact: “In the midst of his eager anticipation he began to perceive difficulties.”

Or he may state also something which the fact resembles. He may—

2. Speak of the fact as being like something else: add to the example above, "as one sees a summer sky begin to overcloud."

3. Speak of something else, and imply that the fact in question resembles it: "In the midst of his eager anticipation he began to perceive difficulties. There appeared on the horizon a small cloud about the size of a man's hand."

4. Speak of the fact in terms of something else: "As he sunned himself in the warmth of his anticipations he suddenly realized that it was clouding up."

These last three modes of statement are three different ways of suggesting a likeness. One states it directly; another leaves it wholly to inference; the third stands between the two. 2 is Simile, 4 is Metaphor, and 3 I will call Allegory,¹ although that term is usually used of productions more elaborate than a mere simile or metaphor. Each of these figures we will consider for a little, premising that they are on the whole only typical, and that the student will find in his reading many cases which stand upon some borderland.

Simile. As to Simile, it is rather hard to say whether it be a more natural mode of expression than metaphor. Metaphor is so common a linguistic phenomenon that it is by its means largely that the scope and meaning of a language grows. Were it not for man's passion for metaphor we should need twice as many words as we now have. But, on the other hand, whoever will notice the daily speech of his companions will remark that conscious metaphor is not so common as conscious simile. "Like lightning, like a shot, like a breeze, like anything." Real metaphor, however common among uncivilized people, is rather rare in

¹ Following P. Souriau: *La Suggestion dans l'Art*, p. 228, note.

the speech of civilized people except in the case of particular words where, as a rule, the metaphor is hardly thought of. We say *prevent* or *get ahead of*, *he was much incensed* or *he flared right up*, without much thought of the figure involved. In literature, metaphor is the more common, certainly at the present day.

It is hardly necessary to give examples of Simile. I will, however, as examples of formal simile transcribe an example from Homer and one from Matthew Arnold. They will illustrate one distinguishing point.

In a Simile the writer states a resemblance between some idea which he is considering and some other idea. For convenience let us speak of the latter idea as the *image*; let us say that in Simile one says that the idea is *like* the image, or *as* the image *so* the idea. A simile may be put in various ways, but the characteristic is that both ideas, the original and the image, are presented to the mind, each separate, and a likeness is affirmed between them. Each idea exists clearly and distinctly itself in the mind. This is most obvious in the similes of Homer and such as are modelled upon his. In such similes there is usually noted but one point of resemblance between two ideas, yet each is fully described. E.g.:

"As when some woman of Maionia or Karia staineth ivory with purple, to make a cheek-piece for horses, and it is laid up in the treasure-chamber, though many a horseman prayeth to wear it, but it is laid up to be a king's boast, alike an ornament for his horse and a glory for his charioteer; even in such wise, Menelaos, were thy shapely thighs stained with blood and thy legs and thy fair ankles underneath."—*Iliad*, iv.; trans. Leaf.

Now here the only point of similarity in the image is the color of the ivory and the purple stain. The fact that the staining is done by a woman of Maionia or Karia, that the ivory is a cheek-piece for horses, that it is laid up in

the treasury, that many horsemen pray to wear it,—these points and some others have nothing to do with the thighs, legs, and ankles of Menelaos. They are mentioned by Homer to bring the image clearly before the mind, to give a more adequate, distinct picture of it, not because they have any connection with the resemblance. So in Matthew Arnold's *Sohrab and Rustum*, ll. 329-336:

"As some rich woman, on a winter's morn,
Eyes through her silken curtains the poor drudge
Who with numb blackened fingers makes her fire,
At cockcrow, on a starlit winter's morn,
When the frost flowers the whitened window-panes—
And wonders how she lives, and what the thoughts
Of that poor drudge may be; so Rustum eyed
The unknown adventurous youth. . . "

Here the silken curtains, the poor drudge, the blackened fingers, the frost-flowers, the cockerow, the other details, have nothing at all in common with the original idea. They exist only to make the image called up more distinct.

It will, I think, be found that they have this effect. These figures, although at the time it may seem as though they were needlessly full and explicit, do have a remarkable power of standing out sharply in our minds. They are not easily forgotten, for they impress themselves distinctly upon our attention.

Somewhat different from these figures are those careful similes which will be remembered in the work of Cardinal Newman, in which, althongh it is not always possible to follow out the resemblance through every particlnlar, we usually feel that detail after detail is added to the image not merely to secure its greater distinctness, but to make the more full and sure our apprehension of the resemblance.

"To a near-sighted person colors run together and intermix, outlines disappear, blues and reds and yellows be-

come russets or browns, the lamps or candles of an illumination spread into an unmeaning glare or dissolve into a milky way. He takes up an eyeglass, and the mist clears up; every image stands out distinct, and the rays of light fall back upon their centres. It is this haziness of intellectual vision which is the malady of all classes of men by nature of those who read and write and compose quite as well as of those who cannot, of all who have not had a really good education."—*The Idea of a University*, p. 333.

"It is natural to expect this from the very circumstance that the philosophy of Education is founded on truths in the natural order. Where the sun shines bright, in the warm climate of the south, the natives of the place know little of safeguards against cold and wet. They have, indeed, bleak and piercing blasts; they have chill and pouring rain, but only now and then, for a day or a week; they bear the inconvenience as they best may, but they have not made it an art to repel it; it is not worth their while: the science of calefaction and ventilation is reserved for the north. It is in this way that Protestants stand relatively to Catholics in the science of education; Protestants depending on human means mainly are led to make the most of them," etc.—*Ibid.*, p. 5.

74. Allegory. In a Simile the author presents two ideas and affirms a resemblance. In Allegory he contents himself with presenting one idea only and implying a resemblance to some other idea which may or may not have been stated beforehand. The term Allegory is commonly restricted to longer and more sustained examples. Thus the *Pilgrim's Progress* depicts the journey of a wanderer from one city to another. The implication is obvious that Bunyan is presenting the Christian Life, but he does not state the comparison explicitly. Spenser in the *Faerie Queene* presents to us the adventures of various

knights and ladies. He explains at the beginning that his characters are typical of virtues and vices. Both are Allegories, for both are statements of one idea with an implied representation of another.

The short allegories of the Bible are commonly called Parables.¹ A good example is that parable first recorded, the parable of Jotham, *Judges* ix, 8-15. The term is also more generally used, although the more generic term for a short allegory is Fable, which term also has with certain writers a restriction² with which we need not trouble ourselves. Oriental literature if we may judge from translations abounds in Allegory in our sense. Here is a story from Saadi's, *Gulistan*, viii. 1 (trans. James Ross):

"A certain nobleman had a dunce of a son. He sent him to a learned man, saying: Verily you will give instruction to this youth, peradventure he may become a rational being. He continued to give him lessons for some time, but they made no impression on him, when he sent a message to the father saying: This son is not getting wise, and he has well nigh made me a fool!—Where the innate capacity is good, education may make an impression upon it; but no furbisher knows how to give a polish to iron which is of a bad temper. Wash a dog seven times in the

¹ The Parables in Matthew are usually introduced as Similes. But they are not Similes; the introduction is only formal. E.g.: "The kingdom of heaven is likened unto a man that sowed good seed in his field" (*Matt.* xiii, 24). "Again the kingdom of heaven is like unto a man that is a merchant" (xiii, 45). "Therefore is the kingdom of heaven likened to a certain king" (xviii, 23). "For the kingdom of heaven is like unto a man that is a householder" (xx, 10). This is only a form. It is not the kingdom of heaven that is represented by the sower, the merchant, the king, the householder. The expression serves to introduce the parable. In Luke the introduction is almost always omitted, as in the Good Samaritan, x, 30 (cf. p. 276); the Prodigal Son, xv, 11; Dives and Lazarus, xvi, 19; the Talents, xix, 12. So also in some of the parables in Matthew, as the Sower xiii, 3.

² Lessing, *Abhandlungen über die Fabel*, I. Von dem Wesen der Fabel. La Fontaine: *Fables Choisies*, Préface.

ocean, and so long as he is wet he is all the filthier. Were they to take the ass of Jesus to Mecca, on his return from that pilgrimage he would still be an ass."

These last sentences may be popular proverbs, which are more commonly allegories than similes. E.g.:

- "The early bird catches the worm."
- "It's a long lane that has no turning."
- "A stitch in time saves nine."
- "An iron hand in a velvet glove."
- "All is not gold that glitters."
- "Make hay while the sun shines."

In applying such proverbs to daily happenings no one says, "You are like the early bird that catches the worm," although now that such proverbs are in everybody's mind one often puts them in the form of metaphor: "You're an early bird this morning."

The figure is not so common in English literature as Simile or Metaphor. The following examples are taken from Emerson:

"This human mind wrote history and this must read it. The Sphinx must solve her own riddle."—*History*.

"Be it as it may, his books have no melody, no emotion, no humor, no relief to the dead prosaic level. In his profuse and accurate imagery is no pleasure, for there is no beauty. We wander forlorn in a lacklustre landscape. No bird ever sang in all those gardens of the dead."—*Swedenborg*.

[After speaking of the sayings of the "high priesthood of the pure reason"] "The angels are so enamored of the language that is spoken in heaven that they will not distort their lips with the hissing and unmusical dialects of men, but speak in their own, whether there be any who understand it or not."—*Intellect*.

"To be communicable it [truth] must become picture or sensible object. . . . The ray of light passes invisible

through space, and only when it falls on an object is it seen."—*Intellect*.

"A drop of water has the properties of the sea, but cannot exhibit a storm. There is beauty of a concert as well as of a flute; strength of a host as well as of a hero; and, in Swedenborg, those who are best acquainted with modern books will most admire the merit of mass."—*Swedenborg*.

75. Metaphor. A metaphor is sometimes defined as a simile with the term of comparison omitted, but this definition appears to me to neglect a very important characteristic of the metaphor. I should prefer to say that if the Simile is a statement that an idea is like an image a Metaphor is the statement of an idea in terms of an image. That is, we are not told that A is like B, but A is spoken of as if it were B. This can readily be understood by a few examples which I choose from Emerson's *Essays, First Series*:

"The walls of rude minds are scrawled all over with facts, with thoughts."

Of course no rude minds have any walls, nor can any walls be scrawled over with facts. But Emerson conceives of the mind as a chamber, perhaps, and then speaks of it as though it were a chamber. Thus he says properly that its walls are scrawled over. But the walls of a room may be scrawled over with words, names, sentences, proverbs, and so on. Following out the analogy, these would represent the impression made on the mind by thoughts, facts. He does not take the trouble to state the resemblance, but puts in the words themselves. He then proceeds: "They shall one day bring a lantern and read the inscription." This latter is on the borderground between Allegory and Metaphor.

"Time dissipates to shining ether the solid angularity of facts." *Time* and *facts* are literal, the rest figurative.

"A man . . . is a knot of roots, whose flowers and fruit-

age are the world." *Man* and *world* are literal, the rest figurative.

"He shall collect to a focus the rays of *nature*.

EXERCISE.

Point out the literal and figurative elements in the following metaphors; they are all from Emerson's essay on *Self-Reliance*. It is worth while in studying any such question as this to run through some one thing and note whatever is to the point.

1. "A man should learn to detect and watch that gleam of light which flashes across his mind from within, more than the lustre of the firmament of bards and sages."

2. "What pretty oracles nature yields us on this text in the face and behavior of children, babes, and even brutes."

3. "It [conformity] loses your time and blurs the impression of your character."

4. "Meantime nature is not slow to equip us in the prison-uniform of the party to which we adhere."

5. "Let a man then know his worth and keep things under his feet."

6. "What is the aboriginal Self, on which a universal reliance may be grounded? What is the nature and power of that science-baffling star, without parallax, without calculable elements, which shoots a ray of beauty even into trivial and impure actions, if the least mark of independence appear."

7. "When we have new perception, we shall gladly disburden the memory of its hoarded treasures as old rubbish." (Metaphor or Simile?)

8. "Trust thyself: every heart vibrates to that iron string."

76. Mixed Metaphors. One subject usually touched upon in regard to Metaphors is that of Mixed Metaphors. I am tempted to believe that the indiscriminate condemnation of mixed metaphors arises rather more often from pedantry than from common sense. Mixed metaphors are certainly often enough ridiculous, but it can hardly be said because they are mixed, for all metaphors are mixed. It must be for whatever reasons make other things ridiculous. The stock instance is Shakespeare's: "Take up

arms against a sea of troubles." Now here the figure changes in the middle, as it were; possibly there were two figures in the poet's mind:

To take up arms against a host of troubles.

To hold one's own against a sea of troubles.

And, as is the case not only with figures, but with syntactic constructions, and even with single words, he confused the two, or he may have begun with one idea and finished with another. But the result is certainly not ridiculous. To my mind it is not nearly so ridiculous as the following metaphors, which (in a technical sense) are not mixed at all:

"In filling memory's woodbox throw in a log for me."

"In the chimney of your affections count me always a brick."

"A drop of ink falling like dew upon a passing thought produces stately growths which make millions think."

The celebrated metaphor of Sir Boyle Roehe is sometimes quoted: "Mr. Speaker, I smell a rat. I see it floating in the air. But I will nip it in the bud." But this is not a mixed metaphor: it is a rapid succession of very incongruous metaphors, and the ridiculousness of it arises largely from the conception of the rat floating in the air and being nipped.

A really mixed metaphor seems to be the following from something of Whittier's:

"I ask not now for gold to gild

With mocking shine an aching frame."

Here the mixture is such that it is difficult to tell whether a figure were intended or a pun.

It is usual to speak of mixed metaphors, but, as we have seen, the term usually applies to a rapid sequence of metaphors. We may just as well have a rapid sequence of similes. If the rapidity of sequence in simile or metaphor defeats the object of the figure it is of course bad. As a

rule, if it calls up a humorous conception, it will defeat its object. E.g.:

"The first bar [of Schumann's D minor symphony] may be considered, so to speak, the keystone of this movement. Trite and uninteresting as it is, it follows us relentlessly . . . till . . . we hardly know whether to feel aggravated at its pertinacity or astonished at the effect produced by such an unpromising subject."—*Thomas Concert Programme*.

Here the simile would seem to be meant to help us to understand the music. I am, however, haunted by the idea of being pertinaciously followed by that relentless and uninteresting keystone to such a degree that I fear I should not be wholly in sympathy with the composer.

77. Petrified Metaphors. It must be remarked that it is often rather hard to say whether such and such an expression should be called a metaphor. Metaphor is and always has been one of the commonest means of extending the scope of language. We have a great number of words in our language which were originally or at one time metaphors (e.g. p. 238). We have a number of expressions which are constantly used with no real thought of their metaphorical sense. Such expressions I shall not call metaphors. For convenience' sake I shall understand by the word metaphor only such expressions as do call up an image, or as are intended to call one up. I would not be understood to speak of such expressions as:

"In unmeasured terms."

"The ties of allegiance."

"When their blood is heated."

"Bring down an anathema on his head."

"Which he has bequeathed to posterity."

Such expressions are extremely common.

I will quote a few more chosen from a few pages of Macaulay's *History*, ch. xiii.:

“The power of this aspiring family reached the zenith.”

“But at eighteen the boy broke loose from the authority of his guardian.”

“The old feud had never slumbered.”

“These exploits left no trace.”

“The enthusiasm even of this man was lukewarm.”

“The host which had been the terror of Scotland melted fast away.”

EXERCISE.

Think of some similitude and present it in the form of Simile, Allegory, Metaphor, as on p. 254.

This exercise might as well be done a number of times. One difficulty is apt to be that one writes down a comparison instead of a simile (p. 270), which may make allegory or metaphor impossible. One benefit is that one learns by experience that some similitudes are useful in one form, some in another,—while the same simile is rarely equally good in all forms,

78. The Relation of the Preceding Figures to the Intellectual Qualities of Style. Considering these characteristics of the figures of Similarity, you will see why I said that if Clearness was our aim Simile was best to use, Allegory next, and that Metaphor was not conducive to Clearness at all. Probably no one of the three really makes a statement immediately clearer. It may make something simpler or easier to understand, but strictly speaking it can hardly make anything clearer, at least immediately, to detract attention from it to something else. But at least Simile does not interfere with Clearness very much. It says: “This thing we are talking about is like that other thing in such and such a way.” There is no real confusion there. Nor is Allegory really confusing if one be at once aware of the implied comparison. The fact that the comparison is not stated interferes with the simplicity of the thing, but if the comparison be understood at the outset Allegory is no more

confusing than Simile. On the other hand metaphor is in its very nature a confusion. It speaks of one thing as if it were really something else. It is true that very often when the metaphor is simple we do not notice the confusion, but on the whole the metaphor is opposed to clear thinking.

I often think that there is no fact of Rhetoric which is more luxuriantly illustrated in the history of thought than this very one. The number of cases in which people have made metaphors take the place of ideas is enormous. But whether they have noticed the fact or not, yet on the whole those writers who have had clearness chiefly in mind avoid metaphorical expression. Contrary to a common impression, the best orator uses few metaphors. Even so florid a speaker as Burke never expresses himself in the style of Emerson or Lowell. The reason, I take it, is that the orator feels instinctively that it is a bit harder to make himself understood than it is for the writer,—when a person is merely to hear something once, he hardly takes it in as surely as when he is reading. So the orator, although his desire for brilliancy and energy leads him often to metaphorical expression, is yet inclined to be careful for clearness' sake. So also the scientist whose object it is mainly to be clear,—we will not say the scientist in his technical work, but in popular exposition. In popular exposition there is almost always abundance of illustration, but in the best of such work there is little metaphor. Lastly, those authors with whom a sincere desire to be understood is evidently one of the chief aims—1 should mention Macaulay, Newman, Matthew Arnold—will, as a rule, be found to indulge sparingly in metaphor.

But clearness is not the only aim in writing, and it is obvious enough that if metaphor does not tend toward clearness, it does give us liveliness, brilliancy, energy, far more than does simile. Compare the same illustrations in

the form of a metaphor and of a simile, and see how much the metaphor gains in its brevity and even in its ellipsis. There is a dash about it and a lack of old-fogeyism that is attractive. It is more impressive too, because it lacks a certain roundabout character that would seem to exist in the same thing put in simile form.

I am the Good Shepherd.

I am like a good shepherd.

When a new planet swims into his ken.

When a new planet comes into the field with the languorous, hanging motion of a fish.

He fired up a little when I told him so.

When I told him so he became a little excited, as when you strike a parlor-match.

There are many cases where clearness need not be so particularly thought of, where there is no danger of real confusion, where anybody can get at our meaning, and then metaphor has certainly the advantage over simile.

So has allegory to some extent. Metaphor is more brilliant than simile, chiefly because it is more compact. Allegory is rather more brilliant than simile, because it implies a likeness and does not actually state it. In other words, it makes a call on the reader, and this, if it be not excessive, the reader usually appreciates. You will see this easily enough if you will turn back to some of the examples of allegory given (p. 259). If you take the trouble to state carefully the likeness you will see that you lose in vigor; it seems a little tamer.

As far as simplicity is concerned, no one of the three can be said to be especially useful. In fact, theoretically one may say that every figure, as such, is a step away from simplicity. This is true enough, I believe, but it is rather pedantic to give much weight to the fact. For although as figures—that is, as far as form is concerned—Simile, Allegory, and Metaphor are all somewhat opposed to sim-

plicity, yet when we consider their content we shall see that it may be such as to make the matter in hand really simpler. Comparisons, of whatever kind, to matters with which we are acquainted really serve, if they be sound, to make a statement simpler to us. They bring it down to our level, take away the strangeness, show us what there is about it that is not really so abstruse as at first seemed to be the case. When the geographer compares the earth to an orange, there is really a gain in simplicity—the matter is not so abstruse, although the statement "The earth is an oblate spheroid" is more literal.

So now you should have some idea of what these figures are worth. Remember that if you use them, whether with a purpose or not, they will certainly have their particular effects, whether I have stated those effects correctly or not. And remember also that if you don't avail yourself of their help you are merely wasting your opportunities. You should be able to know, when you are writing, what you are trying to accomplish. If you are writing some scholarly paper you want to be clear. If you are explaining some technical matter you want to be simple. If you are telling a story or giving an account of something that has happened to you, you want to be brilliant, lively, vivacious. You must be able to tell for yourself what is the chief aim you have in mind, and you should now have some idea of one of the means by which it may be attained. One thing, however, I must caution you against. Don't think that figures are necessary to any quality of style. Macaulay, whose style is certainly clear and brilliant, does not often in his later work use anything that could be called either simile, allegory, or metaphor. Let me ask you to attend to these two extracts—one of them extremely metaphorical, and the other wholly bare of figure. The latter passage is quite as effective as the former—perhaps more so.

"Obscure but important movements in the regions of

eternal twilight, revolutions of which history has been silent, in the mysterious depths of Asia, outpourings of human rivers along the sides of the Altai mountains, convulsions upheaving remote realms and unknown dynasties, shock after shock throbbing throughout the barbarian world and dying upon the edge of civilization, vast throes which shake the earth as precursive pangs to the birth of a new empire—as dying symptoms of the proud but effete realm which called itself the world; scattered hordes of sanguinary, grotesque savages pushed from their own homes and hovering with vague purposes upon the Roman frontier, constantly repelled and perpetually reappearing in ever-increasing swarms, guided thither by a fierce instinct or by mysterious laws—such are the well-known phenomena which preceded the fall of western Rome. Stately, externally powerful, although undermined and putrescent at the core, the death-stricken empire still dashed back the assaults of its barbarous enemies.”—Motley: *Rise of the Dutch Republic*; Introduction, v.

“ Hitherto the barbarian inroads had been but the migration of restless populations from the East to the West. Across the table-lands of Asia, or the vast plains of Europe, the mighty host moved on, with the speed of horsemen, or the slow pace of flocks and herds, or with temporary halts or long settlements here or there, as the ease might be according to their own pleasure or the compulsion of an enemy in the rear. Before them the land was open and presented no obstacle, and they had only to move in order to go forward. The distant ocean was the only term of their wanderings and of their conquests. Thus the two islands of the West were safe from this invasion, which lasted for centuries. It was otherwise with the fierce northern tribes, who afterwards appear upon the scene of history. What the horse was to the Hun, such was the light bark to the Norwegian or Dane. If the Hun was

never on foot the Northman never needed land. The sea, instead of being a barrier, was the very element and condition of his victories, and carried him upon his bosom up and down with an ease and expedition which even in an open plain country was impracticable."—Newman: *Historical Sketches; The Northmen and Normans*, i. 4.

The paragraph quoted last is followed by two which from the point of style make rather a better comparison. I have selected this one on account of its subject-matter.

B. COMPARISON AND ANALOGY.

79. We must now say a word about Comparison and Analogy, and see what they are and why they should be distinguished and set apart from the figures we have already been speaking of. They would certainly seem to be very like them.

Of course Simile, Allegory, and Metaphor all involve a comparison of two ideas. Equally true is it that an Analogy and a Contrast involve such comparison. It would seem that so general a term as Comparison was out of place as a particular designation. Yet I think, provided we do not trouble ourselves with the attempt to define the exact limits of each term, we shall see certain modes of illustration broadly different which seem to call for names. We have already used Simile, Allegory, Metaphor for certain indications of resemblance between two ideas. They involve comparisons, but the term Comparison we shall use in a narrower sense. These three we call Figures of Speech, but they also serve as Illustrations.

There are, however, certain other statements of likeness which we do not call Figures. When, for instance, Macaulay in his *History* compares Lochiel with Lewis XIV. (iii. 252) or the state of Scotland in 1689 with the state of Europe (iii. 249) or the Restoration with the Revolution (iii. 314), or Schomberg with Wellington (iii. 328), we do

not think of these as figures. If you will compare them with the examples in the previous section you will perceive that there is a difference. As to what the precise difference may be we need not inquire very particularly: it probably lies in the fact that in this case we are comparing things of the same kind, whereas in the figures we were comparing things of different kinds. We may at least take this as the distinction between a simile, for instance, and a comparison.

It has not been our plan to endeavor after very nice distinctions in critical definition. But we can hardly read a good history without perceiving that the device of comparison, in the broadest sense, may serve various different purposes. A curious example offers itself in the third Lecture of Stanley's *Jewish Church*. Compare, if you will, the following passages:

"The ground was strewn with wide sheets of bare rock; here and there stood up isolated fragments, like ancient Druidical monuments." i. 64.

"The monument . . . must have been, like so many described or seen in other times and countries, a rude copy of the natural features of the place, as at Carnac in Brittany, the cromlechs of Wales and Cornwall, or the walls of Tiryns, where the play of nature and the simple city of art are almost undistinguishable." i. 64.

"When we see the rude remains of Abury in our own country, there is a strange interest in the thought that they were the first architectural witness of English religion. Even so the pillar or cairn or cromlech of Bethel must have been looked upon by the Israelites." i. 65.

Here, almost in the same page, we have the stone set up by Jacob brought nearer to us by three comparisons—to use the broadest term. The first is obviously a simile. The second we should call a comparison proper, for it compares Jacob's monument with other monuments of similar

character, and marks very particularly a certain common characteristic. In the third we have a slight difference: it is not Jacob's monument that is compared to the rude remains of Abury. We are told that the relation of the monument of Jacob to the Israelitish religion was much the same as that of the remains of Abury to the English religion. When a likeness in relation is noted between two things, it is called an Analogy.

Let us for a moment fix our attention upon this last mode of illustration. A very little historical reading will show you what a powerful means it is of bringing to our comprehension things that it might otherwise have been difficult to understand. I should recommend to you, if you do not feel clear on this point, to read carefully some good history and to note the analogies. Of course it is not every historian who looks at his subject in this way. Motley, for instance, as a rule has his mind too intently on his subject for the time being to compare it with like events of other times and places. And Macaulay, on the other hand, was always ready with a comparison or an analogy. I will give you a few examples from Dean Stanley's work just quoted. *The History of the Jewish Church* is particularly rich in illustrations of this kind, for the author had constantly in mind the idea that the history of the Jews, although the history of a sacred people, was not a sacred history, that the events of the Bible have had their analogies in succeeding times. To impress his reader with that idea he is constantly noticing similarities which often take the form of Analogies as we have defined them.

When Abraham purchased the cave of Machpelah, he says (i. 43): "The tomb of Machpelah is a proof standing to this day of the long predetermined assurance that the children of Abraham should inherit the land in which this was their ancestors' sole but most precious possession. It

is like the purchase of the site of Hannibal's camp by the strong faith and hope of the besieged senators of Rome."

"It has been said that Egypt must have presented to the nomadic tribes of Asia the same contrast and the same attractions that Italy and the southern provinces of the Roman empire presented to the Gothic and Celtic tribes who descended upon them from the Alps." i. 84.

Abimelech "on the other hand . . . appealed to the common element of himself and the subject Shechemites, like our Henry, the first Norman son of a Saxon mother." i. 385.

Note also the more elaborate analogy drawn between Israel under the Judges and the Middle Ages (i. 343 foll.), which is partly direct comparison. Compare also the calling Jacob "the Hebrew Ulysses" (i. 180); the comparing the Hebrews in Egypt and the Pelasgians in Attica (i. 92); the influence of Egypt on the Hebrews and that of Rome upon the early Christian Church (i. 94); the impression made by Strabo's mention of Moses, and Pliny's mention of the early Christian society (i. 115); the passage of the Red Sea, and the raising of the siege of Leyden, and the overthrow of the Armada (i. 145); and in fact the whole work *passim*.

We ought now to have an understanding of Analogy: it concerns not the things in question so much as their relation to something else. It is not that the Hebrews resembled the "Gothic and Celtic tribes," for instance, but that the effect of Egypt on the former must have been much the same as the effect of Italy on the latter. Being, then, a comparison of relations, we shall find it most useful in the case of Description, because in that kind of composition we are dealing with particular things, which, however individual they may be, are naturally enough in relations which are often repeated. In Exposition, on the other hand, analogies it would seem are not so obvious, for

general ideas do not so often exist in repeated relations as particular things. The argument by analogy is not a matter of illustration and does not belong to the present discussion.

Having, then, distinguished analogies from other comparisons, there is not much to say now. Contrast as a form of comparison is readily understood and its usefulness is obvious. We have said a good deal about it already (38, c 44). The term Parallel is sometimes used for a detailed comparison of two things which agree in several respects. Otherwise the term comparison is used (as above) for a presentation of an agreement between two things of the same kind, and also, somewhat vaguely, for a somewhat detailed statement of the points of agreement and disagreement. It may be properly applied, I believe, to very short comparisons or very long ones. The restriction usually held in mind is that a comparison notes likeness to some thing of the same kind as the thing compared.

80. Value of the Foregoing Modes of Illustration. Having illustrated Analogy and Comparison in such detail, it seems hardly necessary to show how effective they may be made as means of illustration. They are not merely for use as adornment, they are a solid help. I have remarked, for instance, that Analogy is more useful in Description than elsewhere. This does not mean that it should be carefully avoided in other kinds of composition. That matter will doubtless take care of itself without trouble on your part. The thing for you to take care of is to busy yourself about thinking them up when you are employed over something where they will be useful. You must not expect that they will spring into your mind without trouble. Perhaps they will; so much the better. But if they will not come uncalled you had better send for them, and although, like Glendower's spirits, they are not

always sure to come, yet it is well to get into the habit of thinking them up, for they not only help you to express yourself, but they often help you to see your subject in a clearer light. For instance, suppose you are writing of General Grant: It will undoubtedly give you clearer ideas if you compare him with one or another man who resembled him in some respects. Like Napoleon he rose from rather a low position. Like him he first made his reputation as a general. Unlike Napoleon he never became an emperor: and why not? Here you will probably get at something about Grant that will be worth while. You may either use the comparison in your writing or not, but it has been worth while already if it has made you appreciate some of the strong and noble traits of character which our American general possessed, even if he lacked some of the genius of Frenchman. Or suppose you look about for analogies. Grant having been a distinguished general was intrusted by the people with the highest office in their gift. So the Duke of Wellington after his military career became Prime Minister of England. Without comparing the two men, have we a useful analogy here? Does it throw any light upon the reasons for Grant's election as President, and for the lack of success in some respects of his administration? Thinking out a subject in this way will be of value to you, even if you do not use the comparisons or contrasts, the analogies or parallels, that may have occurred to you. If they have suggested to you things which enable you to see your subject more exactly, they will probably be of some use to your reader. But it is enough for practical purposes if they suggest something to you.

EXERCISE.

Think up Comparisons or Analogies which will bring out interesting points concerning—

1. Bismarck.
2. Lincoln.

3. Galileo.
4. Plymouth Rock.
5. The California Gold Craze.
6. United States Control over an Interoceanic Canal.
7. The Retreat from Moscow.
8. The Colonial Expansion of England.
9. The Coxey Movement of 1894.
10. Chinese Immigration into the United States.

C. EXAMPLE AND ANTONOMASIA.

81. Example. Something ought to be said of Example, of which I have remarked that it is of use only in Exposition. This is merely because it is only of a general idea that an example is possible. You cannot have an example of a particular thing; you have the thing itself. Other things may be useful in the way of illustration; you may draw parallels or contrasts, but they are not examples. There is a form of argument called the argument from example, but, as in the case of the argument from analogy, it cannot properly be called an illustration.

The uses of Example in Exposition are two: first, as a device for the exposition itself; and, secondly, as a means of illustration. We have already seen (p. 70) that it is possible to expound a general idea by taking a particular example and mentioning only those things which are common to the species. I have spoken of Tyndall's exposition of the term *glacier* by means chiefly of an account of the Mer de Glace. So Huxley in writing on the Crawfish assumes that the student has before him a specimen of the crawfish. He tells him what he will find about the specimen, but because what he says is as true of one crawfish as of another the account is an exposition, not a description.

Somewhat different is the use of Example as an illustration. Here it does not take the place of the exposition of the general term, but follows the statement of it in lan-

guage more or less abstract (for instance, p. 254). It is a getting down to the concrete. Hence it is that I have mentioned it as particularly useful if we desire our writing to be simple. It is not a great help toward clearness or toward force. But almost everybody grasps a concrete case better than an abstract principle.

Two kinds of Example may be distinguished with advantage, the real and the imaginary. We must not insist too rigorously upon the exactness of the names; if they suggest a difference, it is sufficient for our purpose. Real examples of course are common. Throughout this book I have offered a number of real examples, of particular instances of the general ideas I was trying to expound. Imaginary examples are more of the nature of figures; they have in fact a resemblance to allegory. The Good Samaritan, the Publican and the Pharisee are instances. They are not facts, but there is no especial reason why they should not have been. They are called Parables, but there is a difference between the Good Samaritan and the Prodigal Son, let us say; the former is an example of the man who loved his neighbor, the latter is a symbolic representation of sinful and repentant humanity.

82. Antonomasia. You will remember that on p. 253 I remarked that certain forms of Syneedoche might in a measure take the place of Example in Description. Of Metonymy and Syneedoche in general I do not purpose to speak, for they do not seem to lend themselves to the line of work which we are following. I will remark, however, that the distinction commonly drawn between them is rather misleading. Syneedoche is really a kind of Metonymy, not something different from it. Various forms of statement are mentioned as Metonymy of which the last two are commonly called Syneedoche; i.e.:

Metonymy consists (among other things) of—

1. The speaking of the Cause for the Effect.

2. Of the Substance for the Quality.
3. Of the Sign for the thing Signified.
4. Of Time } for persons or events.
5. Of Place }
6. Of a Part for the Whole } (commonly called
7. Of the Whole for a Part } Synecdoche).

One form of Synecdoche is the use of —

6a. The Individual for the General.

7a. The General for the Individual.

This form of Synecdoche is called Autonomasia. Now of these two kinds the first has something of a relation to Example, and I am led to believe that it is in some respects an aid to Simplicity. The mind is given something concrete to deal with, something which it handles more easily, I should say, than the general term the place of which it takes. Take such expressions as these:

Some village Hampden.

Some mute inglorious Milton.

Some Cromwell.

A Daniel come to judgment.

Doubting Thomas and careless Gallio.

A Napoleon of finance.

The Seattle of the eastern hemisphere.

A Solomon; a Jezebel; a Crœsus; a Solon.

Minto (*Manual*, p. 98) notes of Macaulay, "He says that had Bacon given to Literature the time that he gave to Law and Politics 'he would have been not only the Moses, but the Joshua of philosophy.'"

That such expressions are a help toward Force seems plain; I take them to be also a help toward Simplicity. The use of the personal name instead of the general idea seems to me to be really easier of apprehension.

Of much the same effect is another form of Synecdoche (at least so classed by Bain, *Rhetoric*, i, 183), which consists of putting the concrete for the abstract.

EXERCISE.

Express the following conceptions by Antonomasia.

For example: A boy who has managed to accumulate more marbles than the whole schoolyard put together may properly be called "the Jay Gould or the Rothschild of this spherical currency." Avoid having your figure too hackneyed on the one hand and too recondite on the other.

1. A hypocrite.
2. A person given to lying.
3. An orator of extreme eloquence.
4. A very crafty person.
5. A man unjustly jealous.
6. A person always delaying.
7. A corrupt politician.
8. An exceedingly powerful man, either physically or intellectually.
9. A great leader and establisher of his country's freedom.
10. A man of extraordinary sense of honor.

D. OTHER FIGURES AND DEVICES.

83. Of the other forms of Figure and Illustration it is, I believe, unnecessary to say very much. Personification is an obvious enough figure. It does not, however, seem to call for practice, and we must always remember Macaulay's remark upon the personifications of Robert Montgomery. Nor does Hyperbole seem to call for practice; it is only the technical name for that kind of exaggeration of statement which is so common to Americans that their chief need in the matter is wholesome restraint. It must be remembered that Hyperbole is like any kind of variation: it is perceptible only when there is something to vary from. If all our statement is exaggerated, people get so used to it that they do not pay it any special attention. This might be said of Macaulay's use of Hyperbole. We get used to hearing that "no man was ever," etc. Those devices of style—they are sometimes called Figures of Speech, but they have not very much in common with Simile, Metaphor, and the rest—known as Exclamation,

Interrogation, Apostrophe may also be dismissed in a few words. They obviously have no special connection with Clearness. When they are not carried to excess, however, they give an energy and vigor to one's writing, of which every reader of Carlyle will recognize the character. Nor when we think of some fine passages by De Quincey and Newman can we say that they lack a certain dignity. They are, however, devices which may very easily be misused if used merely for effect, so that one would hardly recommend them to the young writer who would like to turn out forcible and vigorous work. But we have already seen (29) how modified forms of two of these devices may be made effective in Popular Exposition. That is, they are often means for Simplicity. When one is handling some rather abstruse topic, it is often a great assistance to address the reader personally and to put questions either to oneself or to him. Of course such expedients do not usually go by the name of Apostrophe or Interrogation, but the principle at bottom is the same; it is only the use to which the device is put that differs. And having already considered this matter in another place, we need not stop any longer over it.

There remain to be mentioned Irony and Epigram. In a critical study an investigation of these figures would have its place, but I do not believe that anybody was ever yet taught outright to speak ironically or to make good epigrams. The remark that they are effective means to Force, if not to Clearness or Simplicity, must therefore be sufficient for them here.

II. FIGURES IN THEIR RELATION TO SPECIAL PURPOSES.

84. So much for Illustration and Figure as to their purpose, as far as the more general qualities of style are concerned. But we may have other purposes in mind than Clearness and the rest, more particular purposes; we may want to make this or that attractive to the reader, or unattractive, or ridiculous, or familiar, or whatever else. The writer aware of the resources of good writing has various ways of accomplishing his end. He may do something by the kind of words that he uses,¹ but he may do even more by the kind of figure that he uses. Not by the kind of figure as far as form is concerned, for there is not much difference in the various figures in this respect—as far as form is concerned simile is not more ridiculous than metaphor, nor personification more familiar than analogy. Figures may be more or less attractive or familiar as they are more or less simple, or clear, or forcible, but the qualities of style as influenced by figurative expression we have

¹ This is a topic which I have not mentioned under the head Vocabulary. But the following part of a sentence from Newman will give the idea:

"Now the author of the *Christian Year* found the Anglican system all but destitute of this divine element, which is an essential property of Catholicism: a ritual dashed upon the ground, trodden on, and broken piecemeal; prayers clipped, pieced, torn, shuffled about at pleasure, until the meaning of the composition perished, and offices which had been poetry were no longer even good prose, antiphones, hymns, benedictions, invocations, shovelled away; . . . vestments chuck'd off, lights quenched, jewels stolen, the pomp and circumstances of worship annihilated," etc. *Essays Critical and Historical*, ii. 443

Notice the effect of the words *chuck'd off*: they do not mean much more than *cast away*, but they give a very different impression. Newman was speaking of what he regarded as an ignoble action; so he uses a vulgar expression, which is very marked in the otherwise heightened diction. Notice, too, the figure *shovelled away*.

already discussed. We are now concerned only with the subject-matter of figures.

There can be no doubt that the general character of the subject-matter of a similitude or comparison, aside from the particular points which are compared, is something that may have its influence on our impression of the object of the comparison. The general character of the image, to use our old phraseology, influences our conception of the idea. Doubtless not in every case, for often the comparison or simile neither elevates the idea in our mind nor degrades it; but in other cases its general nature has its effect. To take an extreme case we may remember the effect which a comparison with something low or mean seems always to have upon readers of poetry. To illustrate what is, perhaps, familiar enough I quote a few lines from Goldsmith:

“Homer has been blamed for the bad choice of his similes on some particular occasions. He compares Ajax to an ass in the *Iliad*, and Ulysses to a steak broiling on the coals in the *Odyssey*.

“His admirers have endeavored to excuse him by reminding us of the simplicity of the age in which he wrote; but they have not been able to prove that any ideas of dignity or importance were, even in those days, affixed to the character of an ass or the quality of a beef-collop; therefore they were very improper illustrations for any situations in which a king ought to be represented.

“Virgil has degraded the wife of King Latinus by comparing her, when she was actuated by the Fury, to a top which the boys lash for diversion.”—*Essay xxi, On the Use of Metaphors*.

Making some allowance for the pedantry of the critics of whom Goldsmith writes, it is obvious enough that one thinks of Ajax very differently when he is presented to us as being like an ass and when he is compared to a lion, let us say. It would seem natural enough that our general

estimation of the image, the kind of thing to which the idea is compared, should make us feel in this way or that about the idea. And if such is the case we want to know how to avail ourselves of the power which is thus put into our hands.

It would hardly be according to our plan to attempt a careful classification of figures from this point of view. It would be immensely difficult, and so complicated as to be of no more service to you than a simpler arrangement at once unscientific and incomplete. I shall only try to suggest to you by a few examples the possibilities in this direction.

We may say, first, that the subject-matter of the image may be such as to arouse a sympathetic interest on our part, or just the reverse. To attain our first end we must make the comparison with something that is interesting or attractive to the reader. The greater number of stock comparisons were originally of this kind: a hero was compared to a lion by those who admired the lion: a beauty was compared to a swan, for instance, or to a flower, by such as felt swans and flowers to be beautiful. Nowadays such figures have not much effect, because they have become conventional to a great degree, but even a conventional figure may have a sudden force given it by a great poet, as when Wordsworth writes of Milton:

“Thy soul was like a star and dwelt apart:

Thou hadst a voice whose sound was like the sea.”

One can strike out more original figures which will have more effect or less, according as they strike the fancy of one reader or another.

As we can arouse sympathy with the idea, or interest, by one sort of image, so we can preclude it by another kind. There was some difference between the ancient myth of Circe, who turned the companions of Ulysses into swine, and Milton's story of Comus, who changed each one that drank of his cup into that kind of animal which he most

resembled. Those who are compared to swine are so far removed from our sympathy (although the hog is a worthy animal), whereas the comparison to a "wolf, or bear, or ounce, or tiger" is not so bad by any means. Hence we feel an interest in Circe which we do not feel in Comus, for we laugh at the victims of the one and we rather respect the victims of the other. Even in the later forms of the old story Picus turned to a woodpecker and Anonymus changed to an elephant have no real hold on our sympathies.¹

As to the effect of the ridiculous, we all know how strong an effect has even accidental association with something humorous. Thus one reader spoiled for himself that passage in *The Idylls of the King* beginning

"Then Geraint,
For now the wine made summer in his veins,"

by thinking that Geraint must have drunk a good deal, for one swallow does not make a summer. The ridiculous association with a trivial pun always took away from his subsequent appreciation of the passage. On the same principle it is considered a sharp dodge to affix some ridiculous nickname to a person or party, for by that means, justly or unjustly, some degree of prejudice must be overcome. You may recall here De Quincey's fun over "the transfigured coachman of the Bath mail": "In spite of his blooming face some infirmities he had; and one particularly (I am very sure no *more* than one) in which he too much resembled a crocodile. This lay in his monstrous inaptitude for turning round. The crocodile I presume owes that inaptitude to the absurd *length* of his back; but in our grandpapa it arose rather from the absurd *breadth* of his back, combined, probably, with some growing stiff-

¹ As the readers of Keats' *Eudyonion* will observe (bk. iii. l. 540); Hawthorne (*Circe's Palace* in *Tanglewood Tales*) has been a little more successful with King Picus, but he wisely left the elephant to himself.

ness in his legs" (*The English Mail-coach*.) So the coachman is afterward mentioned as "a crocodile belonging to the antepenultimate generation," and in De Quincey's becomes "a venerable crocodile, in a royal livery of scarlet and gold, in a coat with sixteen capes." Of course the crocodile is not an especially ridiculous animal, but the incongruity of the comparison arouses feelings which we attach to the man.

To go from the ridiculous to the trivial, we would not compare anything important to anything essentially insignificant, and conversely a comparison to a trivial thing will make us think slightly of it. So Ruskin, desiring to degrade the hurry for wealth in our day, tells a story of some children who were free of a beautiful house in which they might have enjoyed any kind of delightful pleasure, and goes on: "But in the midst of all this it struck two or three of the more 'practical' children that they would like some of the brass-headed nails that studded the chairs; and so they set to work to pull them out." And finally they all got wild about the brass-headed nails, and quarrelled with each other and hurt their fingers in trying to get them out, and neglected all the pleasures they might have enjoyed, merely for this foolish fancy. You may remember the illustration; it is in *The Mystery of Life and its Arts*. The comparison with such trivial things as brass nails has the effect (for the moment) of degrading wealth in our eyes, so that for the time being the pursuit of wealth for its own sake seems like a trivial and unworthy thing.

In like manner may we render the idea contemptible. So George MacDonald in *Sir Gibbie*, speaking of Fergus, the preacher whom he wishes to prejudice in the eyes of the reader; he compares him to a pedlar and his oratory to fireworks. "The new preacher," he says, "the pyrotechnist of human logic and eloquence, who was about to burn his

halfpenny blue-lights over the abyss of truth, and throw his yelping crackers into it" (*Sir Gibbie*, iii. ch. xiii.). And then he speaks of him as "the pedlar who now rose to display his loaded calico and beggarly shoddy over the bookboard of the pulpit." These cheap blue-lights and yelping crackers, the loaded calico and beggarly shoddy, these are things which a sensible man thinks either matters of no consideration, or else he has a sound contempt for them. Hence Fergus suffers in our estimation, as Macdonald meant he should.

On the other hand, just as some figures have, unconsciously enough on our part, the effect of lowering our estimation of the object, so some figures for one reason or another have the power to command our respect, and the feeling which we really have for the image we transfer in a measure to the idea. Such a figure is Wordsworth's mention of Newton as "voyaging on strange seas of thought alone." The figure at once exalts our conception of Newton, as we may see if we imagine that Wordsworth had compared him, for instance, to a mole burrowing in the ground. The comparison would not have been wholly inapt, for Newton found his way along paths unseen by men, and his course was known only by very slight disturbances in the everyday order of affairs. He was a retired man and kept his studies much to himself. But wholly aside from the appositeness, the latter simile is worthless, for it lacks the imaginative, elevating power of the former. Somewhat the same heightening effect has the following simile from Newman:

"The mind ranges to and fro, and spreads out and advances forward with a quickness which has become a proverb, and a subtlety and versatility which baffle investigation. It passes on from point to point, gaining one by some indication; another on a probability; then availing itself of an association; then falling back on some received

law; next seizing on testimony; then committing itself to some popular impression, or some inward instinct, or some obscure memory; and thus it makes progress not unlike a chamerer on a steep cliff, who by quick eye, prompt hand, and firm foot ascends, how he knows not himself, by personal endowments and by practice rather than by rule, leaving no track behind him, and unable to teach another. It is not too much to say that the stepping by which great geniuses scale the mountain of truth is as unsafe and precarious to men in general as the ascent of a skilful mountaineer up a literal crag."—*Oxford University Sermons* (ed. 1887), p. 275.

And I may bring this slight exversus to an end by a pair of comparisons which illustrate both sides of the matter, namely, those of the First Psalm: "And he [the righteous man] shall be like a tree planted by the rivers of water, that bringeth forth his fruit in his season; his leaf also shall not wither, and whatsoever he doeth shall prosper. The ungodly are not so, but are like the chaff which the wind driveth away. Therefore the ungodly shall not stand in the judgment, nor sinners in the congregation of the righteous." The righteous man is compared to a palm, because he is fruitful, firmly rooted, flourishing; and the wicked is, as in many other passages, like chaff, because it is suddenly scattered and comes to naught. But in each comparison that which is not mentioned is as important as that which is; the palm is a blessing to all about it, the chaff is worthless and despised by all.

EXERCISE.

Find some figure which, aside from the aptness of the comparison, shall put the following in a good or bad light:

- | | |
|-------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. The Scholar. | 6. The Dandy. |
| 2. The Miser. | 7. The Man of Common Sense. |
| 3. The Demagogue. | 8. The Good Housekeeper. |
| 4. The Bully. | 9. Doing Wrong. |
| 5. The Flirt. | 10. Doing Right. |

III. THE SOURCES OF SIMILITUDES.

85. Everyday Affairs. By far the greater number of figures, if not of illustrations, are drawn from the events and affairs of everyday life, a combination of phenomena so vast and unrelated that it would be as difficult as it would be for us useless a task to attempt any classification. One merit have such figures: they compare with something familiar to all. One drawback they may perhaps be thought to have, that they are commonplace. But commonplace they need not be; however common the image, a happy likeness gives an air of distinction. How excellent are some of Lowell's figures from the commonest sources. When he says of Chancer that "in him we see the first result of the Norman yeast npon the home-baked Saxon loaf" (*My Study Windows*, p. 251), or of the Life of Josiah Quincy, "Thus many a door into the past, long irrevocably shut upon us, is set ajar" (*Ibid.*, 99), or in the essay on Thoreau, "The word 'transcendental' then was the maid of all work for those who could not think, as 'Pre-Raphaelite' has been more recently for people of the same limited housekeeping" (*Ibid.*, 195), the figure is as good as those drawn from Gothic volume (p. 251), the horn of Huon of Bordeaux (p. 100), or stained-glass windows (p. 195).

So it is with Emerson. Of "those affections and consuetudes that grow near us, he says "These old shoes are easy to the feet" (*Essays, First Series, Prudence*); of Life, "Seen from the nook and chimney-side of prudence, it wears a ragged and dangerous front (*Ibid., Heroism*); of the power of exhilaration of the imagination he says "We are

like persons who come out of . . . a cellar into the open air" (*Ibid., Intellect*). Of course many such similitudes are now so trite that we hardly notice them; roads and walls, fire and food, debit and credit, and a thousand other things give us metaphors that everybody uses without thinking. But this is because we use them merely from having heard them. A keen observation stores the mind with original images. Lowell is as figurative a writer as I know, and his similitudes are rarely trite; but I should say the majority of them came from the simplest things.

86. Nature. Next to the great world of everyday matters, and, indeed, not so very different from it, though deserving a place by itself, is nature. We all know how trite are some figures from nature; the flowing of a stream, the tossing of the sea, the sprouting of a seed, solid rocks, shifting sands, birds, beasts, and what not, give forms of expression so common that everybody shuns them. But here again the keen observer has always something new. I quote again from Lowell's *My Study Windows*.

Of Emerson's writings he says: "It is wholesome to angle in those profound pools, though one be rewarded with nothing more than the leap of a fish that flashes his freckled side in the sun and as suddenly absconds in the dark and dreamy waters again" (p. 377). And of his oratory: "There is a kind of undertow in that rich baritone of his that sweeps our minds from their foothold into deeper waters with a drift we cannot and would not resist" (p. 383). Of great poets he writes: "As an oak profits by the foregone lives of immemorial vegetable races that have worked over the juices of earth and air into organic life out of whose dissolution a soil might gather fit to maintain that nobler birth of nature, so we may be sure that the genius of every remembered poet drew the forces that built it up out of the decay of a long succession of forgotten ones" (p. 234). Of the similes of the old rhymes: "They are wood-

strawberries, prized in proportion as we must turn over more leaves ere we find one" (p. 257).

These figures are certainly not commonplace; they are the figures of a poet.

87. Certain Requirements of Figure. In these two directions, nature and the common things and affairs of every-day life, we do not, perhaps, note one of the necessities of a good figure; the quality is there, but we are likely enough not to notice it. If you are going to make a thing clearer or simpler by comparing it with something else, that something else must, as a rule, be more familiar to your reader than the thing spoken of; the image must be more familiar than the idea, to use our old phraseology. As far as force is concerned, we should have to state much the same principle with a little modification. In the figures we have been inspecting the image is something familiar in a general way to every one. This is as it should be; and yet we do not desire our similitudes to be commonplace.

There would seem to be two opposing influences. If your images are too recondite¹ the figure will be merely abstruse; if they are too familiar, the figure will be ordinary. But there is evidently an error here, for we have already seen that comparisons with the most familiar things are not necessarily ordinary. It is not the familiarity of the image, but the familiarity of the comparison, that makes so many a figure trite. "So and so is a mighty beacon-light" is a trite figure, despite the fact that few persons, except dwellers by the sea, are very familiar with beacons. "Hitch your wagon to a star," says Emerson, and is original, although every one sees wagons and stars nearly every twenty-four hours.

But although there is a fallacy in the latter part of our statement, there is none in the former. It is no use as far

¹ As with Donne, now and then, and some of his successors.

as clearness, simplicity, force are concerned to compare your idea to something that the reader knows nothing of. It serves some minor purposes to use recondite comparisons, but not the common ends of style. Figures from the sources I have mentioned rarely offend in this respect, but figures from Literature, from Science, from History, and from many other minor sources may easily enough do so.

Thus when Lowell says, "Even swearing had its advocates, who answered a simple inquiry after their health with an elaborate ingenuity that might have been honorably mentioned by Marlborough in general orders," he is obscure in a generation unfamiliar with *Tristram Shandy*. When he says, "The nameless eagle of the tree Ygdrasil was about to sit at last," he is obscure to such as are unacquainted with the main lines of Norse mythology. When he speaks of something as being sent forth to illustrate the "feathered Mercury as defined by Webster and Worcester,"¹ we have to go to the dictionary before we have much of a notion of his meaning.

This is a danger, although only a relative danger. There are not a few people, even nowadays, who remember that "our army swore horribly in Flanders" and who know something of the tree Ygdrasil, even if the "feathered Mercury" be unfamiliar. The matter is relative: if we are writing for people like ourselves, we shall probably not run into error.

With this caution in mind we may find sources for similitudes in all our reading and all our action.

88. Science. "Language is fossil poetry. As the limestone of the Continent consists of infinite masses of the shells of animalcules, so language is made up of tropes, which now in their secondary state have long since ceased

¹ All three examples occur in the first page of the essay on Thoreau in *My Study Windows*.

to remind us of their poetie origin."—Emerson: *Essays, Second Series, The Poet.* (Cf. 77.)

So in speaking of the older philosophical thought in the system of Plato, Walter Pater uses the same image in a slightly different way:

"They are everywhere present in it, not as the stray, carved corner of some older edifice, to be found here and there amid the new, but rather like the minute relics of earlier organic life in the very stone he builds with."—*Plato and Platonism*, p. 2.

Lowell says of Emerson:

"There are stamine plants in literature that make no fine show of fruit, but without whose pollen, quintessence of fructifying gold, the garden had been barren" (*My Study Windows*, p. 197); and of Thorean a page or two afterward: "Among the pistillate plants kindled to fruitage by the Emersonian pollen Thoreau is thus far the most remarkable."

The following is from Newman:

"The present crust of the earth is said to be the result of a long war of elements, and to have been made so beautiful, so various, so rich, and so useful by the discipline of revolutions, by earthquake and lightning, by mountains of water and seas of fire; and so in like manner it required the events of two thousand years, the multiform fortunes of tribes and populations, the rise and fall of kings, the mutual collision of states, the spread of colonies, the vicissitudes and the succession of conquest, and the gradual adjustment and settlement of innumerable discordant ideas to carry on the huiman race to unity and to shape and consolidate the great Roman Power."—*Historical Sketches*, i. 106.

If we choose, we may call these illustrations from nature, but since the images are such matters as the average man learns, not from nature, but from science, it seems well enough to put them under a head by themselves. And of

all good illustrations drawn from science we must observe, first, that they must not be too scientific, too far removed from common knowledge; and, second, that they are better when they are, like the examples quoted, somewhat self-explanatory.

89. Etymology. Under the head of science I may perhaps bring a word or two on the subject of illustration by Etymology. I speak rather in the way of warning, and yet it is probable that a caution is not very necessary, for there are not very many who affect the mode.¹ It must be remembered that unless the etymologies be correct the illustration is ridiculous,—to those who know anything about the matter. Carlyle, for instance, traced Eternity in the title of *King* because he thought it meant *Cun-nig*, or *Able-man*. Ruskin, who is also fond of etymologies, makes the following gift in *The Crown of Wild Olives*:

"And yet we are impudent enough to call our beggings and chantings 'Divine Service'; we say, 'Divine service will be "performed"' (that's our word)—the form of it gone through."

This I call a bad illustration, because *perform* does not mean to go through a form, any more than *perfume* means to go through a crowd, or *perfume* to go through a smoke, nor, may it be added, do people in general imagine that the word does mean to go through a form. So the figure does not make things clearer, but obscures them.

Somewhat akin to these actual errors are the affected etymologies which sometimes seem to cast some light upon matters. For example, J. M. Sterett in his *Studies in Hegel* (1890, p. 32) says: "But this became a kind of

¹To see what may be done (seriously as well as ironically) one may read Mr. Ruskin's derivations of the names of Shakespeare's characters with Matthew Arnold's comment (*Essays in Criticism*, i. 70, 71), and also what Socrates has to say of the names of the gods in the *Cratylus* (Jowett's translation).

mysticism, which to intelligence is but a *misty* bridging over of the *schism* between God and man."

Aside from the ridiculousness of the last two ideas, this illustration is bad, because the word *mysticism* has no connection at all with the other words mentioned, so that the whole thing sinks into the nature of a pun, or, to give it a finer name, it is an example of paronomasia. The pun tends to associate an erroneous and rather silly idea with the word *mysticism*, so that the fixing the desired idea in the mind is accomplished at some little expense. Of course, when humor is our aim, such puns may be all very well, as when the Married Man, who is weary of much moving of his household goods, makes "the interesting philological discovery . . . that the word *ran* as applied to the trucks we have to move our household possessions is derived from the parent word *vandal*, a vandal being one who ignorantly destroys that which is beautiful.—J. K. Bangs: *The Paradise Club*, ch. vi.

90. Literature and Art. Another great source of illustration is to be found in Literature and Art. Here I need do no more, I suppose, than mention the possibilities and to emphasize a little a caution already offered on p. 290. All cultivated people have, of course, an immense common possession in the works of the great artists of the world. A certain acquaintance with literature and art we may assume. If we are writing especially for uneducated people, the case is different, and so it is if we care to address ourselves only to the smaller number of especially cultivated persons. But in general we may rightly assume a certain acquaintance with such matters, and we gain a good deal by so doing.

Such illustrations are commonly allusions, or sometimes quotations or adaptations of quotations.

"*"Impartial as Jonathan Wilde's great ancestor."*
"The same Gano which had betrayed me."

"The Edinburgh Review never would have thought of asking, 'Who reads a Russian book?'"

"Rousseau-tinted spectacles."

People who "see nothing more than the burning of a chimney in that clash of Michael and Satan."

"As keenly as Johnson felt it at Charing Cross."

b. "I know not whether it is because I am pigeon-livered and lack gall."

"Art thou *there*, old Truepenny?"

"Hath not an American organs," etc.

Of some of these examples (from Lowell's essay *On a Certain Condescension Observable in Foreigners*) I should say that the allusions might be just a step beyond the ordinary reader. But whether they be or not they show how a mind penetrated with good reading finds for everything comparisons and analogies.

Toward the end of his essay on Milton Macaulay says:

"His thoughts resemble those celestial fruits and flowers which the Virgin Martyr of Massinger sent down from the gardens of Paradise to the earth, and which were distinguished from the productions of other soils, not only by superior bloom and sweetness, but by miraculous efficacy to invigorate and heal."

One might say in regard to this illustration that it does not carry us very far, since comparatively few readers nowadays are sufficiently familiar with the plays of Massinger to apprehend the allusion. This I take to be the case, but whether one have read Massinger or not the illustration is obvious. If the last half of the sentence had been omitted, it would have been obscure for the greater number, but as it is no one can miss the point. Much the same remark may be made of another illustration in the same essay, where Macaulay evidently had no expectation that his reader would recall the passage of Ariosto he

had in mind. But he wanted to use the comparison, and he put it so that all would understand it:

"Ariosto tells a pretty story of a fairy, who, by some mysterious law of her nature, was condemned to appear at certain seasons in the form of a foul and poisonous snake. Those who injured her during the period of her disguise were forever excluded from participation in the blessings which she bestowed. But to those who, in spite of her loathsome aspect, pitied and protected her she afterwards revealed herself in the beautiful and celestial form which was natural to her, accompanied their steps, granted all their wishes, filled their houses with wealth, made them happy in love and victorious in war. Such a spirit is Liberty. At times," etc.

Under the present rubric we might add figures based upon Fables and well-known Tales. I need only instance allusions to King Log and King Stork, The Fox and the Grapes, Jack's Beanstalk, Jack Horner and his Pie, and we might add Bluebeard and his Wives, Sinbad and the Old Man of the Sea, Alnaschar, and so on.

And nearly connected with these are matters of Common Tradition, such as The Chinese Wall, The Colossus of Rhodes, The Blue Laws, The Laws of the Medes and Persians, Horoscopes, Oracles, Temples, Giants, Dwarfs, Mermaids, and other matters which everybody has heard of, but never seen.

In such directions may numbers of illustrations be found, the chief danger being that somebody else has found them already, so that the world has become so well accustomed to them that it will regard your efforts as being rather dull.

91. The Bible. Another source of illustration and figure is the Bible. Here you are rather apt to burn your fingers, but if you really know your Bible it is a great help. It is practically effective and theoretically as well.

For the characteristic of figure and illustration is that they should be intermediaries between your idea, which is unfamiliar to your reader, let us say, and the ideas and thoughts which are not unfamiliar to him. Now the Bible is so universally read that its language, its mode of thought, its ideas, its figures, are very commonly familiar. Allusions to the Bible are more sure of an understanding than allusions to any other piece of literature. Hence the not very uncommon use of Biblical language by various authors.

"The stars in their courses fought against Mr. Quincy's party."—Lowell: *My Study Windows*, p. 105.

"...burning some memoranda, lest they should rise up in judgment."—*Ibid.*, p. 110.

"Emerson awakened us, saved us from the body of this death."—*Ibid.*, p. 381.

Ruskin is noteworthy for the effectiveness with which he uses Bible imagery. He has the right to use it, as any one will acknowledge who will look at the account of his early readings with his mother in *Praterita*, ch. ii. Good examples may be found in almost any of his writings. The following is the end of the second lecture in *Sesame and Lilies*:

"Who is it, think you, who stands at the gate of this sweeter garden, alone, waiting for you? Did you ever hear, not of a Maud, but a Madeleine, who went down to her garden in the dawn, and found One waiting at the gate, whom she supposed to be the gardener? Have you not sought Him often; sought Him in vain, all through the night; sought Him in vain at the gate of that old garden where the fiery sword is set? He is never there; but at the gate of *this* garden He is waiting always—waiting to take your hand—ready to go down to see the fruits of the valley, to see whether the vine has flourished, and the pomegranate budded. There you shall see with Him the

little tendrils of the vines that His hand is guiding—there you shall see the pomegranate springing where His hand cast the sanguine seed;—more: you shall see the troops of the angel keepers that, with their wings, wave away the hungry birds from the pathsides where He has sown, and call to each other between the vineyard rows, ‘Take us the foxes, the little foxes, that spoil the vines, for our vines have tender grapes.’ Oh—you queens—you queens! among the hills and happy greenwood of this land of yours, shall the foxes have holes and the birds of the air have nests; and in your cities shall the stones cry out against you that they are the only pillows where the Son of Man can lay His head?”

It's rather good exercise to look out the origin of the allusions in a passage like this: Ruskin will be found to have laid a good many books of the Bible under requisition.

92. Application of the Foregoing. These are only a few of the most obvious sources from which similitudes may be drawn, for it must be observed that here we are only speaking of such figures and illustrations as are based upon comparison. But when we begin to think of Comparison we see that the possibilities are only limited by the bounds of our own knowledge and that of our reader. The latter is, as I have already pointed out, the person of greatest importance. We must consider him especially in analogies, parallels, and contrasts, as well as in metaphors and allegories. In our Similes we have such a chance to explain ourselves that it is not of so much consequence that the reader should be already acquainted with that of which we mean to speak, but even here the additional effort on the part of the reader in learning something new will often serve to make your work ineffective in the direction you desire.

When you think over what is implied in saying that the

whole field of your knowledge is open to you to draw upon for assistance in figure and illustration, you will see what an opportunity you have here. Emerson says that the scholar should be ambitions of action if only for a vocabulary, and in like manner might one say here: If it were only for means to bring his idea more clearly and strongly before the reader, the scholar should be desirous of all knowledge. It would almost seem as though there were nothing which might not somehow be turned to account. But, as we have seen, particularly in speaking of similitudes from everyday affairs and from nature, the man with a quick power of observation has here the immense advantage. If we have not this gift, or have not to some degree cultivated the power of really seeing and knowing, our illustrations will be too often commonplace and hackneyed. Thus, as I have already pointed out, figure and illustration are not mere forms of expression; they are characteristic of thought as well (p. 249). It does not necessarily follow that the faculty of figurative language and illustration is native, and that if we have it not we are to dismiss any idea of availing ourselves of its assistance. Certainly it is often an inborn gift, and certainly no one would think that by study and practice he could ever reach the wealth of imagery of Lowell. But perhaps one does not care for such a figured expression. And however that be, to a minor degree one may cultivate his power of seeing likeness and dissimilarity, and with a sound knowledge of the particular end that may be attained by figure and illustration may give his writing a quality which, if he neglected the opportunity, would be really missed.

PART FIVE.

THE SENTENCE.

93. The Value of Constructive Work on the Sentence.

The reason that I have postponed to a minor place at the back of the book a matter so important as sentence structure is that the sentence is something in which constructive work is of very doubtful value. With the other matters there were ways in which we could become familiar with particular processes as a help to a larger grasp on the whole. We could practise beginning narratives, for instance, or selecting points for Description or Exposition, we could try to manage paragraph connection, there was this and that to be done with Figures and Vocabulary: just as in music we can practise scales for months, or in drawing practise on ears and noses, or cubes and spheres, just as in outdoor games we can practise during the winter in the cage or at the pulley-weights, so we can spend as much time as we like in practising this and that point in the subjects we have already gone over. With the sentence, however, the matter is not so easy.

You might certainly exercise yourselves definitely in writing different kinds of sentences—periodic, loose, long, or balanced. Such work would give rather a crude sort of constructive sentence-practice. But the difficulty with it is that it may not, probably will not, give the things of first necessity, for real mastery over the sentence does not consist in being able to write periodic sentences at will, or balanced sentences, or sentences of any special kind. For

one thing there are so many sentence structures possible that you could only practise a few of the commoner forms, but even if there were fewer, such work would hardly give you the prime requisites for good sentence-writing. These prime requisites (presupposing good grammar) I believe to be three in number: first, a sense that readily distinguishes the vital, the important ideas and words in any sentence; second, so much of a feeling for rhythm or euphony as will distinguish between what will sound effective and what will not; and, third, a certain flexibility of expression by which the same matter, even any particular word, may readily be shifted about to attain different effects. Now these three things can be got in most cases by constant practise in correcting and criticising. The first you may get by analysing and correcting; the second by reading aloud; the third by rearranging, shifting, recasting.

These three faculties, then, are not the result of constructive work. They are, rather, the result of critical work, and of a great deal of it. But, as I have explained elsewhere, in writing and criticising the exercises which have so far been offered you have already made, I will hope, some advance in the right direction. You will find that the best sentences to criticise are your own; you know, or should know, what you really want to say better than you can know what any one else is trying to say. And if this correction is not really an effort after expression, if it is merely an endeavor to bring one form of speech into agreement with other and more recognized forms of speech, why then it becomes to a great degree futile.¹

The present chapter, then, will only offer some supplementary remarks, will only suggest some things that will

¹ I see that the author of one of the best of the recent books on the critical study of diction makes a similar remark. "It will be more profitable for them [i.e., students] to correct their own offences against clearness, force, ease, and unity than to correct similar offences committed by others."—Buehler: *Practical Exercises in English*, p. 152.

be useful in moulding and adapting one's sentencees to the general form which seems, for one reason or another, to be the most effective. I will call attention to the chief points usually mentioned in treating the matter, but the practice exercises must be general and critical.

EXERCISES.

The exercises on 38-42 should be resumed here. As to critical work for giving grammatical correctness, see what is said on p. 245 concerning the critical study of diction and also pp. vii, viii.

94. Unity of the Sentence. We shall do well to begin by considering the application to sentence structure of those Canons or Principles which we have already had to do with. We shall find them as useful here as elsewhere. And first of Unity. Very probably most of you are familiar with the term "Unity of the Sentence," more so, perhaps, than with Unity of anything else rhetorical. It is not hard to see the general application of the Canon of Unity to the sentence, but there has been some trouble expended in trying to make exact statements on the subject. In a general way the principle of unity of the Sentence is to the effect that each sentence should have some leading idea to which the other ideas should be subordinate, or, if it consists of a number of co-ordinate clauses, that these should be such as may be easily grasped and understood together; in either case there should be a fairly close relation of thought between everything in the sentence, there should be no irrelevant matter.

Here are two examples, both from De Quincey, whose sentences give especial opportunities for the study of this subject in its most refined casuistries. The first is a comparatively complicated sentence, in which, however, all the parts have some relation to one main idea; and the second is a simpler sentence, in which the several different ideas are of like import and character, so that they may all be easily comprehended together.

"And the four following facts may be mentioned, as noticeable at this time:

"I. That as the creative state of the eye increased, a sympathy seemed to arise between the waking and the dreaming states of the brain in one point,—that whatsoever I happened to call up and trace by a voluntary act upon the darkness was very apt to transfer itself into my dreams; so that I feared to exercise this faculty; for as Midas turned all things to gold, that yet baffled his hopes and defrauded his human desires, so whatsoever things capable of being visually represented I did but think of in the darkness immediately shaped themselves into phantoms of the eye; and, by a process apparently no less inevitable, when thus traced in faint and visionary colors, like writings in sympathetic ink, they were drawn out, by the fierce chemistry of my dreams, into insufferable splendor that fretted my heart.—*Confessions of an English Opium-eater.*

"I have had occasion to remark, at various periods of my life, that the deaths of those whom we love, and, indeed, the contemplation of death, generally, is (*ceteris paribus*) more affecting in summer than in any other season of the year. And the reasons are these three, I think: first, that the visible heavens in summer appear far higher, more distant, and (if such a solecism may be excused) more infinite; the clouds, by which chiefly the eye expounds the distance of the blue pavilion stretched over our heads, are in summer more voluminous, massed, and accumulated in far grander and more towering piles; secondly, the light and the appearances of the declining and setting sun are much more fitted to be types and characters of the infinite; and, thirdly (which is the main reason), the exuberant and riotous prodigality of life naturally forces the mind more powerfully upon the antagonist thought of death, and the wintry sterility of the grave."—*Ibid.*

With such examples I shall content myself, and shall not endeavor after a definition. The Canon of Unity is applied in varying degree and manner to sentences of different kinds; if one have the principle firmly enough in mind, it will not be difficult to make such application as each case demands. You will do well to note these two examples, which serve to raise a question of importance. Both are from Macaulay's essay on *Lord Byron*. In the first example we have four sentences, noting particular points, which in the fifth sentence are generalized. In the second, which is almost on the same page, we have the first clause giving the generalization, and the particular points given in clauses rather than in independent sentences. The common opinion is that the second form is the better, but there is room for a good deal of argument, and the point is one of the difficulties of Unity of the Sentence.

"His health sank under the effects of his intemperance. His hair turned gray. His food ceased to nourish him. A hectic fever withered him up. It seemed that his body and mind were about to perish together."

"He had been guilty of the offence which of all offences is punished most severely; he had been over-praised; he had excited too warm an interest; and the public, with its usual justice, chastised him for its own folly."

The difficulty in deciding just what is required in these cases by the law of Unity is, theoretically speaking, increased in considering Narration and Description. It is more difficult to formulate a statement which can be applied to a flowing narrative or an extended description than in other cases. But practically, when one has passed that stage that hurries on carelessly, dropping commas along here and there, the difficulty is not very great. One divides into sentences at "the greater breaks in the sense," as Bain puts it, which only means wherever it seems most convenient.

95. Sentence Connection. Different as may have been the practical application, Unity of the Sentence is much the same thing as Unity of the Paragraph (33). In each case we must depend largely upon our judgment, but in each case we easily recognize that any independent division of thought, expressed in some composite manner, should have certain characteristics. Sentence, paragraph, chapter, or essay, whole book or part of a book, each, so far as it is capable of being considered by itself, must have some individuality. So must it have some relation to the other individuals like itself,—and this brings us from the principle of Unity to the principle of Transition and Connection. As with the other subject, much of what we had to say of the paragraph may be applied here. There are of course special differences; for instance, connection at the end of a paragraph does not seem to have any exact analogue in the sentence. The general principle of the necessity and nature of connection is much the same.

Sentence connection is chiefly indicated at the beginning of the sentence. The chief forms are two:

1. Repetition of a word or idea.
2. Use of a demonstrative pronoun or of a conjunction or equivalent clause.

The first of these points hardly needs much comment from a theoretical standpoint; it is the same as the mode of paragraph-connection spoken of in p. 115. Practically, however, the matter is a little different, for it will be seen to depend not so much upon the insertion of any particular word or thought as on the arrangement of the words and thoughts which come naturally. For example, consider the following arrangements:

At Oxford Johnson resided during about three years.

During about three years Johnson resided at Oxford.

Johnson resided during about three years at Oxford.

Johnson resided at Oxford during about three years.

Of these four sentences the last might be said to have the most natural order. But the first was used by Macaulay, for the reason that Oxford had been the subject last spoken of. *Johnson* could not well have served for connective, for *Johnson* is spoken of throughout the essay. *During about three years* would have been proper only after something which had brought in the idea of time spent at various places. So, by a manipulation of clauses so as to bring to the beginning a word or thought used before, we have here a well-connected sentence.¹

It will not be difficult to arrange your sentences so as to follow the principle here indicated. Ask yourself with each sentence, What is the idea that we have already in mind, the idea from which this sentence goes forward? Then by putting that idea in the beginning you may manage an easy transition.

As to the second means, there is one point to be noted, namely, the proper place of the word *this*. *This* is a pronoun which serves generally to indicate some words expression, or idea that has gone before, and as such it is a very useful and common connective. Where it is so used, it would seem from the ideas we already have of connection that it should come well toward the beginning of the sentence. Such sentences as the following have to my mind a clumsy appearance:

"The Parliament, however, had its doubts of this."—
Matthew Arnold: *Essays in Criticism*, p. 43.

The same thing may be said of *that*:

"Surplusage! he will dread that, as the runner on his muscles."—Walter Pater: *Appreciations*, p. 16.

Doubtless the two demonstratives were put in just their positions for some reason; but as far as connection is con-

¹ It stands at the beginning of a paragraph, so that it serves also as paragraph connection.

cerned they are not eminently useful. My own feeling is of going on with the subject and being jerked back. If the demonstrative had been followed by some noun, the effect, in the first case at least, would be better. And had they come before the verb the flow of the sentence would have been easier.

Concerning the use of conjunctions or phrases which serve as such, there is not much to be said—they come to the pen naturally enough; the chief task here is of criticism rather than of construction. One must use the right connective, not use the same one too often; and so forth. It may be added that although some conjunctions must come at the beginning of the sentence or clause for which they are the connectives, others may come in other places. Thus *and*, *for*, *but* come at the beginning, while *also*, *therefore*, *however* usually come after a few words¹ to which they give a certain emphasis. You can illustrate the matter yourself: the effect is best noticed by reading aloud.

As in paragraph connection, we must remember that it is not always necessary to express connection formally. Our older writers, whose constructions were much looser than those of the best prose to-day, ran along easily with *and*, *for*, and *but*, much as one does in continued conversation. Nowadays the great masters of style seem to have largely dropped the practice of formal connection. Lewis on the Paragraph (p. 178) gives an interesting table showing something of the use of connective conjunctions by English authors. Ascham, Spenser, and Walton connect about half their sentences with conjunctions.² In Gibbon,

¹ Such is, I believe, the best present usage. *Therefore* may be found at the beginning of a sentence, especially in earlier prose; and there are plenty of modern examples of *however* in the same place, usually with a sort of adverbial meaning.

² So far as the table goes, of course. It is based on 300 sentences from each author.

Johnson, Macaulay the proportion runs from $\frac{1}{20}$ with the first to $\frac{1}{2}$ with the last. Modern usage is not uniform, however; De Quincey and Coleridge are carefully connected, whereas in Emerson and Holmes the connection is much more rarely expressed.

96. Proportion. Next to Unity and Connection we must think of the Canon of Proportion in its relation to sentence structure. Proportion we already understand to be the indication by the manipulation of the form, of the comparative importance of different parts of the subject-matter. Like the other Canons it has its relation to the sentence as to larger units of thought. Its main character we have already discussed; its relation to the sentence is largely the question of emphasis. How are we to obtain emphasis where we want it? If we are able always to place important words so as to be especially emphatic, we shall have done a good deal toward obtaining a good Proportion.

That the beginning and the end of a sentence are the emphatic places, so that it is well to put important words either at the beginning or at the end, is probably one of the best known of all devices of Rhetoric. I need not point out its advantages: it is clearer and more forcible; perhaps, also, it is simpler, for we are so accustomed to expecting that the beginning and the end will have the important words that the structure has also a certain Simplicity.

It is, however, to be noted that it seems to be generally understood by writers on the subject that "beginning" and "end" are not to be taken in an absolutely literal sense. If we have to use some forced expression to get the important words where we want them, we may be sure that all is not right. "At the beginning," says Minto,¹ "they may

¹ *Manual of English Prose Literature*, p. 9.

be preceded by qualifying clauses, and at the end may be followed by unemphatic appendages that are not of a nature to distract attention." In a long sentence this principle will generally apply; the shorter the sentence the more necessary to attain the absolute beginning and end. Wendell¹ gives as an example of the importance of the end and the beginning of the sentence one written by himself. He had written first, "Be sure that your sentences end with words that deserve the distinction you give them." On revising he saw that the sentence completely violated the principle it expressed. He therefore changed it to, "End with words that deserve distinction," which makes an excellently succinct and illustrative rule. But here it is clear that it is the very beginning and the very end that are the important places; in a longer sentence Minto's remark would be applicable.

The general principle that the beginning and the end are the important places is a good one to follow, at least in a general way. It is well to notice one point, however: anything in which this principle is constantly regarded, anything in which every beginning and every end are emphatic, gets for itself a certain character which seems to me to be going out of favor nowadays. When it occurs along with a comparatively short sentence structure it is apt to give rather a discrete, detached, almost disjointed effect. And even with a longer sentence it is apt to have an effect somewhat monotonous. The invariable stress at the end of the sentence gives a sort of sentence rhythm which, in time, becomes rather tiresome. The constantly emphatic sentence-ending, never carried out entirely even by Macaulay, is now rather out of favor in connected writing, or perhaps only out of fashion.

There are a few minor points worth mentioning.

¹ *English Composition*, p. 103.

1. If succeeding clauses or sentences end with the same word, the emphatic place in the second and later sentences is not at the end, but just before the repeated expression. For instance:

"The truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth."

"That government of the people, by the people, and for the people."

"They . . . attempt to do what they really cannot do." —Newman: *The Idea of a University*, p. 78.

Even when the word repeated does not come at the end of a clause the effect is much the same:

"It must be confessed, will be confessed, there is no refuge from confession but suicide,—and suicide is confession." —Webster: *Speech in the White Murder Case*.

"If it were not so, all but a very few men would be shut out from the happiness of all men." —Matthew Arnold: *Essays in Criticism*, p. 4.

2. The deliberate use of sentences ending with the same phrase is a device sometimes met with, especially in oratory:

"Can you remove that distrust? That it exists cannot be denied. That it is an evil cannot be denied. That it is an increasing evil cannot be denied." —Macaulay: *Speech of March 2, 1831, on the Reform Bill*.

More common is the corresponding figure in which succeeding sentences begin with the same phrase; it is called anaphora, which, accurately speaking, means a repetition of word or phrase, but not necessarily at the beginning of the sentence. A very familiar instance of sustained anaphora may be found in Hebrews, xi.

3. It has often been considered best not to end a sentence with an unimportant word like a preposition or a pronoun. If the pronoun, for instance, be emphatic, it may very well be at the end: "Finding no one else to do it, he did it himself." But a preposition is very rarely an emphatic word, and a pronoun is not apt to be, so that the rule woul..

apply in most cases. Usage is altering in the matter. Perhaps with the desire of avoiding too constant emphasis in sentence-ending, a good many modern writers have a considerable number of sentences ending with pronoun or preposition.¹

Another way of obtaining emphasis is by Inversion. You will often note the device in prose that is slightly elevated; if often used in ordinary prose, it will probably seem affected. There is so much looseness, comparatively speaking, to English word-order that sometimes you may not be able to invert with good effect, for it may not always be obvious just what has been inverted. But, as a rule, an Inversion will be noticeable, and the effect will be to give emphasis.

In the following the italicized words (the italics are mine) are rendered emphatic by inversion:

"When, then, a number of persons come forward, not as politicians, not as diplomatists, lawyers, traders, or speculators, but with the one object of advancing Universal Knowledge, *much* we may allow them to sacrifice,—ambition, reputation, leisure, comfort, party interests, gold; *one* thing they may not sacrifice,—knowledge itself."—Newman: *Idea of a University*, p. 23.

97. Long Sentences and Short. Freeman, the historian, once gave a compendium of rhetorical teaching in the words, "Write short sentences," which he seemed to think was the only advice possible or necessary. There is a sort of brusque common sense to the counsel, which is in itself of much the same character as his description of university teaching of Literature as "chatter about Shelley." Certainly there exists in the popular mind the idea that short sentences are on the whole better than long ones. And to this idea, as to a similar notion to the effect that words of Old English stock are to be preferred to all others, there is

¹ I suppose Macaulay may have, say, 5 per cent of such sentence-endings; Ruskin, Newman, Matthew Arnold, probably three times as many.

a good deal of basis, although it is very often crude, and unintelligently held.

There have been a number of interesting studies made recently on the subject of sentence length in English.¹ For one thing it has been found that the average sentence length of a good writer is a thing more or less constant. Sherman, investigating the sentences of Macaulay, found that in the *Essays* the average was about 23 words. Turning to the *History of England*, he found not only that the average there was 23 +, but that taking ten thousand sentences at a time it was about the same for each ten thousand. When he considered the averages by the thousand sentences, there were more of 23 + and 24 + than of any other length. It has also been shown by the same scholar (*loc. cit.*) that the average sentence length of English writers has materially decreased in the last two centuries. Men write shorter sentences than before. There are still those who habitually write long and intricate sentences, but on the whole the tendency is to be shorter. It would not seem, however, that our best writers hold to a very short sentence length. As far as data exist, the chief writers of short sentences are Macaulay, Dickens, George Eliot, Emerson, whose sentences average less than 25 words. On the other hand, Ruskin, Matthew Arnold, Walter Pater, Cardinal Newman, have a sentence average of more than 30, the last two in fact generally run above 40.

So much for the facts as far as we know them. As to the inferences, the rules, if any, the ideas to be got from them, each man must find out what to do for himself, for each man's case is peculiar. If it be his habit to write long and involved sentences, he will do well to read Macaulay and practise breaking his own sentences into shorter ones. If he make a sort of choppy, staccato conglomeration of short sentences, let him turn to Newman and learn to com-

¹ Following L. A. Sherman: *Analytics of Literature*, ch. xix.

bine them into longer ones. And whatever kind he writes he must, as will appear later, mingle short and long together, or his writing will become monotonous.

In the greater number of cases, however, the advice to write shorter sentences, if not short ones, will be found useful, at least for the sake of practice. There are several kinds of long sentences which are often met with in the work of a beginner. First, there is what, except for the punctuation and capitals, is really a number of sentences without any grammatical coherence. Such a sentence should be divided into its constituent parts, and then perhaps rearranged. There then is the long sentence, into which (defiant of any notion of unity) the writer has hurled a whole paragraph, often being correct enough as to grammar, but making a very confused and ill-proportioned combination. Sentences of this sort must be entirely remodelled. Lastly, there is the long sentence which is correctly arranged and in good proportion, with which the only fault to find is that, where there are many of them, it gives a heavy effect, and is often difficult to understand. On the other hand, the too frequent use of the very short sentence is not so often attended by the dangers of bad grammar, confusion, disproportion, abstruseness. Its chief difficulty is that it generally sounds ill; crude, abrupt, ill digested, often infantile. So between the two the better advice is that of Freeman. There are probably more men whose faults will be cured by trying to write shorter sentences than will get good out of trying to write longer ones. Be this as it will, you want to understand not what most men want, but what you want.

98. Loose Sentences and Periodic. Another distinction made in sentences is between the Periodic and the Loose. A periodic sentence is one in which the grammatical construction is incomplete until the end, or, less precisely, one in which the limiting clauses are introduced before the terms which they limit. The loose sentence is one in which there

is not this suspense. The periodic sentence is exhibited very fully in De Quincey and strongly advocated by Herbert Spencer in his essay on *The Philosophy of Style*, already referred to, 45. Spencer is of the opinion that a style largely periodic is superior to one that is looser, he would call it the "direct style," he regards it as enabling an economy of attention on the part of the reader, while a looser style he holds to be rather more appropriate to the uncultivated mind. The following is of interest:

"A greater grasp of mind is required for the ready comprehension of thoughts expressed in the direct manner, where the sentences are in any wise intricate. To recollect a number of preliminaries stated in elucidation of a coming idea, and to apply them all to the formation of it when suggested, demands a good memory and considerable power of concentration. To one possessing these, the direct method will mostly seem the best; while to one deficient in them it will seem the worst. Just as it may cost a strong man less effort to carry a hundredweight from place to place at once than by a stone at a time, so to an active mind it may be easier to bear along the qualifications of an idea and at once rightly form it when named than to first imperfectly conceive such idea and then carry back to it, one by one, the details and limitations afterward mentioned. While, conversely, as for a boy, the only possible mode of transferring a hundredweight is that of taking it in portions; so, for a weak mind, the only possible mode of forming a compound conception may be that of building it up by carrying separately its several parts."—*The Philosophy of Style*, § 28.

All of which we need not argue here. It will be enough to point out that whatever be the advantages of a periodic style Spencer himself uses only an approximation to it, while De Quincey, who is probably the most systematically periodic writer we have, often made difficult reading, and was indeed led to various eccentricities by the same turn of mind that led him to his ordinary practice.

On the other hand, there can be little doubt that the loose structure leads easily to habits of construction which are almost slipshod. The ordinary structure of conversation is loose, for the reason that, as a rule, we do not know just what we are going to say, but modify our idea and make it more exact as we go along and hear how it sounds. One of the most common conversational usages is a participial or relative clause tacked on at the end. This may be observed in the work of Pater, who at one time strove in various ways to give his writing the flexibility and representative character of conversation.

"Dryden, with the characteristic instinct of his age, loved to emphasize the distinction between poetry and prose, the protest against their confusion with each other coming with somewhat diminished effect from one whose poetry was so prosaic. In truth his sense of prosaic excellency affected his verse rather than his prose, which is not only fervid, richly figured, poetic, as we say, but vitiated, all unconsciously, by many a scanning line. Setting up correctness, that humble merit of prose, as the central literary excellence, he is really a less correct writer than he may seem, still with an imperfect mastery of the relative pronoun."—*Appreciations*, p. 3.

These three sentences illustrate a common conversational usage. It may be a question whether written style gains by such borrowings from spoken language. That matter, however, is relative; some subjects admit or call for a more conversational style than others.

Returning to the question of periodic or loose sentences, it may be said that it is interesting chiefly from the critical standpoint. De Quincey's periodic structure was much in keeping with his whole way of thought, and Pater's loose structure is very characteristic of his way of thought. Now it is certainly possible for one who admires the succinct, definite effect of the periodic sentence to modify his style in that direction, or for one who likes the more familiar,

easy-going way to gain something there. But when it comes to giving hints for general practice I do not think much will be gained by practising one kind or the other.

99. Balanced Sentences. One kind of sentence often mentioned by rhetoricians is the Balanced Sentence. A balanced sentence is one in which two clauses seem to balance each other through similar arrangement of the grammatical parts. "After long inquiry and patient investigation" is a balance as far as it goes. "His ambition impelled him in one direction, but his diffidence dragged him in the other" is a balanced sentence. In its arrangement of clauses balance resembles parallel construction, but parallel construction usually arranges several clauses as if side by side, connected by the punctuation, while a balance, as it were, hangs two clauses one on each side of a conjunction or its equivalent. The reason why the balanced sentence was selected from a great number of typical sentence structures was, I take it, that it had been a favorite with the writers of the eighteenth century, and that it was used with excellent effect by Macaulay. In itself the balanced sentence has its advantages, but in spite of them all it is not much used at present.

The earliest history of the balanced sentence I am not familiar with; the structure may doubtless be found very far back. It appears in great exuberance in the work of John Lyly (1554–1606), more particularly in the two volumes of *Euphues*, but also in his plays. Where he caught the idea is not now important; he certainly made use of it frequently and produced balanced sentences of great elaboration, adding to the balance a kind of curious alliteration which was greatly admired. Here are some sentences from Lyly which will exemplify the point:

"No service, Euphues, but that you keep silence, until I have uttered my mind; and secrecy when I have unfolded my meaning."—*Euphues* (ed. Arber), p. 80.

"I can neither remember our miseries without grief, nor redress our mishaps without groans."—*Ib.*, p. 106.

"Youths that were wont to carry devices of victory upon their shields now engrave posies of love on their rings."—*Campaspe*, IV. iii.

This mode of writing was thought very admirable, and was imitated by various contemporaries, especially Nash and Greene, of whom the latter produced the following masterpiece, in which we have not only balance, but parallel construction:

"But let their love be never so slight, and their fancy never so fickle, yet they will be counted as constant if vows may cloak their vanity or tears be taken for truth: if prayers, protestations, and pilgrimages might be performances of promises, then the maid should have mountains that hath but molehills; treasure that hath but trash; faith that hath but flattery; truth that hath but trifles; yea, she should enjoy a trusty lover, that is glad of a trothless lechour."—Greene: *Works*, ii. 134.

But Euphuism with its balanced sentences and other devices was only a fashion and ran its course very quickly. It probably had an influence on English prose in the direction of care for structure and for euphony, but as far as its particular characteristics were concerned it died out very quickly. And as to the balanced sentence, it is not for half a century or so that we find many examples, and then in the essays of Abraham Cowley (1618–1667). With him the balance became one of the recognized elegancies of style for two hundred years or more. Its great master in the eighteenth century was Johnson, by whom it was employed so frequently as to be one of the most marked features of his weighty and dignified, if somewhat ponderous, style. Afterwards it proved to be a form well suited to the thought of Macaulay, because it was so good a medium for antithesis. He also used it where there was no antithesis:

"Now it does not appear to us to be the first object that

people should always believe in the established religion or be attached to the established government. A religion may be false. A government may be oppressive. And whatever support governments give to false religions, or religion to oppressive governments, we consider as a clear evil."¹

Later masters of style hardly use the balance at all except in a simple way. It is really rather an artificial form, and the writers of the present are generally aiming at a natural style. It has its advantages; like parallel construction it is an aid to clearness, and in itself it gives a sort of pleasure. But it has its drawbacks too; it is apt to become merely conventional, unless used with caution it is monotonous, and it offers many temptations to wander from the path of absolute sincerity.

100. Variety in Sentence Structure. The Canons of Selection and Sequence are not of especial import in sentence structure; we have already got such an idea of them as shows that they are not among the things one must have in mind in writing good sentences, so far at least as the sentences themselves are concerned. But the Canon of Variety, a principle to which we have so far given but passing attention, is one which is now of some importance. If we do not always have it in mind in writing,—and the aim is really to write without any principles at all definitely in mind,—if it be not always in mind, it should at least always be a sort of subconscious influence.

For it would seem as if there were no form of sentence structure which, if constantly repeated, did not become wearisome. If you cultivate a comparatively short sentence and use it unrelieved by something longer, your writing will lack flow and even movement and harden into a sort of trivial sputter. If you manage to use long sentences creditably, and use nothing else, your readers will find it hard not to think you ponderous and long-winded. If you in-

¹ Quoted by Minto : *Manual*, p. 87.

dulge a fancy for the balance to any extent, you will seem artificial. If you try always to make your endings emphatic, you will lose the effect you are aiming at by the monotony. Connection you need not be much afraid of, but even here too great insistence leads to particular usages and favorite mannerisms. In fact any device when employed so often as to become noticeable loses its force. It is a little strange: one would say that if these ways of writing sentences were good ways, if they were really the best ways of expressing this or that, it would matter little if the reader should become aware of them, nay, even that it would be for the better that he should become aware of them. But it would seem that such is not the case; a writer with marked peculiarities of sentence structure is almost always held guilty of mannerism.

In practice the matter need not trouble us much; we need only to be on our guard in looking over our work. Really one rarely uses this or that sentence form consciously; one has the possibilities in mind, and the idea takes sometimes this form, sometimes that, so unless we have a particular bias in some direction there is not very much to fear. When we revise what we have written, especially if we read our work over aloud, we can be on the alert to notice any monotony and to correct it. The Canon of Variety is of more import in critical work than in work that aims to be constructive.

101. Sentence Structure and Modes of Thought. Hitherto we have always tried to recognize whatever connection there might be between the idea and the mode of expression. We have dealt with Rhetoric as much from the standpoint of the man who was thinking of what he meant to write as from that of the man who was writing of what he had already thought about. Or rather, as it may seem, we have passed from one standpoint to the other,—for the study of kinds of composition involved mostly the manipulation

of our ideas,—and now in this chapter on sentence structure we have thought entirely of the mode of expression.

We have already seen, however, over and over again, that the expression can never be considered alone, nor can the thought be considered alone. The idea and the style are so inextricably connected in good writing that whenever we think of one alone, or of the other, it is really by a kind of artificial abstraction. In Narration or Description we had the question of putting into form what we were thinking of, and now we shall find, even in sentence structure, that there is something to do with the idea as well as with the expression. It would probably go too far to attempt to show that certain forms of thought always demand certain forms of the sentence, although different forms of sentence structure have more or less of briskness, inertia, stateliness, or what not, and so are appropriate to this or that subject-matter; still, not to press the idea too far, we can easily see that some connection there is.

Most easy is it to observe the fact in a manner chiefly critical. Suppose we compare the sentence structure of De Quincey and that of Macaulay. The sentences of the latter are, on the whole, concise and clear-cut, never cumbersome, often antithetic, generally of manifest effectiveness, full of mannerisms. These are all matters of sentence structure, and yet such as they are they are very appropriate to the brisk, definite, practical, imposing, successful, opinionated Macaulay. De Quincey, on the other hand, writes his sentences very much longer, and fills them with modifiers and limiting clauses; they are carefully conducted to a periodic close, they are rhythmical and rolling in sound—in a word, they are characteristic of the philosophic dreamer, the man who lived in intellectual conception, the disorderly, extravagant, orating man of letters and of thought. Surely Macaulay could not ever have written sentences like De Quincey's, nor could De Quincey have so aroused himself as to write like Macaulay. This is only one instance, but

if you study the sentence structure of Carlyle say in *Sartor Resartus*, of Emerson in his *Essays*, of Walter Pater in any of the writings of the last few years of his life, you will find further exemplification, as indeed you may find it elsewhere.

Even sentence structure can be representative; your sentence structure may represent your personality, if you like, as well as other matters. It must be confessed that not every personality constructs for itself a garment so well fitting as those we have been looking at. It takes a powerful, a striking character to work out its expression in the not very ductile material at the service of the writer. Most people can no more design a garment of style than they can design a garment of any other kind. As with clothes so with writing: the average man follows the fashion, the reason being that he is an average man.

I would not advise you to search about in your minds to see what forms of sentence structure may be most appropriate to your own particular form of originality. But to tell the truth the advice would be useless and needless: if you have any originality, it will find its own mode of expression in due time; if you have not any originality, you will have to settle down into some ordinary form of expression like almost everybody else.

PART SIX.

ARGUMENTATION.

102. The Place of Argumentation in Rhetoric. Before we bring our work to an end we must have a few words on Argumentation. Here I shall be able to give you but a short treatment of the question, as in the case of sentence structure, although not for the same reason. Sentence structure we considered shortly, because the subject did not lend itself readily to constructive treatment. Such is not the case with Argumentation; it may be excellently treated in constructive fashion, and, indeed, has lately been so treated by G. P. Baker,¹ in such a fashion, too, that it is hardly worth while to touch it at all here. For other reasons, however, Argumentation holds a somewhat peculiar position in our study.

Just how far Argumentation belongs to Rhetoric, and just how much Rhetoric belongs to Argumentation, is rather a nice question. Certainly a good part of Argumentation seems of very different nature from the things we have been considering so far. An argument always consists of reasoning, and the Science of Reasoning is usually held to be Logic. If, therefore, we include a treatment of Argumentation in our work, we must include a study of Logic, a piece of work quite as extensive as all that we have gone over already. And further, Argumentation, beside reasoning up to the truth of a proposition, aims also at persuasion, at gaining the reader's assent. And Persuasion seems to depend

¹ *The Principles of Argumentation.*

upon so many conditions quite extra-rhetorical. It appeals so largely to the emotions,—how largely is eloquence a part of persuasion!—and despite the example of Aristotle it seems impossible to include in Rhetoric a study of the human emotions. There is certainly a great deal to Argumentation which we cannot think of handling in a book like this. On the other hand, Argumentation is certainly Discourse of some kind, it is Expression in writing or speaking, it certainly comes within our idea of Rhetoric (p. 2?).

We cannot very well avoid treating the manner, at least, of Argumentation. Nor can we very well avoid handling the subject-matter; we have hitherto spent our time on thought as well as on expression, and there seems no good reason for not doing so here. And lastly, Argumentation has always been considered by rhetoricians as a part of their topic,—by some, from Aristotle to Whately, the main part. It would almost seem that we had before us this dilemma: either to include in our work a system of Logic and a treatment of the emotions and the incentives to human action, or to omit something that has a reasonable and prescriptive claim to consideration.

One reason for this curious position of Argumentation lies in its subject-matter. Its subject-matter is not only different from that of the first three kinds of composition, but it is of a different order. They dealt with terms; Argumentation deals with propositions, which are combinations of terms. Now all terms are to be handled in somewhat similar fashion; we have seen how Narration and Description blended with each other (16), how certain processes were common to Description and Exposition (p. 68), how even Narration and Exposition had their common points (p. 15); in each case the aim was to give the reader the full scope and meaning, the extension and implication, of some term. But Argumentation is something different; it concerns the relation of propositions. It is one thing to understand that A is thus and thus and B so

and so, whatever A or B may represent, whether event, thing, or general idea; but it is something different to see that *if A is thus and thus B must be so* and so.

We have already seen that one understands the nature of the reasoning that leads to truth by the Science of Logic. We may ask, in thinking of what has just been said, Is there not some special science which leads one to understand the processes whereby we grasp the scope and meaning of terms, their extension and implication? In other words, if Logic be the science which gives the basis of Argumentation, is there not some science which gives the basis to Narration, Description, Exposition?

Looking back over the matters you have already studied, you will see that some of them are certainly logical in character. Classification (18), for instance, depending upon Generalization (23) and leading up to Definition and Division (26)—all these processes are subsidiary to the processes of reasoning, and treatment of them may be found in any text-book on Logic.

These processes, however, have chiefly to do with Exposition; we have still those processes which have to do with appreciating the nature of some event, some character, some scene—in other words, the processes characteristic of Description and Narration. Here we seem at once to be nearing the ground of Psychology; perception, discrimination, comparison, imagination, association—such processes as these are certainly needful in our appreciating particular things, in our apprehending particular terms, and these things are all treated of by Psychology.

On the other hand, it may be supposed that Psychology is interested in these processes, and others too of like enough nature, as processes, without regard to the objects of them, and that we can hardly imagine any Art founded upon such a consideration. We have been looking at objects with a certain purpose,—dimly apparent perhaps already,—namely, the purpose of being strongly impressed by something in the

object, and of rendering that impression to the reader; we were impressed by sound, form, color, action, motive, desire, by any of the phenomena of active life or passive circumstance, and we wished to convey the impression to others. And why? Because we thought it worth conveying. And setting aside the conveyance for the sake of information, which we have treated only in a subsidiary way, we have usually thought the impression worth conveying because it was interesting, attractive, amusing, terrible, beautiful. Now the science which treats of these matters is that ill-defined science called *Esthetics*.

By such considerations we may see that the Science and Art of Rhetoric, so far as concerns the treatment of Terms, have dependence partly upon the principles of Logie, partly upon those of *Esthetics*, partly upon those of Psychology. But so far I have alluded specifically to none of these sciences. I have assumed that everybody knew in a general way something about generalization, classification, definition, division; about what was interesting, awful, grotesque, beautiful; about the more general processes of perception, imagination, discrimination, comparison, association. So they do; and they also, in a general way, know something about Reasoning.

Hence, to bring this protracted introduction to an end, as we proceeded in a very rule-of-thumb fashion, so far as science was concerned, in treating of the first three kinds of composition, so may we proceed in treating of the fourth. Everybody does know something of reasoning; we may proceed from that. And as in our First Part we had no thought of teaching *how* to generalize and classify, *how* to perceive what was beautiful or interesting, *how* to compare or imagine, so we shall not try to teach how to reason. We will go on much in the way we have been going. Assuming that you have something of an idea of the processes necessary to an argument, I will point out the means and

methods which best exercise the thought in arguing, and which offer best practice in the expression of one's argument.

Only, since we have here a topic which is really as large as all the other kinds of composition put together, since we have a matter which should really have a book to itself, if we would treat it on the scale on which we handled the other kinds of composition, even although argumentative discipline is really of slight worth unless it be thorough and systematic, I shall give but a slight treatment, not for a moment thinking to offer any discipline which shall sufficiently exercise one in argumentative writing, but aiming merely at an indication of the main points of the subject.

I. PROCESSES PRELIMINARY TO THE ARGUMENT.

103. Before the Argument Proper. In the first place, in considering a question with a view to argument you want to think whether you have something that really requires argument. We have already seen (25) how a proposition may be dealt with by Exposition; if the truth or falsity of the proposition be admitted, it becomes practically a general term and may be expounded as such. The question should be, Is the truth or falsity of this proposition, when it is rightly understood, a matter of question? Very possibly not, in which case the necessity for argument disappears. It is not easy to give examples of such propositions that will make the case as clear as I think your own recollection can make it. Have you never, especially in earlier days, conducted a heated argument which finally wound up with, "Oh, well, if *that* was what you meant, any one would agree with you. But that wasn't what I thought you meant"? Be sure, then, that your proposition is rightly understood at the start, for it may save you trouble.

But this phrase "rightly understood" opens another

matter. The terms of the proposition and its general purport must, as we have seen, be rightly understood, at least in the judgment of the parties to the discussion. If the terms of the proposition are understood in different senses, you can come to no real agreement. Now the effort to have the terms of the proposition and its purport clearly understood calls for Exposition, or it may be Description or Narration, and then this prior explanation may call for argument on its own account. Just at present we see it often stated that "the Monroe doctrine compels the United States" to take such and such grounds. If we wish to argue the question, we must first be quite sure about the Monroe doctrine, and the settling this matter may call for as much argument as the question itself. In legal cases it is often a great part of the argument to show that this or that expression in a statute or an instrument has this or that meaning. The meaning being admitted, the way may be quite clear. So, for instance, with the language of our Constitution; so, indeed, in government under any written instrument. Exposition especially is almost always implied or expressed (24), and where it must be expressed the argument will often take the form, "Such and such an exposition is the correct one."

But it must often happen, of course, that when Exposition has done all its work, or Narration or Description, as the case may be, there will still remain difference of opinion concerning the proposition which is clearly understood and agreed upon. It now becomes a matter of importance to make sure exactly what is to be proved and who is to prove it. That is, we must determine the issue and see where lies the burden of proof.

On this first point it is not very easy to give any explicit rule. A good analysis of the topic is the first requisite, and a good judgment comes next to see just where argument is necessary. A year or more ago there was a good deal of argument on the subject of the annexation of the Sandwich

Islands. As in every important public matter there was immense argumentative activity in the newspapers and in the magazines. It was argued that Hawaii was at the cross-roads of the Pacific; that Hawaii was already largely American; that our trade with Hawaii was immensely profitable. On the other hand, it was argued that Hawaii could never be admitted to the Union as a state; that the whole matter was being engineered for selfish objects; that the purposes of the United States would be best served by the establishment of a protectorate. There were many more points presented on either side, some of them very strongly, so that I almost changed my mind after each article. The scope of the question was so great that it was extremely difficult to see just what was vital to the argument and what irrelevant. The same thing occurs every four years when the tariff is discussed; there are multitudes of newspaper articles and campaign speeches, but not many people change their opinions, some, doubtless, through party prejudice, but some also because nine tenths of the writers and speakers are unable to define the issue in such a way as to meet with general acceptance.

And after the issue has been defined you must see who has to prove it. This matter is easier. It is generally assumed that whoever advances a new theory or idea, whoever sustains a position contrary to what is generally accepted, should demonstrate its soundness. So usually if you are endeavoring to prove any point, the burden of proof will rest on you. If, however, you can show the dependence of your idea on something else clearly understood and accepted, you shift the burden to your opponent. Thus in the days of the anti-slavery arguments the defenders of slavery North and South might have found it difficult to defend to the satisfaction of all an institution so repugnant to modern ideas. But they succeeded in connecting their cause with the Constitution, which all Americans acknowledged, and compelled the Abolitionists to show why the

constitutional view should not obtain in this case as in others. The Abolitionists were even compelled to disown the Constitution in this particular case; in fact they called it a "compact with hell."

Before proceeding to argue, then, look just to see whether argument is necessary, look next to see if this or that view of the terms in the case will carry the day, define the issue carefully, and be sure you see where lies the burden of proof.

II. PROCESSES OF ARGUMENT.

104. Refutation. It is almost always necessary at some time to show either to yourself or to others the falsity of a position contrary to your own. This is Refutation. It does not necessarily come before the direct argument; that is a matter of judgment. If you think your hearers are not disposed to the negative of your view, you need not trouble to refute until occasion arises; if, on the other hand, your hearers are prepossessed against your view, refutation may well come first. You must be careful, however, not to become too much interested in this fascinating branch of the subject. It is a common feeling to distrust the positive work of one who shows himself most at home on the negative side. I read, for instance, of Lessing that 'his skill in disputation is extraordinary, and this skill is in fact his great temptation, for he cannot resist proving the contrary of every proposition which an opponent sets up, with a precision which is too good to be true.'¹ "Too good to be true," because it seems as though a man who is devoted to refutation is actuated by the very human desire for victory rather than by a zeal for truth.

A great part of Refutation is such that no valuable general directions can be given. You must see clearly the purport

¹ Bosanquet: *History of Aesthetic*, p. 223.

of the opposing position for one thing; it may present itself in some specious form. You must examine the reasoning which leads to it; you may find illogical conclusions, or, as the term is, *non sequiturs*. And if these means fail you must examine your adversary's premises; perhaps you may not agree in fundamental principles. But such refutation is of much the same character as the critical revision you must give your own argument. I can mention especially only one way of looking at an opposing argument which is often very effective.

If for a moment you assume the position of your opponent to be well taken, you may subsequently show that it leads surely to a position which cannot be sustained, or that it leads to one of two positions neither of which is tenable. Or, supposing that some position is undoubtedly sound, you may be able to show that it invalidates the theory it is meant to substantiate.

Of these three forms of Refutation the first is called the Reductio ad Absurdum. It is sometimes used to show that an opponent's position necessitates something ridiculous. Thus Macaulay figures out from Sadler's *Law of Population* that in "the back settlements of America or New South Wales there will be families of 1,762,500 children." But it is not necessary that the conclusion should be ridiculous: it need only be obviously untenable. Thus Huxley, in his first lecture on Evolution, states first that "there are only three hypotheses which have been entertained, or which well can be entertained, respecting the past history of nature." Of these three the third is the so-called "hypothesis of evolution." Clearly if the first and second theories can be shown to be unfounded there will be a strong presumption created for the third. He states the first theory and ends as follows:

"And inasmuch as, under these circumstances, there need be no limit to the propagation of animals and plants, it is clear that the consistent working out of the uniformi-

tarian idea might lead to the conception of the eternity of the world. Not that I mean to say that either Hutton or Lyell held this conception—assuredly not; they would have been the first to repudiate it. Nevertheless, the logical development of their arguments tends directly toward this hypothesis.¹

The second process is called the Dilemma; it is illustrated in the following from Newman's *Idea of a University*:

"I say, then, that if in a certain university, so called, the subject of Religion is excluded, one of two conclusions is inevitable,—either, on the one hand, that the province of Religion is very barren of real knowledge, or, on the other hand, that in such university one special and important branch of knowledge is omitted. I say, the advocate of such an institution must say *this*, or he must say *that*: he must own, either that little or nothing is known about the Supreme Being, or that his seat of learning calls itself what it is not."

The third development I will call for the moment the Boomerang, for it consists in turning an argument against the maker of it, it hoists the engineer with his own petard. I would, however, use a more ordinary name were I acquainted with the true technical term. It is not easy to offer a concise illustration of this mode of refutation, for it is apt to be too extended to quote conveniently. You may find a number of examples in Macaulay's essay on *Sadler's Law of Population*, an essay which consists almost entirely of refutation, and, indeed, offers illustrations of all three points that I have mentioned. I quote a passage or two, but will leave it to you to find the working out:

"Mr. Sadler gives a long table of all the towns of England and Ireland which, he tells us, irrefragably demon-

¹ I quote from G. P. Baker (*Specimens of Argumentation*, p. 66), a very convenient little volume of selections where good illustrations of all these points may be found.

strates his principle. We assert, and will prove, that these tables are alone sufficient to upset his whole theory."

"To prove this point he quotes Aristotle, Hippocrates, Dr. Short, Dr. Gregory, Dr. Perceval, M. Villermi, Lord Bacon, and Roussean. We will not dispute about it; for it seems quite clear to us that if he succeeds in establishing it he overturns his own theory."

105. Induction and Deduction. When you consider your own position, whether you try first to dispose of an opposing argument or not, you will find that you must depend almost entirely upon your knowledge of the subject, and upon your quickness in perceiving the relation between the special point to be proved and other points which may be either acknowledged facts, or themselves dependent upon further argument. You must prove one thing by another, and the great point is to know the right things and to see the connection that exists between them. No one can really teach you that. There are, however, two general kinds of argument, and the difference between them is well to remember. First, your own position may be a special case of some more general principle; such relations form the subject-matter of what is called Deductive Logic. Or you may have in hand a number of separate facts and desire to establish some general principle by their means; such arguments are dealt with in what is called Inductive Logic. In practice you will find that most arguments combine the two processes. For instance, you may desire to show that the United States should control and manage the telegraph. A rough-and-ready argument says, "The United States manages the Post-office successfully; it should therefore manage the telegraph." But if we run through the real steps of the argument we shall find them to be something like this:

- (1) The United States should control the telegraph; for
- (2) Every nation should control its telegraph; for
- (3) Every nation controls its Post-office; and

(4) Every nation should control such institutions as the Post-office.

But (5) the telegraph is such an institution as the Post-office.

Therefore the propositions (2) and (1).

Here we come first by Deduction from (1) to (2); it's a simple matter, every one would agree to it without Logie. It gives us, however, a general proposition to prove instead of a particular one. To prove it we carry it back to one still more general, namely, (4). So far we have had to do only with Deductive argument; but how shall we proceed? how shall we substantiate proposition (4)?

We may, of course, by the same process carry the argument still further back. But we may also argue the matter in this way:

Great Britain has found it advisable to control the telegraph.

So France, Germany, Austria, etc.

Therefore any nation will find it advisable to control the telegraph; which is practically the same thing as (2) above.

This also is a simple enough argument; any one acquainted with the facts would think of it without studying Inductive Logic.

Indeed the processes of Logie, whether Inductive or Deductive, are, as a rule, obvious enough. The real difficulty lies in their application.

For instance, in our first argument we affirmed that the telegraph was such an institution as the Post-office, and upon that statement depended the validity of our argument. In a way the telegraph is such an institution as the Post-office, but certainly not exactly such an institution; it differs in some respects, and it may be that one of the points of difference may be such as to invalidate the reasoning which led to (1). The telegraph has been successfully operated by private companies over the whole United States; the Post-office has not. That difference may be enough

to invalidate the argument. The telegraph is by no means so constantly and universally used by all classes of people as the Post-office ; the telegraph depends more upon mechanical invention than the Post-office, and such invention is most encouraged in a private enterprise. These differences may be of such a nature as to invalidate the argument. You must know the subject well enough to be able to tell whether a premise like (3) is really sound, or whether its language is such as to lead to error.

So with the second case. You have four, or perhaps more, instances in which it has been found wise for a nation to assume charge of its telegraph. But in spite of that it may be that it would not be wise for every nation to do so, for the United States, let us say. If the nations in question were similar, theoretical, ideal nations, and other nations, including the United States, were of like nature, the argument would be sound. But how different nations are, in character, in government, in political principles. The United States, for instance, has developed very largely through private enterprise; the United States is opposed to the existence of a large office-holding class; the United States government, we may hold, has no powers which are not particularly delegated to it. Such, one might say, are some of the points of difference between the United States and the other nations in question, and such differences may be sufficient to invalidate the Induction.

In fact you will find that Induction and Deduction, although both processes are of value in helping to put your argument into a form in which it is easily criticised, both leave the main strength of the argument to your own knowledge of the subject. But even if your own knowledge be sufficient for the case there are two points in which you will have to be particularly careful. One concerns your reliance on other persons, and the other, we may say, has to do with your reliance on yourself. We will go on with a word or two on Testimony and Fallacy.

106. Testimony. In conducting an argument you will almost always have to depend in some degree upon the statements of others. Sometimes, as when you are giving the results of your own experiments, there will be comparatively little reference to any one else. Sometimes, as when you are discussing some question of public policy, you will have to rely largely upon other men's work. In almost all cases, however, the part played in argument by Testimony is an important one. It may be that you are inclined to accept an opinion upon the authority of some one, it may be that you base your reasoning upon facts stated by somebody else. In either case you rely on testimony.

The theory of testimony, the doctrine of evidence, is something too involved, too complicated, to enter upon here. But one or two bits of practical advice may be given which will be found to cover a good many cases. In the first place you must be definite and certain concerning the nature of your testimony, and especially concerning the authority behind it. In the second place you must be sure that the authority is competent to deal with the question on which he is cited.

The first of these principles is really not much more than taking care, being particular and precise, knowing accurately what you are talking about—a thing very excellent in other matters than Argumentation. I once differed with a student in regard to a statement concerning something in the life of Bismarck. He said that the statement had been made in a book in the university library. I asked what book, but all that he could remember was that it was a green book. This is a ridiculously exaggerated case, I suppose, but inaccuracy in such matters is certainly a very common thing. Now when it comes to books you certainly can be exact. You can be sure of the author, the title, the edition, and the page of whatever you quote, and you can be sure of your quotations by taking proper care. If by any chance you cannot gain access to the book you refer to, you

should let it be understood that you refer to a statement as quoted by somebody else. In regard to the statements of men also you can be fairly exact by taking pains; and sufficient pains you are bound to take both for their sakes and for your own.

In the second place you want to be sure that your authority is authoritative, that he is competent to pronounce upon the matter. People are not very careful here if we may judge from a good many advertisements. One reads, for instance, the statement of Mr. J. S. (accompanied by his portrait), a prominent New York alderman, to the effect that such and such a tonic is the best medicine that can be taken when one becomes weak, nervous, and sleepless from overwork, or prolonged strain on the brain or nerves. The makers of the tonic are of the opinion that "such an unqualified endorsement . . . is information for the people of especial value." But the value of such information, if it can be called such, is somewhat lessened by the fact that aldermen do not as a class have any special knowledge of medicine. Suppose Mr. J. S. were President of the United States, even, would his opinion be so good as that of your family physician? This matter, however, is not so easy as the other. Unless you have made some little study of the question in hand you cannot be sure that you know the standing of this one or that who has written upon it. In questions of Language, for instance, is Max Müller to be preferred to Hermann Paul? In Political Economy would you follow John Stuart Mill or Henry George? In Biology is it Romanes or Weissman who is the better authority? In matters of this kind a layman may be pardoned for erring. But you will remember that although you may not be to blame for an error, your argument may collapse because of it.

In so far as you can, however, you must be sure of just who or what is authority for your statements, and be sure, too, that your authority is good.

107. Fallacies. Certain common errors in reasoning are generalized under the name of Fallacies. To specify them, to treat them separately, would hardly be possible without assuming some knowledge of the logical principles which they contravene. As in a former case, then (67), instead of stating the errors one is liable to make, I will merely try to point out some of the commoner causes that lead one to fall into error. They are chiefly such as may be avoided by due caution. The errors that you fall into because you really know no better are comparatively few. Far greater is the number of errors which you would be likely to detect were the argument put forward by somebody else. It is our own mistakes to which we are all apt to be rather blind.

The two chief cases in which you will be apt to overlook mistakes in reasoning are, first, when you are quite sure that you are right; and, second, when you are quite sure that you are not wrong. There may not seem to be very much difference: but by the first alternative I mean that we are all of us inclined under one circumstance or another to pursue an argument confidently, with no especial feeling against the contrary position, but with sufficient absorption in our own idea to often miss errors that will be obvious to one more impartial; by the second alternative I mean to designate those cases which are often enough called cases of prejudice.

We are all of us to some degree prejudiced; it is a difficult matter to get so clear of circumstance as to come to a question without bias in one direction or another. Most important of all is probably the prejudice of interest and of pride. We are apt to find it hard to see the justice of anything that picks a flaw in our ideas about our family, our religion, our country, or our own ideas as such merely, or of anything that attacks our pleasure, our occupations, our pocket-book. It is not necessary that these important matters should be really endangered; the mere idea is enough to arouse us. Any argument that even theoretically favors

them has a good chance with us; we are pretty sure that it cannot be wrong, although we may not see just how it must be right. Next in importance I take to be the prejudice of habit and of feeling. Any weak spot in a view which we have been taught in youth, in which we have for a good while been accustomed to believe, or which stirs our sympathy and emotion is likely to go unnoticed. So in cases which seem to be of such a sort we must make an extra effort to see if we can possibly be wrong.

On the other hand, the being sure that you are right is, I believe, not so common as the tendency I have just mentioned. It arises chiefly when we have become embarked on any line of thought and are carried cheerfully along by the mere pleasure of active energy, or it may be that the necessity of having some opinion, the habit of always having definite ideas on things, is so strong within us that it unconsciously leads us to accept too quickly some position as sufficiently established, when really it has no definite foundation at all. In neither instance are we so prepossessed against an error in our argument as in cases of prejudice; it may often happen that we don't see a fallacy, in cases of prejudice we practically won't see them.

How, then, to guard against these difficulties? I have no panacea. I can only say that you must think of each question you mean to argue from the points of view we have considered: ask yourself whether it runs along in dangerous conformity with your feelings, your habits, your interests, your pride; ask if you have come to your belief merely for want of a better, or because you were carried along by the mere pleasure of work. If it comes under either of these heads, be careful; it will not be out of place to test your own position by trying to argue the negative.

III. THE EXPRESSION OF AN ARGUMENT.

108. Other Kinds of Composition in Argumentation.

You can easily write something which shall be Argumentation pure and simple—a paragraph, for instance, noting the steps which lead to the establishment of some point. But it is far more common that your argument will express itself largely in bits of Exposition, Description, or Narration. Each separate part of the argument, considered by itself, will be the subject of one of the simpler forms; it is only when their relation to each other comes into question that they become argumentative. So for a good argument you need the other kinds of composition. Still each one is conducted in rather a different way, different in that you will be constantly alive to show the application of the narrative or what not to the point at issue. Thus Webster in the snatches of narration which occur in the speech on the White murder case narrates this and that chain of events, not as matters of independent interest, but with constant bearing upon the argument. Burke in describing the spirit of the American people has always in mind that Parliament must offer conciliation. Newman in expounding the idea of a university never fails to show the bearing of the exposition upon his argument to the effect that Theology must be represented in every true university. For a while, perhaps, a reasoner may affect to present a matter without regard to the argument, but really he cannot do so, for it is only in its relation to the argument that the matter is in place.

109. Qualities of Style. Coming now to the application of whatever we have already learned concerning the

art of expression, we may first consider the Qualities of Style. For just as we may consider the different qualities in handling the different kinds of composition (p. 168), so may we throw some light upon this kind of composition by considering the relation to it of the Qualities of Style. I shall be able only to give you a few words on Clearness, in this respect the most important quality. Argumentation is not a simple matter, and it may be beyond all your efforts to make a particular course of reasoning anything but difficult and abstruse. Force is a quality of the utmost value in Argumentation, but the force of an argument should lie chiefly in the matter, and not so much in the expression. The chief quality in Argumentation is Clearness.

We have already seen various ways (48, 72) in which by manipulating paragraph-structure, illustration, and so on, we could do more or less to make our writing clear. These aids to clearness may be used in any kind of writing; is there anything especially applicable to Argumentation?

We must here make chief mention of a practice, although not applicable to Argumentation alone, already spoken of under the head of the Paragraph (33); namely, the making of an outline beforehand, or, as it is more commonly called in the case of Argumentation, a brief.¹ For this drawing of briefs may be urged all the reasons that were given on pp. 103-106, and the further one that as Argumentation is usually a more difficult and hazardous matter even than Exposition, such a preliminary is all the more necessary. It is so necessary in Argumentation to see clearly just what it is that you allege; you must not spare yourself, you must put your reasoning to the severest test to determine its validity. It may look very poor and thin when you state merely the skeleton of it, stripped of the amplification

¹ This matter deserves far more extended treatment than can be given it here. Mr. Baker has developed the use of the Brief in very useful fashion, as may be seen in his *Specimen Briefs; Specimens of Argumentation*, pp. 1-5; *Principles of Argumentation*, pp. 83-166.

which will make it fluent, embodied, convincing. But you will find it worth while to take the trouble.

In these briefs you want first, in an introduction, to state the question and the reasons for considering it. Then in the main part of the brief you will put the argument, not merely noting heads, but stating each point fully enough to give the idea to one not already acquainted with it. State it in the form of a regular sentence, as, for example, to take an instance used before (p. 333):

Refutation.

1. The argument that the United States should control the telegraph because Great Britain and other nations do so is not conclusive; for

The United States differs from the nations in question in points affecting the matter.

(a) The United States has developed chiefly through private enterprise.

(b) The United States is opposed to the existence of a large office-holding class.

(c) The United States government has only such powers as are delegated by the Constitution.

This illustration is a piece of refutation. Refutation may be given a place by itself in the brief, but if you have but a bit here and a bit there it may find its place in connection with the different parts of the positive argument. After the argument pro and con has been stated you may try in your conclusion to summarize the reasoning.

110. The Canons of Rhetoric. Lastly, what is to be said about our general principles? Which is of the most importance here? Or it may be simpler to inquire which is of the least. It is on the whole not so important to think of Variety and Selection; of more importance are Sequence and Proportion, and, I suppose, Connection and Unity come first. But no one of these canons is of such importance as in Narration or Description, chiefly because of the

different effect usually aimed at in those kinds of composition, the first two being intended for the appreciation, but Argumentation for the understanding.

Unity, however, is important—how important any one will realize who recalls an “informal discussion” where four or five men were all arguing at once. Define the issue and stick to it. It is harder to read an argument than most things; one’s mind lapses more from strict attention, a very little irrelevancy or wandering is enough to make one lose the thread of the reasoning. If you want the reader to follow you, you must keep as closely to the path as you can; don’t step aside after the flowers of ornament or of anything else, for the reader may not find you when you get back.

Next to Unity is Connection. If you have one logically constructed chain of reasoning, you will not find it difficult to make the connections easy and agreeable. More difficult, but more necessary, is it to manage one’s transitions and connections when one is to allege a number of separate reasons, connected with each other only by their connection with the main question. Here you must exercise your ingenuity to manage the matter, for it is really of rather more importance as far as the pleasure and convenience of the reader are concerned than in the previous case.

As to Sequence, you may note, as in the case of Narration (8), that Argumentation is better adapted to expression in language than Exposition or Description. Where you have an argument that is a chain of reasoning, where each point depends upon the point before and leads up to the point following, there the idea will move, will go forward, and so does Language. In such cases, as in Narration, Sequence is a very simple matter. But, as before, if your argument consists of several reasons which attest each one the probability of the point at issue, there is no natural sequence, and it is more necessary to consider the matter.

It is usual to put the most important reasons last and first, the principle being, I suppose, to conciliate the reader at the beginning, to leave him with a good impression at the end, and to cover up the weaker arguments. This rule, however, is not of very great value, for, as a general principle, the weaker arguments are better omitted.

Proportion in Argumentation is not hard to understand. It means economy of effort; it means that the unimportant things are not to catch the reader's attention; it means that the main points are to stand out. But to give a practical example of Proportion I will not extend my treatment of it, and observing (in a subordinate clause) that there is little to say of Variety and Selection in Argumentation, I will bring this slight series of hints on the subject to a close.

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